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INTRODUCTION

Many of the nation's savings and loan associations, as well as the
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC), I are cur
rently under severe financial stress. 2 The Federal Home Loan Bank
1. FSLIC insures both state and federally chartered savings and loan associations.
12 U.S.C. § 1726(a) (1982). Since 1982, FSLIC insures certain federal savings banks as
well. The Gam-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982 (GSDIA), permitted the
conversion of any institution eligible for FSLIC insurance to a federal savings bank. Pub.
L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1471 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). In particular, see
12 U.S.C.. § 1464(i) (1982). These federal savings banks are also insured by FSLIC. 12
U.S.C. § 1464 (1982). In this comment, "association," "institution," and "savings and
loan association" refer to a FSLIC-insured institution. "Bank" refers to an FDIC-insured
institution.
2. Almost one quarter of all savings and loan associations were merged out of exist
ence between 1980 and 1983. S. KIDWELL & R. PETERSON, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
MARKETS AND MONEY 273 (3d ed. 1987). By the mid-1980's, many associations operated
at dangerously low net worth, those operating with less than one percent net worth being
considered on the verge of insolvency. Those operating with between one and three percent
were operating below regulatory net worth requirements. Id. (citing Mahoney & White,
The Thrift Industry in Transition, 71 FED. RESERVE BULL. 137 (1985». Currently, there
are "around 445 insolvent thrift institutions being sued by creditors nationwide for billions
of dollars." Nat'l L.J., March 21, 1988, at 26, col. 4.
FSLIC also is facing a net worth crisis. FSLIC's primary reserves have fallen below
the two billion dollar mark, yet FSLIC insures 3,234 institutions which have more than
$1.1 trillion in total assets and more than nine hundred billion dollars in deposits. Letter
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Board (Board), the federal agency which supervises both the thrift in
dustry and FSLIC, is authorized to appoint FSLIC as the receiver for
insolvent associations. 3 As receiver, FSLIC may liquidate the associa
tion, put it back on a sound footing, merge it with a solvent associa
tion, or create a new association.4
An insolvent savings and loan association, by definition, is unable
to meet all of its liabilities. As the association defaults on its obliga
tions, creditors become entitled to sue, typically on a contract claim. S
In many instances, an association already is in court defending claims
when the Board appoints FSLIC as receiver and places the association
in receivership.6 As receiver, FSLIC steps into the shoes of the associ
ation, takes control of the association's assets, and takes over the asso
ciation's rights and obligations, including the association's obligations
to its insured and non-insured creditors. 7 If FSLIC liquidates the asfrom William J. Anderson (Assistant Comptroller General) to Representative Femand J.
St. Germain and Senator William Proxmire (Mar. 3, 1987) (appearing in GENERAL Ac
COUNTING OFFICE, THRIFT INDUSTRY: THE TREASURY!FEDERAL HOME LoAN BANK
BoARD PLAN FOR FSLIC RECAPITALIZATION, at 1-2 (1987». According to the General
Accounting Office's 1986 FSLIC audit, FSLIC "may have a negative net worth" of more
than three billion dollars. Id. at 1.
3. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(6)(D) (1982).
4. 12 U.S.C. § 1729(b)(I)(A) (1982). FSLIC's present financial status may be ad
versely affecting its ability to meet its statutory obligations. FSLIC reserves are so low that
FSLIC is able to close and liquidate only the weakest associations. Brief of Appellant at 12
n.5, CHG Creditors Comm. v. FSLIC No. 86-3646 (consolidated with Morrison-Knudsen
Co. v. CHG Int'l, Inc., 811 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 1987» (citing Barth, Brumbaugh,
Sauerhaft, & Wang, Implications/or Risk-Taking in the Thrift Industry, CoNTEMP. POL'y
ISSUES 1-6 (1985». "The FSLIC is required to resolve every failure at a cost no greater
than that of liquidation." Beesly & Tracy, The Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corpo
ration, 16 FED. HOME LoAN BANK BOARD J. 13 (April 1983). See also 12 U.S.C.
§ 1729(b)(I)(A)(v) (1982). Thus, if liquidation is the least costly alternative, FSLIC must
pursue it. Liquidation, however, involves a substantial initial outlay of FSLIC funds be
cause FSLIC must pay the insured accounts promptly. 12 U.S.C. § 1728(b) (1982). Other
FSLIC options do not require such a substantial initial outlay of funds. For example, when
FSLIC elects to merge an insolvent association with a solvent one, the depositors' accounts
are transferred to the solvent association. 12 U.S.C. § 1728(b) (1982).
Since 1982, however, FSLIC may give assistance to troubled thrift institutions through
loans and direct deposits. 12 U.S.C. § 1729(f) (1982) (enacted as part of the GSDIA Pub.
L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1480). As a result, FSLIC may be keeping some associations going
by giving them cash infusions, because it does not have the large cash reserves to pay
depositor claims if the associations were to close. If so, FSLIC and the Board may be
violating their statutory mandates in two respects. First, the Board may not be placing
associations in receivership that really should be, and second, FSLIC may be spending
more money in the long run by keeping shaky associations going than it would by promptly
closing and liquidating. See infra note 173 for statutory conditions which require the
Board to appoint a receiver.
5. See Part II for the facts and discussion of the cases.
6. See id.
7. 12 U.S.C. § 1729(d) (1982). 12 C.F.R. § 569a.6 (1987).
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sociation, it must first satisfy the insured creditors (the depositors),8
and then sell off the assets and satisfy the remaining uninsured credi
tors, including itself.9 To determine the validity of the uninsured cred
itors' claims, those claims must be adjudicated,1O and FSLIC has
asserted that it has the exclusive authority to adjudicate them. 1 1 That
is, all creditors must present their claims to FSLIC for adjudication,
and courts must dismiss any ongoing litigation. Creditors have chal
lenged FSLIC's assertion of exclusive adjudicatory authority, and two
United States Courts of Appeals have decided the issue differently.
In North Mississippi Savings & Loan Association v. Hudspeth,I2
the Fifth Circpit Court of Appeals determined that Congress intended
FSLIC to have' exclusive authority to adjudicate creditor claims and
that all creditor claims are thus "switched to the administrative track"
once FS~fC is named receiver.13 According to the administrative
claims pr~cedure outlined and approved by the Hudspeth court, a
creditor ~ust first present any claim to FSLIC as receiver. 14 IfFSLIC
disallows ,he claim, the creditor may appeal to the Board. Is Only af
ter appeall to the Board is a creditor entitled to pursue its claim in
court, and then only in the form of judicial review of the administra
tive decisibn under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).I6 If the
creditor already is suing the association in court at the time that the
8. 12 U.S.C. § 1728(b) (1982). After FSLIC reimburses the depositors, it is subro
gated to the depositors' rights. 12 U.S.C. § 1728(b) (1982).
9. FSLIC is often the single largest uninsured creditor. Morrison-Knudsen Co. v.
CHG Int'l, Inc., 811 F.2d 1209, 1215-16 (9th Cir. 1987).
10. [d. All obligations and assets must be determined in the liquidation context. [d.
11. North Miss. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Hudspeth, 756 F.2d 1096, 1101-02 (5th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1054 (1986). FSLIC assumes its role as adjudicator primarily
in the liquidation context, because the validity of all claims must be determined. FSLIC
contends, however, that once it has been appointed receiver, it has the authority to adjudi
cate all creditor claims whether it chooses to liquidate or not. [d.
Most creditor claims are not adjudicated if FSLIC resolves the receivership in one of
the other authorized ways. For example, if FSLIC merges the insolvent association with a
sound association, all of the association's obligations and rights become obligations and
rights of the sound association. FSLIC may, however, freeze out a particular class of credi
tors by transferring all assets and debts of the insolvent association to the solvent associa
tion except for any debt owed to a member of the class of creditors to be frozen out, thus
preventing this class of creditors from pursuing its claims against the solvent association.
Although the creditors may pursue their claims against the insolvent' association, there are
no assets to satisfy the claims. This is illustrated in the discussion of Hudspeth at infra
notes 77-106 and accompanying text.
12. 756 F.2d 1096 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1054 (1986).
13. [d. at 1103.
14. [d. at 1102-03.
15. [d. at 1102.
16. [d. at 1103. These three steps constitute the "administrative track" as outlined
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association is placed in receivership, the Hudspeth ruling requires the
court to dismiss the creditor's court case so that the claim may be first
adjudicated administratively. Most courts that have been presented
with similar facts--creditors bringing court actions against associa
tions that are in receivership, or to be soon placed in receivership-
have followed the Hudspeth approach and dismissed the court actions
so that the claims may be resolved administrativelyY
In Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. CHG International, Inc.,18 the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals took an entirely different approach and held
that Congress intended FSLIC not to have any adjudicatory power. 19
Under the Mo"ison-Knudsen approach, some form of a FSLIC ad
ministrative claims procedure is legitimate, but that procedure does
by the Hudspeth court. The APA is codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-06, 1305,3105,
3344, 7521 (1982).
According to the Morrison-Knudsen court, the standard of review under the APA for
FSLIC adjudication (assuming it were authorized) is either the "arbitrary and capricious"
or the "substantial evidence" standard, both of which are more deferential than the de novo
standard. Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. CHG Int'l, Inc., 811 F.2d 1209, 1222 (9th Cir. 1987).
In a de novo proceeding, all the evidence is considered anew, without deference to previous
findings of fact. R. PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO & P. VERKUlL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRO
CESS § 7.4.1, at 370 (1985) [hereinafter R. PIERCE]. Thus, the creditor, under the Hudspeth
approach, never receives a de novo proceeding in a court of law.
17. See, e.g., Coit Independence Joint Venture v. FirstSouth Say. & Loan Ass'n, 829
F.2d 563 (5th Cir. 1987), petition for cert granted, 108 S. Ct. 1105 (1988); FSLIC v.
Bonfanti, 826 F.2d 1391 (5th Cir. 1987), petition for cert. filed sub nom., Zohdi v. FSLIC,
56 U.S.L.W. 3165 (U.S. Sept. 9, 1987) (No. 87-255); Lyons Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Westside
Bancorporation, 828 F.2d 387 (7th Cir. 1987); Godwin v. FSLIC, 806 F.2d 1290 (5th Cir.
1987); Chupik Corp. v. FSLIC, 790 F.2d 1269 (5th Cir. 1986); York Bank & Trust Co. v.
FSLIC, 663 F. Supp. 1100 (M.D. Pa. 1987); Acquisition Corp. of Am. v. Sunrise Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 659 F. Supp. 138 (S.D. Fla. 1987); FSLIC v. Oldenburg, 658 F. Supp. 609
(C.D. Utah 1987); FSLIC v. Quality Inns Inc., 650 F. Supp. 918 (D. Md. 1987); Resna
Assoc. v. Fin. Equity Mortgage Corp. 673 F. Supp. 1371 (D.N.J. 1987); First Fin. Say. &
Loan Ass'n v. FSLIC, 651 F. Supp. 1289 (E.D. Ark. 1987); Kohlbeck v. Kis, 651 F. Supp.
1233 (D. Mont. 1987); Baskes v. FSLIC, 649 F. Supp. 1358 (N.D. Ill. 1986); Colony First
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. FSLIC, 643 F. Supp. 410 (C.D. Ca. 1986); First Am. Say. Bank
v. Westside Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 639 F. Supp. 93 (W.O. Wash. 1986); Lyons Say. &
Loan Ass'n v. Westside Bancorporation, 636 F. Supp. 576 (N.D. Ill. 1986); Sunrise Say. &
Loan Ass'n v. LIR Dev. Co., 641 F. Supp. 744 (S.D. Fla. 1986); Baer v. Abel, 637 F. Supp.
347 (W.O. Wash. 1986); Murdock-SC Assocs. v. Beverly Hills Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 624
F. Supp. 948 (C.D. Ca. 1985), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 815 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1987)
(without opinion), petition for cert filed, 56 U.S.L.W. 3249 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1987) (No. 87
452); Keller v. Antioch Say. & Loan Ass'n, 492 N.E. 2d 937, 143 Ill. App. 3d 278, 97 Ill.
Dec. 278 (1986); FSLIC v. Kennedy, 732 S.W.2d 1 (Tx. Ct. App. 1987); Glen Ridge I
Condominiums, Ltd. v. FSLIC, 734 S.W.2d 374 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986), supplemental opin
ion on motion for rehearing, 735 S.W.2d 244 (1987).
18. 811 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 1987),petitionfor cert filed sub. nom., FSLIC v. Steven
son Assoc., 56 U.S.L.W. 3249 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1987) (No. 87-451).
19. Id. at 1215, 1222.
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not and cannot amount to adjudication. 20 While a court may, and
often should, dismiss a creditor's court claim for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies, that is a matter of judicial discretion. 21 The
Morrison-Knudsen court intimated that by permitting adjudication of
private common law claims by a non-article III court, the Hudspeth
approach may present serious constitutional problems which the Mor
rison-Knudsen court's contrary statutory construction avoids. 22
The issue presented in the Hudspeth and Morrison-Knudsen
cases-whether FSLIC has the exclusive power to adjudicate creditor
claims in its capacity as receiver for insolvent savings and loan associa
tions23-is presented in Coit Independence Joint Venture v. FirstSouth
Savings & Loan Association 24 and will come before the Supreme Court
in the 1988-1989 term. Both the approaches of the Fifth and Ninth
Circuit Courts of Appeals present challenging statutory and constitu
tional questions concerning the legality of FSLIC's adjudication of
creditor claims. The resolution of the statutory issue involves an anal
ysis of congressional intent through an examination of the relevant
statutes and their legislative histories. With respect to congressional
intent, there are four possible interpretations: 1) Congress intended
FSLIC to have exclusive power to adjudicate creditor clai~s (the
20. Id. at 1218.
21. Id. at 1223-24.
22. Id. at 1221-22. The Morrison-Knudsen court's approach, noting the unfairness of
FSLIC adjudication of claims, avoids possible due process problems as well. Id. at 1215
16. FSLIC controls the assets, is often the largest creditor of the association, is struggling
to remain solvent, and is the decisionmaker. Id. If the claims procedure is an adjudicatory
one, the creditor is disadvantaged; he or she is denied a disinterested decisionmaker and, on
subsequent judicial review, the court is likely to defer to FSLIC's determination. Id. at
1221-22. If the claims procedure is a non-adjudicatory one, the claimant, even if he or she
is required to exhaust administrative remedies, would be entitled to a de novo judicial pro
ceeding. See id. at 1221-24.
The Morrison-Knudsen approach also avoids confiict with the right to a jury trial
under the seventh amendment. U.S. CoNST. amend VII.
23. To clarify at the outset, the main issue addressed in this comment is whether
FSLIC, in its capacity as receiver, has the exclusive power to adjudicate creditor claims
against insolvent thrift associations. Generally, these claims do not depend on FSLIC's
enabling statute or any regulation of the Board for their resolution. Rather, they are often
state law claims, usually contractual in nature, and do not arise out of FSLIC's mishan
dling of the receivership. Any claim that arises out of FSLIC's handling of the receivership
is a different type of claim, and its resolution will depend on FSLIC's enabling statute or a
regulation of the Board. These two types of claims are analytically distinct, and FSLIC
adjudication of them poses different problems. Although the main focus of this comment is
the former, the latter are discussed at variouS points. See infra notes 68-73 & 475 and
accompanying text.
24. 829 F.2d 563 (5th Cir. 1987), petition for cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1105 (1988).
Coit presents no new analysis on the issue; the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals' analysis is
found in Hudspeth. See infra note 144 for the facts of Coit.
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FSLIC-Hudspeth position), 2) Congress intended FSLIC to have con
current adjudicatory authority with courts, 3) Congress took no posi
tion on the specific issue of granting FSLIC adjudicatory authority,
and 4) Congress intended not to confer any adjudicatory authority on
FSLIC (the Morrison-Knudsen approach).
In addition to the question of statutory construction, there are
two related but distinct constitutional issues raised by exclusive
FSLIC adjudication. The first, discussed in Morrison-Knudsen, is the
propriety of a non-article III entity adjudicating claims that arguably
can be adjudicated only in article III courts. 2S The second issue, not
addressed by either the Hudspeth or Morrison-Knudsen courts, con
cerns a possible due process violation caused by the lack of a neutral
decisionmaker in FSLIC adjudication. 26
Finally, in the event that there is no statutory basis for FSLIC
adjudication, or alternatively, that there is statutory authority to adju
dicate but constitutional problems prohibit exclusive FSLIC adjudica
tion, the Board must explore alternative adjudicatory and non
adjudicatory administrative claims resolution procedures and select a
procedure that is both constitutional and consistent with the needs of
FSLIC. If the selected procedure is non-adjudicatory, courts will ap
ply the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and require
creditors to pursue their claims administratively in most cases. 27
Part I of this comment discusses the history and background of
FSLIC and the Board, presents the key statutes on which the courts
rely, and explains the current and proposed claims procedures. Part II
presents the facts of the Hudspeth and Morrison-Knudsen cases, ex
plains the holdings of both courts, and discusses the central policy
considerations of the opinions. Part III presents the many statutory
arguments for and against the existence of exclusive FSLIC adjudica
tory power and subjects them to critical analysis. Then Part III ex
plains how the Board might promulgate regulations that would
establish FSLIC adjudicatory authority for FSLIC without an explicit
congressional mandate. Part IV investigates two major constitutional
problems and outlines alternative claims and appeals procedures that
25. Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1221.
26. The Morrison-Knudsen court noted this problem, but did not discuss it in consti
tutional terms. Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1216.
27. The Morrison-Knudsen court discussed the judicial doctrine of exhaustion of ad
ministrative remedies in the context of the current FSLlC claims procedure (which the
court found to be non-adjudicatory). See Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1223-24. This
comment examines the doctrine in the context of alternative adjudicatory and non-adjudi
catory claims resolution procedures in Part V.
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would pass consitutional muster. Finally, P~rt V discusses alternative
adjudicatory and non-adjudicatory administrative remedies and the ju
dicial doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
I.
A.

BACKGROUND

History and Structure of the Board and FSLIC

Congress created the Board in 1932 as part of the Federal Home
Loan Bank Act (FHLBA}.28 The Board is an independent federal reg
ulatory agency which supervises FSLIC and the regional Federal
Home Loan Banks,29 which are federally chartered institutions cre
ated by the FHLBA.30 In addition, the Board charters and supervises
federal savings and loan associations created ~y the Home Owners
Loan Act (HOLA}.31 Congress granted the Board considerable super
visory power, including rulemaking authority.32
Created by the. National Housing Act of 1934 (NHA},33 and
placed under the supervision of the Board,34 FSLIC is a govemment
28. Ch. 522 § 17, 47 Stat. 736 (1932) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1437(1) (1982». The
Board is an independent agency located in Washington, D.C. T. MARVELL, THE FED
ERAL HOME LoAN BANK BoARD 38 (1969). Congress established the Board to stimulate
the housing industry by providing loans to prospective home owners. Id. The Board con
sists of three members who are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate.
Id. at 40. In addition to supervising FSLIC, the Board oversees the chartering of new
associations and the merging of existing associations. Id. See also G. KAUFMAN, THE U.S.
FINANCIAL SYSTEM: MONEY, MARKETS, & INSTITUTION 270-71 (1986).
29. 12 U.S.C. § 1423 (1982). There are twelve regional Federal Home Loan Banks,
T. MARVELL, supra note 28, at 20, whose main purpose is to make funds available to
savings and loan associations for home mortgage loans. Id. These banks are analogous to
the regional Federal Reserve Banks in the Federal Reserve System. Id.
30. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(a) (1982).
31. Ch. 64, § 5, 48 Stat. 132 (1933) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461-1470 (1982 and
Supp. IV 1986».
32. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1437(a), 1464(d)(II) (1982). Section 1437(a) provides in part:
"The board ... shall have power to adopt, amend, and require the observance of such rules,
regulations, and orders as shall be necessary from time to time for carrying out the pur
poses of the provisions of this chapter." Id. Section 1464(d)(ll) provides in part: ''The
Board shall have power to make rules and regulations for the reorganization, consolidation,
liquidation, and dissolution of associations . . . insured by the Federal Savings and Loan
Insurance Corporation ...." Id.
33. Ch. 847, Title IV, § 402, 48 Stat. 1246 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1724-1730g
(1982 and Supp. IV 1986».
34. Congress enacted the NHA to provide home mortgage insurance to both savings
and loan associations and banks. T. MARVELL, supra note 28, at 27. The Federal Home
Administration (now the Department of Housing and Urban Development) administered
the mortgage insurance program. Id. Congress, through the NHA, created FSLIC and
placed it under the Board to insure the depositor accounts in savings and loan associations,
thereby giving depositors of thrift institutions the same protection that depositors in other
banks already had. Id. at 27-28. (Congress created the Federal Deposit Insurance Com
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owned insurance corporation insuring the deposits in both federally
chartered savings and loan associations3S and qualifying state associa
tions. 36 In addition to its obligations as insurer, FSLIC has two re
lated fun~tions: first, to monitor state chartered savings and loan
associations and enforce compliance with federal law and regula
tions;37 and second, to act as conservator or receiver38 for insolvent
associations.39
B.

Statutory Powers of FSLIC as Receiver

Title 12, section 1729 of the United States Code prescribes
FSLIC's duties and powers as a receiver generally.40 Once the Board
has named FSLIC receiver,41 FSLIC is authorized:
(i) to take over the assets of and operate such association;
(ii) to take such action as may be necessary to put it in a sound
solvent condition;
(iii) to merge it with another insured institution;
(iv) to organize a new Federal association to take over its assets;
pany (FDIC) the previous year to insure bank deposits. Id. at 28. See infra notes 289-316
and accompanying text for further discussion of the FDIC and a comparison of FSLIC to
the FDIC.) The NHA enabled savings and loan associations to compete with banks for
depositor funds and ,to prevent panic runs on savings institutions that forced so many insti
tutions to fail in the early 1930's. T. MARVELL, supra note 28, at 28. Congress, in enacting
the federal deposit insurance system (FSLIC and FDIC), was responding to the banking
crisis of the early 1930's when one half of all banking institutions failed. S. KIDWELL & R.
PETERSON, supra note 2, at 124.
35. 12 U.S.C. § 1726(a)(I) (1982).
36. 12 U.S.C. § 1726(a)(2)(1982). See 12 U.S.C. § 1726(b)(1982) for the application
procedures that apply to state chartered institutions, and 12 U.S.C. § 1726(c) (1982) for the
reasons that an application may be rejected.
37. 12 U.S.C. § 1730 (1982). See section III B (2)(bXiv) for the discussion ofFSLIC
enforcement powers over state chartered savings and loan associations. The Board has
enforcement powers as well. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d) (1982). See section III A for the discus
sion of Board enforcement powers over federally chartered associations.
38. The statutes do not distinguish between conservatorship and receivership powers,
but the regulations do. Compare 12 C.F.R. § 548 with 12 C.F.R. § 549 (FSLIC is a conser
vator when it steps in and operates an association, and a receiver when it exercises one of its
other options under 12 U.S.C. § 1729(b». In this comment, the word "receiver" is used in
place of the phrase "conservator or receiver."
39. Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. CHG Int'l, Inc., 811 F.2d 1209, 1215 (9th Cir. 1987).
40. 12 U.S.C. § 1729 (1982).
41. For a description of the determinations that the Board must make before it ap
points a receiver for an insured association, see infra note 173. If the association is state
chartered, additional conditions must obtain. See infra note 225. Once the Board appoints
FSLIC as receiver for a state chartered association, the Board and FSLIC have the same
powers over the state association as they would over a federal association. See generally 12
U.S.C. § 1464(d) (1982). Some savings banks iiI the process of converting their charters
may still be FDIC-insured, in which case the Board must appoint the FDIC receiver. 12
U.S.C. § 1464(a) (1982).
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(v) to proceed to liquidate its assets in an orderly manner; or
(vi) to make such other disposition of the matter as it deems
appropriate;

whichever it deems to be in the best interest of the association, its
savers, and the Corporation; and
(B) shall pay all valid credit obligations of the association. 42

In the event of a default,43 FSLIC must pay each depositor to the
extent insured as soon as possible. 44 FSLIC then becomes subrogated
to the rights of the paid-off depositors4S and competes with other unin
sured creditors for the remaining assets of the failed association. 46
Section 1729(d), entitled "Additional powers of Corporation,"
applies in the event that FSLIC liquidates an association and provides:
In connection with the liquidation of insured institutions, the
Corporation shall have power to carry on the business of and to
collect all obligations to the insured institutions, to settle, compro
mise, or release claims in favor of or against the insured institutions,
and to do all other things that may be necessary in connection
therewith, subject only to the regulation of the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board, or, in cases where the Corporation has been appointed
conservator, receiver, or legal custodian solely by a public authority
having jurisdiction over the matter other than said Board, subject
only to the regulation of such public authority.47'
42. 12 u.s.c. § 1729(b) (1982).
43. An association is in default when the Board places it in receivership "for the
purpose of liquidation." 12 U.S.C. § 1724(d) (1982).
44. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1728(b), 1729(b)(2) (1982). FSLIC may pay the depositor in cash
or make available to the depositor an account in either a new insured association or in
another insured association. 12 U.S.C. § 1728(b) (1982).
45. 12 U.S.C. § 1729(b)(2) (1982).
46. Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. CHG Int'l, Inc., 811 F.2d 1209, 1215-16 (9th Cir.
1987).
47. 12 U.S.C. § 1729(d) (1982). The introduction of § 1729(d) refers to FSLIC's
control of federal receiverships, or federalized state receiverships. The second part of
§ 1729(d) refers to state-controlled receiverships. See section III B (2)(a) for the complete
analysis of this subsection. Section 1729(d) originally was enacted as § 406(d) of the NHA
and read as follows:
In connection with the liquidation of insured institutions in default, the Cor
poration shall have power to carry on the business of and to collect all obligations
to the insured institutions, to settle compromise, or release claims in favor of or
against the insur~d institutions, and to do all other things that may be necessary
in connection therewith, subject only to the regulation of the court or other public
authority having jurisdiction over the matter.
National Housing Act of 1934, ch. 847, title IV, § 406(d), 48 Stat. 1259.
Congress amended § 1729(d) when it passed the GSDIA. 12 U.S.C. § 1729(d) (1982).
Although the amended language was slated for expiration three years after the October 15,

1988]

FSLIC-ADJUDICATION OF CREDITOR CLAIMS

237

,

The Hudspeth court relied on section 1729(d)in finding that FSLIC
had adjudicatory authority.48 To establish that FSLIC not only has
adjudicatory authority, but exclusive adjudicatory authority, the Hud
speth court relied on title 12, section 1464(d)(6)(C)49 of the United
States Code, in conjunction with section 1729(d). Section
1464(d)(6)(C) provides: "Except as otherwise provided in this subsec
tion, no court may take any action for or toward the removal of any
conservator or receiver, or, except at the instance of the Board, re
strain or affect the exercise of powers or functions of a conservator or
receiver."5o Part III of this comment discusses and analyzes in detail
sections 1464(d)(6)(C) and 1729(d), their legislative histories, and the
arguments advanced in both the Hudspeth and Morrison-Knudsen
cases.
C.

Creditor Claims and Appeals Procedures

The Board has promulgated rules governing FSLIC's handling of
creditor claims against both insolvent state and federally chartered in
stitutions. 51 Those rules require FSLIC to notify all creditors that
they must "present their claims, with proof thereof" to FSLIC.52
Once presented with a claim, "[t]he receiver shall allow any claim sea
sonably received and proved to its satisfaction. The receiver may
wholly or partly disallow any creditor claim . . . not so proved, and
1982 enactment (see sunset provisions of the GSDIA, 96 Stat. 1488), it did not expire until
October 13, 1986. 12 U.S.C. § 1729 (Supp. IV 1986). This change was to have "no effect
on any action taken or authorized" while such amendment was in effect. Id. (explanatory
statement accompanying notice of expiration of the GSDIA amended language). Section
1729(d) now reads as originally enacted. 12 U.S.C. § 1729(d) (Supp. IV 1986).
The GSDIA's amended language controls all cases cited in this comment with the
exception of Coit Independence Joint Venture v. Firstsouth, 829 F.2d 563 (5th Cir. 1987)
(upholding the Hudspeth approach under the current version of § 1729(d». See infra note
141 for the facts of Coit.
48. Hudspeth, 756 F.2d at 1101.
49. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(6)(C) (1982).
50. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(6)(C) (1982). Congress enacted § 1464(d)(6)(C) as part of
the Financial Institutions Supervisory Act of 1966 (FISA), Pub. L. No. 89-695, 80 Stat.
1028, which considerably extended § 5(d) of the Home Owners Loan Act of 1933 (HOLA),
ch. 64, § 5, 48 Stat. 132. The HOLA is codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461-1470
(1982 & Supp. IV 1986). As originally enacted, § 1464(d)(6)(C) only applied to receiver
ships of federally chartered associations, but the Bank Protection Act of 1968 (BP A) made
§ 1464(d) generally applicable to federalized state receiverships as well. See section III B
(2)(a)(ii) for the legislative history of the BPA. See section III A (1) for the legislative
history of the FISA.
51. 12 C.F.R. §§ 549.4, 569a.8 (1987). Section 549.4 applies to creditors of federally
chartered associations and § 569a.8 applies to creditors of state-chartered associations.
52. Id.
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shall notify the claimant of the disallowance .... "53 These rules do
not establish a decisionmaking procedure for the receiver to follow in
determining the validity of creditor claims that are based on law other
than FSLIC's enabling statute or Board-promulgated rule. The deci
sionmaking procedure is established by unpromulgated regulations of
the Board. 54 The procedures replace the functions of a court, and the
controlling law usually is state law.
53. 12 C.F.R. § 549.4(b) (1987). Section 569a.8(b) provides in part: "Any claim
filed ... and proved to the satisfaction of the Receiver shall be allowed by the Receiver.
The Receiver may disallow in whole or in part or reject in whole or in part any creditor
claim ... not proved to its satisfaction ...." 12 C.F.R. § 569a.8(b) (1987).
54. The Board has adopted a detailed claims procedure, but it has not yet promul
gated the procedure as a regulation. See "Procedures for the Administration and Determi
nation of Claims Filed with FSLIC as Receiver" [hereinafter "Procedures for Receiver"]
(14 pages of printed material available from the Board, accompanied with 3 forms, a flow
chart, and 2 pages of filing instructions, entitled "Instructions for Filing Claims with the
FSLIC as Receiver" (hereinafter "Filing Instructions") (undated office-printed material
available from the Board».
According to the "Filing Instructions," once notice has been published pursuant to
regulation, each non-depositor creditor must file a "Proof of Claim" on forms provided by
FSLIC. The c'laimant must provide documentation in support of the "Proof of Claim" and
all material must be received by FSLIC within 90 days of the first notice of publication.
FSLIC then reviews the "Proof of Claim" forms to see that they are properly completed.
Once complete, FSLIC determines within 180 days of receipt whether the claim is "recon
cilable" (whether the claim "may be allowed based upon the books and records of the
association") and thus allowed. If the forms are not properly completed, the receiver will
notify the claimant, and the claimant may amend his or her application provided the 90
day deadline has not passed. Additional time may be given if good cause is shown. "Filing
Instructions" at 1.
Should the claim be unreconcilable, FSLIC may require the claimant to provide more
information for further FSLIC review, and the claimant will be given additional time to
provide this information. The receiver then must notify the claimant as to what documents
have become part of the administrative record. The claimant has 30 days to request that
the receiver include other documents as part of the administrative record. The record is
then made available to the claimant. Id. at 1-2.
After reviewing all of the documents, the receiver prepares a "proposed determina
tion" which includes proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law and mails a copy to
the claimant. Within 30 days of the mailing date, the claimant may request FSLIC to
reconsider the proposed determination. If this request is made, the receiver shall reply,
stating whether or not it agrees with the claimant. If the claim is disallowed in full or in
part, the receiver's statement includes notification that the claimant has the right to Board
review. If the claimant does not request reconsideration, the proposed determination be
comes final. Id. at 2.
Any appeals to the Board must be in accordance with the Board's appeals procedures,
and filed within 60 days. For details of the appeals procedure, see infra note 56. Finally,
the instructions include the statement that "Appeal of the Receiver's Determination is a
Pre-requisite to Obtaining Judicial Review." Id.
FSLIC appoints "Special Representatives" who
shall be the decisionmaker, and the Claims Counsel shall provide legal advice to
the Special Representative. The Special Representative, in his discretion, may
assign the tasks of review of claim to Claims Counselor to other agents of the

~
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The promulgated rules both permit and require Board review of
claims disallowed by the receiver. ss As with proceedings before the
receiver, the 'regulations do not set forth any decisionmaking proce
dures for the Board to follow in reviewing appeals. 56
Special Representative, subject to the oversight and direction of the Director, OF
SLIC, with the advice and consent of the General Counsel.
"Procedures for Receiver" at page 7. "Director, OFSLIC" refers to the "Director of the
Office of the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, as defined in 12 C.F.R.
§ 500.20 (1986)." "Procedures for Receiver" at 4. "General Counsel" refers to the "Gen
eral Counsel to the Board, as defined in 12 C.F.R. § 500.17 (1986)." "Procedures for Re
ceiver" at 4. "Special Representative(s)" refers to
individua1(s) designated as Special Representative(s) for the FSLIC as Receiver
for an association as stated in the Board Resolution appointing the FSLIC as
Receiver. The Director, OFSLIC with the concurrence of General Counsel, shall
designate the Special Representative(s) for each receivership . . . . The Special
Representative(s) shall conduct the cJaims procedure, including the determina
tion of the merits of claims.
Id. at 5.
55. The basis for Board review under 12 C.F.R. § 549.5(b) is found in the following
sentence: "Unless ... the claimant files a written request for payment regardless of the
disallowance, disallowance shall be final, except as the Board may otherwise determine."
Id. The basis for Board review of claims disallowed under 12 C.F.R. § 569a.8(d) is the
foIlowing sentence: "The Receiver shall file with the Board ... a list of creditor claims filed
after the date fixed [deadline for the filing of claims] ... and a list of claims disallowed by
the receiver. . .. Any such claim may be allowed by the Board in its discretion upon good
cause shown." Id.
56. The Board employs an appeals procedure which it has not yet promulgated in the
form of rules entitled "Procedures for the Processing and Determination of Administrative
Appeals From Decisions of the FSLIC as Receiver" (6 pages of undated office-printed
material available from the Board) [hereinafter "Appeals Procedures"]
The Board has delegated final decisionmaking authority on appeals of FSLIC's final
decisions to the Director, Office of the FSLIC (Director). "Appeals Procedures" at 1. The
appeals procedures are for implementing 12 C.F.R. §§ 549.4, 549.5 and 549.5-1 under au
thority of 12 U.S.c. § 1437 (1982). "Appeals Procedures" at 1.
The creditor has 60 days to appeal FSLIC's final determination. To appeal, the credi
tor must send the following to the Director: (1) a copy of the administrative record, (2) a
"clear and concise" statement of the facts and arguments on which appeal is based, and
(3) appropriate citations to legal authority. Id. at 2-3. The burden of proof is on the claim
ant at all times. Id. at 4.
In most cases, the Director makes a preliminary review within 60 days. The Director
then notifies the claimant that: 1) the record is complete, 2) more information is required,
or 3) an additional 30, 60, or 90 days is required before completion of preliminary review.
If the appeal is not timely, any objection to the receiver's final determination is waived. 'A
timely appeal is necessary to obtain judicial review. If the claimant does not object to any
portion of the receiver's determinations, that portion is not subject to appeal. Id. at 3.
On timely receipt of all appeals material, the Director makes a determination that the
record is complete. The Director must issue a decision within 180 days from the date that
the record is found to be complete. The Director will either make a decision on the merits
with the concurrence of the General Counsel, or, with or without the concurrence of the
General Counsel, submit the appeal to the Board for a decision on the merits. If the Direc
tor decides on the merits, the Director notifies the claimant in writing, setting forth the
reasons for the determination. This is deemed final agency action for purposes of judicial
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In November, 1985, the Board proposed rules that "would codify
existing procedures and provide u~form and complete procedures for
the presentation and determination of claims, as well as for appeals
from claims determinations. "57 If adopted, the proposed regulations
largely will codify the procedures currently 'in use. 58
There are weaknesses in both the current and proposed claims
and appeals procedures. According to the FSLIC position accepted
by the Hudspeth court, the FSLIC claims procedure is exclusive; the
creditor loses both his or her independent right to pursue a claim in
court and the constitutional right to a jury trial. The potential unfair
ness of this result is compounded by the deferential standard of review
of administrative adjudications. According to Hudspeth, judicial re
view is available under the APA only after the creditor has exhausted
the administrative claims and appeals procedures. 59 The standard of
review under the APA is either the "arbitrary and capricious", 60 or
the "substantial evidence" standard,61 both of which afford considera
ble deference to FSL~C's determination. 62 Thus, the creditor loses not
only the right to bring a court action in the first instance, but also the
review. Id. at 4-5. Unless the Director submits the appeal to the Board or notifies the
claimant that additional time is needed, failure to issue a determination within 180 days
also constitutes final agency action affirming FSLIC's final determination. Id. at 6.
If the Director submits the appeal to the Board, the Board will review the record and
any advice of the Director. The Board, in its sole discretion, may permit the claimant to
supply additional information in writing or may "entertain oral argument." The claimant
receives written notice of the Board's determination, and that also constitutes final agency
action. The Board also considers extensions of time and may grant them for good cause.
Id.
57. 50 Fed. Reg. 48,970, 48,977 (1985).
58. 50 Fed. Reg. 48,993, 48,994 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 569c.7, 569c.9 pro
posed November 27, 1985). The proposed regulations are still pending. Confirmed by tele
phone interview with Office of the General Counsel of the Board (Jan. 22, 1988).
59. North Miss. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Hudspeth, 756 F.2d 1096, 1135 (9th Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1054 (1986). The APA is codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 551-59,
701-06, 1305, 3105, 3344, 7521 (1982).
60. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982).
61. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1982).
62. According to the Morrison-Knudsen court:
The "substantial evidence" test applies under the APA only to agency,adjudica
tions "required by statute to be determined on the record after opportunity for an
agency hearing," or to an administrative "hearing provided by statute". 5 U.S.C.
§§ 554(a), 706(2)(E). FSLIC's administrative process for handling creditor
claims appears to involve no "hearing" at all. If that is true, the "arbitrary and
capricious" standard would be controlling. This standard might be even more
deferential that the "clearly erroneous" test found deficient in Northern Pipeline ..
Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1222 n.5 (citing Northern Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipe
Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 85 (1982».
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opportunity to have a court evaJuate the evidence anew. 63
Because FSLIC's claims procedure "appears to involve no 'hear
ing' at all,"64 many of the traditionaJ safeguards of a jury triaJ6S are
absent. For example, the claims procedure involves only the individ
uaJ creditor and FSLIC, so that the creditor is denied the opportunity
to rebut evidence that another creditor might bring. 66 The most sig
nificant weakness, however, is the lack of a neutraJ decisionmaker in
FSLIC adjudication. 67 If the claims and appeals procedure were non
adjudicatory, the unfairness to the creditor would be minimized. If
the creditor and FSLIC are unable to come to terms, the creditor
could bring a court claim.
Because the claims procedure is designed to determine the valid
ity of creditor claims against the insolvent association that do not de
pend on FSLIC's enabling statute, and to provide a means of review of
that determination, there are additional problems with both the Hud
speth approach and the FSLIC regulatory scheme. Hudspeth requires
the creditor to pursue all claims administratively. FSLIC as receiver
has special receivership powers; for example, FSLIC has the power to
repudiate certain contracts that are otherwise valid,68 yet both the cur
rent and proposed regulations lack the proceduraJ apparatus by which
creditors may challenge FSLIC's decision to repudiate a contract.
The current appeals procedure also does not accommodate such a
challenge; that procedure involves review merely of FSLIC's final de
termination of the claim, and usua11y depends on state law, not
FSLIC's enabling statute or Board regulation. There appears to be no
aJternative administrative procedure for handling these claims; there
fore, Hudspeth requires all claims to be handled administratively when
not all claims can be handled administratively. This is, perhaps, less a
problem of the Hudspeth approach than it is a failing of the Board to
promulgate regulations which would accommodate chaJlenges to
FSLIC's handling of a receivership.
63. This concern is discussed in Part IV A.
64. Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1222 n.5. See supra notes 54 & 56 for claims and
appeals procedures.
65. See infra note 462 for the list of traditional safeguards of a jury trial.
66. See Appellant's Opening Brief at 9-12, Stevenson Assocs. v. FSLIC, (consoli
dated with Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. CHG Int'l, Inc., 811 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 1987» (86
2081).
67. These matters are discussed in Part IV B.
68. 50 Fed. Reg. 48,991 (1985) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 569c.69(f)(3) (proposed
Nov. 27, 1985». Under the current regulations, FSLIC has the power to repudiate a con
tract in its capaCity as receiver for state-chartered associations, 12 C.F.R. § 569a.6(c)(3)
(1987); but not for federally chartered associations.
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Furthermore, the creditor does not to have the opportunity to
participate in a FSLIC decision to repudiate a contract, for example.
Those decisions appear to be made without any kind of hearing. Any
judicial review of the decision may come too late for creditor partici
pation, for FSLIC is not liable for decisions it makes as receiver;69 if
the affairs of the association have been wound up, the party to the
contract has no recourse. 70
Not only is there no administrative procedure available to chal
lenge FSLIC's determinations as receiver, there are few substantive'
regulations which detail FSLIC powers. Thus, if a creditor seeks judi
cial review under the APA, a reviewing court may not be able to deter
mine whether FSLIC acted properly as receiver because the
regulations either fail to or inadequately address many substantive is
sues. 71 Under the current regulations, for example, it appears that
FSLIC does not have the power to freeze out a class of creditors,72 yet
FSLIC froze out a class of creditors in the Hudspeth case. 73 Accord
ingly, FSLIC makes decisions which affect the interests of a creditor
unilaterally, the creditor is unable to challenge the decision adminis
tratively, and courts will be unable to determine whether FSLIC acted
properly.
To summarize, there are two types of claims: first, the initial de
termination of the validity of the claim where the controlling law is
not FSLIC's enabling statute or Board regulation (usually it is state
law); and second, challenges to FSLIC's receivership authority and
69. See S. REP. No. 536, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. at 49, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE
CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 3054, 3103; First Sav. & Loan Ass'nv. First Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n, 547 F. Supp. 988, 996-97 (D. Haw. 1982).
70. For an example of this, see the discussion of Hudspeth in section II A.
71. See 50 Fed. Reg. 48,970 (1985).
72. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 549, 569.a (1987).
73. See infra notes 77-90 and accompanying text for facts of Hudspeth. A reviewing
court would be unable to determine the propriety of a FSLIC decision to freeze out a class
of creditors. The p~oposed rules also fail to provide FSLIC with the power to freeze out
creditors.
The proposed regulations authorize FSLIC, in its capacity as receiver for either state
or federally chartered associations, to repudiate a contract, yet the circumstances under
which FSLIC may do so purposefully were left vague. The Board, in the comment section
of the proposed rules, indicated that the power to repudiate a contract would be limited to
executory contracts and leases. 50 Fed. Reg. 48,976 (1985). The Board did not define
.
"executory contract." Id.
The current rules fail to provide a means for both determining which claims may be
preferred and how participation interests in loan agreements are to be treated in the event
of liquidation. 50 Fed. Reg. 48,970. The Board proposed the new rules in order to improve
the claims procedures and provide "new rules of general applicability." Id. The proposed
regulations provide rules for participation interests and priorities. 50 Fed. Reg. 48,995
(1985) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 569c.1O and 569c.ll).
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determinations based on FSLIC's enabling statute or Board regula
tion. This comment primarily is interested in the former: the propri
ety of exclusive adjudication of creditor claims that are most often
founded on state law. However, it is important to note the difference
and to avoid any confusion between the two types of claims. With
respect to the former type of claim, there is an administrative proce
dure for determining the validity of claims, but it has serious proce
dural weaknesses. With respect to the latter type of claim, there is no
effective administrative procedure for challenging FSLIC's action. In
addition, there are serious substantive problems as well, because the
powers of FSLIC as receiver are not detailed in either the statutes or
the applicable Board regulations. 74
This discussion has illustrated both the substantive and proce
dural unfairness inherent in the Hudspeth approach. The discussion of
the two major cases in Part II elaborates many of these weaknesses.
Part III then carefully scrutinizes the statutes and the courts' readings
of those statutes.
II.

THE CASES

The Fifth and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals each decided the
issue of exclusive FSLIC adjudication differently. The Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that FSLIC has exclusive adjudicatory author
ity in receivership proceedings. 7s The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
on the other hand, held that FSLIC has no adjudicatory authority.76
This section presents the facts of these two cases, explains the courts'
reasoning, and discusses the policy implications of both decisions.
With almost no case law on the matter, both courts relied on statutory
construction and policy rationales inferred from the legislative histo
ries of the various congressional acts amending the HOLA and NHA.
The arguments themselves are presented and analyzed in Part III.
A.

North Mississippi Savings & Loan Association v. Hudspeth77
The dispute in Hudspeth began in 1977 when the State of Missis

74. For more discussion of this problem, see infra note 475.
75. North Miss. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Hudspeth, 756 F.2d 1096 (5th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 1054 (1986).
76. Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. CHG Int'l, Inc., 811 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 1987), peti
tion for cert. filed sub. nom, FSLIC v. Stevenson Assocs., 56 U.S.L.W. 3249 (U,S. Oct. 6,
1987) (No. 87-451).
77. 756 F.2d 1096 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1054 (1986). The Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals revised and reversed an earlier, now withdrawn, opinion.
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion by FSLIC to Dismiss
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sippi passed a law requiring all state-chartered savings and loan as
sociations to be FSLIC insured. 78 The Board refused to authorize
FSLIC to insure the accounts of North Mississippi Savings & Loan
Association (Old North) unless then-president Joseph Hudspeth re
signed his position. 79 Joseph Hudspeth resigned only after he and Old
North executed an agreement for Old North to pay him a "regular
monthly amount."80 In 1982, Old North brought suit in state court,
asking the court to find that the compensation agreement was either
voidable or did not exist.81 Hudspeth counterclaimed, asking for
,either specific performance or damages. 82
In 1983, Mississippi placed Old North in receivership, appointing
FSLIC as receiver.83 The Board then appointed FSLIC as sole re
ceiver and "federalized"· the receivership.84 Proceeding under section
1729(b)(1)(A)(iv),8S FSLIC created a new federal association, New
North Mississippi Federal Savings and Loan Association (New
North), and appointed a federal conservator to run it. 86 FSLIC trans
ferred to New North all of Old North's assets, except that New North
"agreed to reconvey to the FSLIC as receiver ... any potential claim
for malfeasance against Old North's officers or employees."87 FSLIC
also transferred all liabilities to New North, except for "any obligation
owed by Old North under a compensation agreement such as Hud
speth's."88 FSLIC, as receiver for Old North, stopped paying Hud
speth. 89 Hudspeth joined as parties both New North, as transferee in
interest, and FSLIC, as receiver for Old North. 90 New North subseI

Claims for Lack of Subject Matter at 11-12, Stevenson Assocs. v. FSLlC, No. C85-7192
(N.D. Calif. February 7, 1986).
78. Hudspeth, 756 F.2d at 1099.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. Under 12 U.S.C. § 1729(c)(I)(B)(i)(I) (1982), if the Board finds that certain
conditions exist under 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(6)(A)(i), (ii) or (iii) (1982), it may appoint
FSLIC as receiver of state-chartered associations. The receivership becomes "federalized"
and FSLlC has the same control of the state association as it would have over a federal
association. The state authority that initially appointed FSLlC receiver would, thereafter,
have no control over the receivership.
85. 12 U.S.C. § 1729(b)(I)(A)(iv) (1982).
86. Hudspeth, 756 F.2d at 1099.
87. Id. at 1099 n.!.
88. Id. at 1099. FSLlC froze out certain creditors, including Mr. Hudspeth. Even if
Hudspeth's contract claim were upheld, Old North would not have any assets to satisfy it.
89. Hudspeth, 756 F.2d at 1099.
90. Id.
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quently removed the action to federal court.
According to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, the district
court "construed Hudspeth's counterclaim as a challenge to the valid
ity of the FSLIC's termination of the compensation contract and its
transfer of Old North's assets and liabilities to New North."91 The
district court relied on sections 1464(d)(6)(C)92 and 1729(d)93 and
held that" 'original jurisdiction over the conduct ofthe FSLIC ... lies
with the ... [Board],' rather than any court."94 Because "Hudspeth's
sole remedy was a petition to the . . . [Board] with judicial review
available under the Administrative Procedure Act,"9S the district
court dismissed Hudspeth's claim. 96 The Fifth Circuit Court of Ap
peals affirmed,97 finding that "any court ruling that New North bears
a liability not assigned it by the FSLIC would modify the FSLIC's
distribution of assets, and would 'restrain or affect' the FSLIC's pow
ers as a receiver in violation of 12 U.S.C. section 1464(d)(6)(C)."98
The court also stated that any court ruling that Old North owed Hud
speth a debt would likewise restrain or affect the powers of the receiver
and thus "all of Hudspeth's claims are switched to the administrative
track."99
91. [d. at 1101. Because the district court in Hudspeth "construed Hudspeth's coun
terclaim as a challenge to the validity of the FSLIC's termination of the compensation
contract," the enforceability of the agreement as a matter of state law was no longer at
issue. Rather, FSLIC's authority to terminate the agreement was at issue, and the ques
tion was whether Board "regulations did not authorize the FSLIC here to set aside an
otherwise-enforceable contract." [d.
According to the regulations, FSLIC, as receiver for a state-chartered savings and
loan, may "[r]eject or repudiate any lease or contract which it considers burdensome." 12
C.F.R. § 569a.6(c)(3) (1987). Interestingly, there is no corresponding authority for FSLIC
to repudiate a contract when it is receiver for a federally chartered association. Yet, FSLIC
must "pay all valid credit obligations." 12 U.S.c. § 1729(b)(I)(B) (1982). The regulations
do not specify the circumstances under which FSLIC may find a contract burdensome. A
reviewing court would have no basis for deciding whether FSLIC acted within its authority
or not. See supra notes 59-73 and accompanying text for the discussion of the unfairness of
the procedures and regulations.
The district court's Hudspeth opinion was never officially published, and is unavaila
ble. North Miss. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Hudspeth, W.C. 83-193-NK-P, slip op. (N.D. Miss.
March 12, 1984).
92. 12 U.S.c. § 1464(d)(6)(C) (1982). See sections II A and III B (I) for the legisla
tive history and analysis of this § 1464(d)(6)(C).
93. 12 U.S.c. § 1729(d) (1982). See sections III B (2)(a) for the legislative history
and analysis of § 1729(d).
94. Hudspeth, 756 F.2d at 1101 (quoting unpublished district court opinion).
95. [d.
96.

[d.

97.
98.
99.

[d. at 1103.
[d. at 1102 (quoting, in part, § I 464(d)(6)(C».
[d. at 1103. One criticism 0:- the Hudspeth opinion that is not made by any other
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The Hudspeth court inferred from the legislative history of the
Bank Protection Act of 1968 (BPA)loo that "Congress wanted the
FSLIC to be able to act quickly and decisively in reorganizing, operat
ing, or dissolving a failed institution, and intended that the FSLIC's
ability to accomplish these goals not be interfered with by other judi
cial or regulatory authorities."l0l In particular, the Hudspeth court
used the policy rationale inferred from the BPA to interpret section
1729(d), which the court mistakenly believed was enacted as part of
the BPA.102
The Hudspeth court found the existence of regulations controlling
FSLIC's claims procedure to be additional evidence of FSLIC's adju
dicatory authority.103 Those regulations permit FSLIC to "disallow
claims 'not proven to its satisfaction.' "104 Finally, the court relied on
a similar but factually and legally distinct federal district court case 105
for the proposition that Hudspeth's "claims are switched to the adcourt deserves mention: the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decided too much. The en
forceability of Hudspeth's agreement as a matter of state law was no longer an issue in the
case and the court's holding should be limited to the types of claims at issue in Hudspeth
and not all claims. The only claims at issue in Hudspeth were claims pertaining to FSLlC's
~ handling of the receivership, and the controlling law is FSLlC's enabling statute or Board
regulation, yet the Hudspeth ruling applies to all claims. Subsequent opinions of the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals have confirmed this reading of Hudspeth by requiring that state
law-based questions be adjudicated administratively. See infra notes 143-44.
100. Pub. L. No. 90-389, 82 Stat. 294 (1968).
101. Hudspeth, 756 F.2d at 1101. The court quoted language from the Senate Re
port explaining the BPA: "FSLlC's authority '[i]n carrying out its receivership responsibil
ities ... would be subject only to the regulation of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board
... .' .. Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 1263, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprinted in 1968 U. S.
CODE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2530, 2539).
102. See section III B (2)(a) for the legislative history and analysis of § 1729(d).
103. Hudspeth, 756 F.2d at 1102. The court cited 12 C.F.R. §§ 569a.8 and 549.4
(1987). See supra notes 51-72 and accompanying text for a discussion of the current
regulations.
104. Hudspeth, 756 F.2d at 1102 (citing §§ 569.a8 and 549.4).
105. First Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 531 F. Supp. 251 (D.
Haw. 1981) (First Savings I). In First Savings I, state authorities placed the state-chartered
First Savings & Loan Association (First Savings) in receivership on February 25, 1980, and
the Board immediately appointed FSLlC as the receiver. Id. at 252. First Savings alleged
that FSLlC and state banking authorities conspired with First Federal Savings & Loan
Association (First Federal) to force First Savings into receivership so that First Federal
could buy First Savings' assets. Id. The ousted directors of First Savings filed suit on
February 28, 1980, against FSLIC, First Federal, and the state officer that placed the asso
ciation in receivership. Id.
The plaintiffs sought three types of relief. First, they asked the court to remove FSLIC
as receiver. Id. at 253. The court denied this request because First Savings failed to name
the Board as a party to the action. Id. Under 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(6)(A), an association
placed in receivership has· 30 days to challenge the Board's appointment of the receiver.
According to First Savings I, a court can remove FSLIC as receiver only by ordering the
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ministrative track." 106
B.

Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. CHG International, Inc.107

The Morrison-Knudsen case involved five consolidated appeals; 108
each of which concerned claims against the insolvent Westside Federal
Savings and Loan Association (Westside), which the Board placed in
receivership on August 30, 1985. 109
Board to do so, First Savings I, 531 F. Supp. at 253, because "no court may take any action
for or toward the removal of any ... receiver." 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(6)(C) (1982).
Second, First Savings asked that its assets be restored. First Savings I, 531 F. Supp. at
253 (FSLIC had sold First Savings' assets to First Federal). The court also refused this
request because the Board was not a party to the action. Id. at 2~4. According to the
court, it could not order FSLIC to return to First Savings the assets it sold to First Federal
because that would constitute restraint of a receiver in a receivership function. Id.
Third, First Savings asked for damages in tort against FSLIC. Id. at 255. The court
denied this relief because the action was not brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act.

Id.
First Savings I does not require that all claims be switched to the administrative track,
nor does it require that creditor claims against the association be adjudicated by FSLIC.
First Savings I required that the Board be named a party to actions challenging FSLIC's
handling of the receivership and to any action removing FSLIC as receiver. However, any
action for the removal of the receiver also must be filed within 30 days of FSLIC's appoint
ment as receiver. Any subsequent challenge to remove FSLIC as receiver must be brought
directly with the Board. Id. at 254. The court also stated that "affected individuals may
still request the Board to investigate the actions of a receiver and take whatever steps are
necessary to insure compliance with the law. If the Board decides to take no action, judi
cial review of this decision may be available" under the APA. Id. (footnote omitted). First
Savings I may require that all challenges to FSLIC's handling of a receivership be pursued
administratively, while saying nothing at all about how the adjudication of creditor claims
against the receivership should be handled. If Hudspeth had read First Savings I in this
way, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals could have dismissed Hudspeth's challenges of
FSLIC's handling of the receivership without holding that FSLIC has exclusive adjudica
tory authority. But the HUdspeth court's holding encompasses all claims, as the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals' subsequent cases show.
The ousted directors of First Savings brought a subsequent action against First Fed
eral, FSLIC, and the Board. First Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. First Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n,
547 F. Supp. 988 (D. Haw. 1982) (First Savings II). The court in First Savings II refused to
entertain the plaintiffs' request to remove FSLIC as receiver because the 30 day statutory
period which entitled the ousted directors to bring a court action to remove FSLIC as
receiver had expired. Id. at 994-95. The First Savings II court found that it had no juris
diction to entertain challenges to FSLIC's handling of the receivership. Id. at 996-97. First
Savings II might stand for the proposition that challenges of FSLIC actions as receiver
which are based on FSLIC's enabling statute or Board regulation are not reviewable by a
court at all. However, neither First Savings I or First Savings II applied to state law-based
creditor claims against the insolvent association.
106. HUdspeth, 756 F.2d at 1103.
107. 811 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 1987), petition for cert. filed sub. nom. FSLIC v.
Stevenson Assocs., 56 U.S.L.W. 3249 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1987) (No. 87-451).
108. Id. at 1212.
109. Id. at 1212-13. FSLIC as receiver elected liquidation. Id. at 1216.
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In Rembold v. Gibraltar Savings & Loan Association,11O an un
named borrower brought suit in state court against Gibraltar Savings
and Loan Association (Gibraltar), asking the court to void a two mil
lion dollar obligation. Gibraltar removed the action to federal district
court and impleaded Westside. l I l FSLIC was appointed receiver and
was substituted as party for Westside. FSLIC moved to dismiss for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction and the court granted the motion,
relying on Hudspeth. 112 Gibraltar appealed.ll3
In American Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Westside Fed
eral Savings & Loan Association,114 American Federal Savings and
Loan Association (American), sued Westside in federal district court,
seeking "declaratory relief on the validity of the various agreements"
included in a participation loan agreement that involved Westside
loans to CHG International Corporation (CHG).11S FSLIC was ap
pointed receiver and moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter juris
diction. Again, relying on Hudspeth, the court sustained the motion,
and American appealed. 1I6
In Stevenson Associates v. FSLIC 117 and Morrison-Knudsen Com
pany v. CHG International Inc., 118 Morrison-Knudsen brought suit in
California state court against CHG, Westside, and Stevenson Associ
ates (Stevenson), seeking damages arising out of a condominium pro
ject. Stevenson cross-claimed against Westside. FSLIC was appointed
receiver, and removed all claims to federal district court. FSLIC re
lied on Hudspeth, and successfully moved to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. Stevenson appealed both the dismissal of its own
claims and the dismissal of Morrison-Knudsen's claims. 119
In CHG Creditors Committee v. FSLIC,120 Westside filed a claim
in CHG's bankruptcy proceeding. FSLIC was appointed receiver of
Westside and made a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter ju
risdiction. The district court supervising the bankruptcy proceeding
110. 624 F. Supp. 1006 (W.O. Wash . .1985). Rembold was the only one of the five
district court decisions appealed that was reported.
111. Gibraltar alleged that Westside had promised to repay the debt in the event that
the borrower defaulted. Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1213.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
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denied the motion, and FSLIC appealed. 121
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals maintained jurisdiction in
Rembold, American Federal, and Stevenson,122 and held that FSLIC
had no adjudicatory authority.123 The court, however, remanded to
the district court the question of whether it should require exhaustion
of administrative remedies before adjudicating the case. 124
The Morrison-Knudsen court, like the Hudspeth court, examined
the key statutes and legislative history, but arrived at the opposite con
clusion, finding that Congress intended FSLIC not to have any adjudi
catory authority. The Mo"ison-Knudsen court refused to read
sections 1464(d)(6)(C) and 1729(d) as empowering FSLIC with exclu
sive adjudicatory authority .. The Morrison-Knudsen court found no
evidence in the language or the legislative history of the statutes to
indicate that Congress intended FSLIC to have adjudicatory power. 12S
The Morrison-Knudsen court examined three policy arguments,
two in criticism of the Hudspeth court, and one in support of its own
holding. First, the Morrison-Knudsen court admitted that efficiency in
winding up the affairs of an insolvent association in order to preserve
FSLIC assets is sound policy,126 but denied that Congress authorized
FSLIC to have the unlimited power it needed in order to further this
policy.127 The court stated that FSLIC must comply with the statu
tory scheme that Congress enacted long before FSLIC's current diffi
culties arose,128 noting that, until the 1980's, FSLIC never argued that
it had exclusive adjudicatory power. 129 Second, granting FSLIC ex
121. Id.
Id. at 1214. In CHG Creditors Comm. and Morrison-Knudsen (district court
case), the court dismissed the appeals. Id. at 1213. In CHG Creditors Comm., the court
held that the district court's refusal to dismiss was not appealable because it was not a final
order. Id. at 1214. In Morrison-Knudsen, the court stated that Stevenson had no standing
to appeal the dismissal of Morrison-Knudsen's claims. /d.
123. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 811 F.2d at 1212.
124. Id. at 1223. See infra text accompanying note 135 for the factors to be consid
ered by a court in deciding whether to require exhaustion of administrative remedies.
125. Id. at 1215, 1222.
126. Id. at 1216. This policy motivated Congress to enact the Financial Institutions
Supervisory Act of 1966 (FISA) and the Bank Protection Act of 1968 (BPA). See section
III A (1) for the discussion of the legislative history of the FISA. See section II B (2)(a)(ii)
for the discussion of the legislative history of the BPA.
127. The Hudspeth court interpreted the policy of the BPA as authorizing FSLIC to
have whatever power it needed to advance this policy. See Hudspeth, 756 F.2d at 1101.
The court found that exclusive adjudication furthered this end, and thus concluded that
FSLIC has exclusive power to adjudicate creditor claims. Id. at 1101-03.
128. Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1216.
129. Id. The statutes on which FSLIC relied for exclusive adjudication were enacted
in 1934 and 1966. See section III B (2)(a)(i) for the legislative history of the NHA. See
section III A (1) for the legislative history of the FISA. Although FSLIC admitted that it
122.
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clusive adjudicatory authority does not necessarily serve this policy of
efficiency. The court noted that judicial review under the Administra
tive Procedure Act is just as capable of producing delay in the winding
up of the affairs of an insolvent association as is initial court
adjudication. 130
The main policy consideration that influenced the Morrison
Knudsen court was fairness: the court questioned whether it was ap
propriate for FSLIC to have the power both to adjudicate money
claims, and at the same time control assets and claim a major portion
ofthem.l3l The current financial problems of FSLIC132 only amplified
this concern.l3 3
The Morrison-Knudsen court's concern with procedural and sub
stantive fairness is apparent in the court's discussion of whether to
require exhaustion of administrative remedies as a matter of judicial
discretion. 134 Factors such as efficiency and cost are balanced against
never argued that it had such power until the 1980's, it stated that this was so because no
federally chartered associations were liquidated between 1941 and 1980. See FSLIC's Peti
tion for Rehearing and Suggestion of Appropriateness for Rehearing in Banc at 7 n.6, Mor
rison-Knudsen Co. v. CHG Int'l, Inc., 811 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 1987) (86-2063) (86-2081)
(86-3621) (86-3646) (86-3658). (Subsequent citations of this brief omit reference to the
docket numbers.)
The Morrison-Knudsen court cited two ~xamples of pre-1980's cases where FSLIC
failed to assert the exclusive power to adjudicate. In Baker v. F. & F. Investment Co., 489
F.2d 829 (7th Cir. 1973), black plaintiffs alleged that they were charged an excessive price
for the homes that they purchased. FSLIC was successor in interest to the savings and loan
association that made loans to the seller. The court held that claims for money damages on
the contract should be dismissed as to FSLIC unless plaintiffs could prove compliance with
the Illinois statute of limitations, but that plaintiffs' equitable claims should not be dis
missed. ld. at 831-38. Presumably, if the plaintiffs could prove compliance with the statute
of limitations, the court would have jurisdiction over the contract dispute. In addition,
FSLIC never moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to exclusive
FSLIC adjudication.
In Hancock Fin. Corp. v. FSLIC, 360 F. Supp. 1125 (0. Ariz. 1973), aff'd, 492 F.2d
1325 (9th Cir. 1974), creditor sought a declaratory judgment or a determination of owner
ship of receivership assets. The district court dismissed the action due to lack of federal
question jurisdiction or diversity jurisdiction. Id. FSLIC never argued that it had exclu
sive authority to adjudicate claims, and, thus, the plaintiffs would have been able to bring
an action in state court.
130. Mo"ison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1216-17. The Hudspeth court failed to show
how initial review would delay that liquidation process. Id.
131. ld. at 1216.
132. See supra note 2.
133. Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1216.
134. ld. at 1223. "[T]he district court must balance the agency's interest in applying
its expertise, correcting its own errors, making a proper record, and maintaining an effi
cient, independent administrative system, against the interests of private parties in finding
adequate redress." Id.
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fairness. -According to the Morrison-Knudsen court, these factors
include:
[1] whether resort to the administrative process would be futile,
[2] whether the administrative process is well understood and well
developed, [3] whether a prompt decision as to all of the contested
issues in the case is likely, [4] whether an exhaustion requirement
would be fair to the parties in light of their resources, [5] whether it
would be fair to other parties in the case whose interests might be
affected, [6] whether the interests of judicial economy would be
served by requiring exhaustion, and [7] whether the agency demon
strates that not requiring exhaustion would unduly interfere with its
functioning. 13s

Were the district court to apply these factors to the facts of Mor
rison-Knudsen in light of the current FSLIC claims procedures,136 the
court could have maintained jurisdiction. First, the administrative
process likely would have been futile because the claims, originally
filed against Westside, became claims against FSLIC as receiver for
Westside. Because FSLIC is an interested adjudicator, the claimants
likely would not receive adequate redress, and thus exhaustion of ad
ministrative remedies would be futile. 137 Second, the claimants proba
bly would have ended up in court for judicial review of their claims
because FSLIC's claims procedure is not well developed. There is no
capacity for handling complicated claims involving numerous parties
and numerous legal issues. 138 The third factor also poses problems for
FSLIC adjudication. Although the claims procedure is designed to
135. Id. at 1223-24.
136. See supra note 54 for current claims procedures.
137. See Appellant's (Stevenson) Opening Brief at IS, Stevenson Assocs. v. FSLIC
(consolidated with Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. CHG Int'l, Inc., 811 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir.
1987» (86-2081) (quoting Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 579 (1983»:
It is sufficiently clear from our cases that those with substantial pecuniary interest
in legal proceedings should not adjudicate these disputes.... [T)he financial stake
need not be ... direct or positive.... It has also come to be the prevailing view
that 'most of the law concerning disqualification because of interest applies with
equal force to ... administrative adjudicators.'
Id.
The presence of an interested decisionmaker in an adjudicatory claims procedure is a
more serious factor than the lack of a disinterested decisionmaker in an non-adjudicatory
claims procedure. The discussion in the above text is merely illustrative.
138. For example, in Morrison-Knudsen, there were many claimants of Westside's
assets, including FSLIC. In addition, there were counterclaims, cross-claims, and im
pleaded parties as well. See supra notes 107-24 and accompanying text for the facts of
Morrison-Knudsen. FSLIC's claims procedure is designed to handle each creditor's claim
individually, and does not provide a means to address other parties' claims. See supra note
54 for FSLIC's claims procedure.
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result in a speedy determination, it probably would not have in this
case because so many different claims and parties were involved. This
problem also implicates the fifth factor. 139 In a complicated participa
tion loan agreement like that involved in Morrison-Knudsen, a FSLIC
judgment as to one party could affect the rights of another party and
thus be unfair against the other party. As the parties had already gone
to court and the claims involved were unlikely to have been settled
through the administrative process because of the complicated agree
ment and the many parties involved, the concern of the sixth factor
would also be raised, and it might well serve the interest of judicial
economy for a court to maintain jurisdiction over the claims. Finally,
FSLIC would not be able to demonstrate that not requiring exhaus
tion, in this instance, would unduly interfere with its functioning. 140
Applied to the facts of Hudspeth, these factors also would militate
against requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies. 141
Between the Hudspeth and Morrison-Knudsen decisions, many
courts had an opportunity to decide the issue. Every court 142 that en
tertained arguments on the issue followed the Hudspeth approach. 143
139. There was no evidence presented in the Morrison-Knudsen case which indicated
that requiring exhaustion would have been unfair in light of the parties' resources, which is
the fourth factor. It could have been unfair, however, because the parties had prepared
their cases. It can only cost the parties more money if the case is dismissed and pursued
administratively, especially if that procedure is likely to be futile, and thus the likelihood, at
least, of unfairness is increased. It should be noted that all of these factors relate to each
other-the existence of one factor makes another factor more likely.
140. FSLIC claimed that not requiring exhaustion would interfere with its exclusive
adjudicatory authority. The Morrison-Knudsen court reasoned that judicial adjudication
did not interfere with FSLIC's powers because FSLIC did not have exclusive adjudicatory
authority. See Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1216-17. But see FSLIC's Petition for Re
hearing and Suggestion of Appropriateness of Rehearing in Banc 3-4, Morrison-Knudsen
Co. v. CHG Int'l, Inc., 811 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 1987), where FSLIC argued that exhaus
tion was critical to its functioning. Even if an exhaustion requirement is critical to FSLIC's
function generally, that is insufficient to establish that not requiring exhaustion unduly
interferes with FSLIC's functioning in a particular case.
141. The key factor would be the absence of an effective administrative procedure for
challenges of FSLIC's decisions as receiver. Thus, requiring exhaustion would be futile.
142. The only exception is CHG Creditors Comm. v. FSLIC, in which the district
court refused to grant FSLIC's motion to dismiss. Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. CHG Int'l,
Inc., 811 F.2d 1209, 1213 (9th Cir. 1987). See supra notes 107-24 and accompanying text
for the facts of Morrison-Knudsen.
143. See Brief of Appellee (FSLIC) at 6-7, Stevenson Assocs. v. FSLIC (consolidated
with Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 1987». The Fifth Circuit Court of Ap
peals reaffirmed its position in two subsequent cases: Godwin v. FSLIC, 806 F.2d 1290
(5th Cir. 1987) (action by depositors to recover the uninsured portion of deposits dismissed
for failure to exhaust administrative remedies); Chupik Corp. v. FSLIC, 790 F.2d 1269 (5th
Cir. 1986) (creditor's attempt to perfect a lien on receivership property dismissed according
to Hudspeth). Among the many district courts that have followed the Hudspeth approach
are: First Fin. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. FSLIC, 651 F. Supp. 1289 (E.D. Ark. 1987);
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Since Morrison-Knudsen, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has af
firmed the Hudspeth approach twice. l44 The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals has also affirmed the Morrison-Knudsen approach.14s Even in
light of the Morrison-Knudsen holding, however, the vast majority of
courts which have addressed the issue of whether the FSLIC has ex
clusive power to adjudicate creditor claims in its capacity as receiver
for insolvent savings and loan associations have chosen to follow Hud
speth.l46 Two recent state court cases embrace the Mo"ison-Knudsen
Kohlbeck v. Kis, 651 F. Supp. 1233 (D. Mont. 1987); Baskers v. FSLIC, 649 F. Supp. 1358
(N.D. Ill. 1986); Colony First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. FSLIC, 643 F. Supp. 410 (C.D.
Ca. 1986); First Am. Say. Bank v. Westside Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 639 F. Supp. 93
(W.O. Wash. 1986); Lyons Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Westside Bancorporation, 636 F. Supp.
'576 (N.D. III. 1986); Sunrise Say. & Loan Ass'n v. LIR Dev. Co., 641 F. Supp. 744 (S.D.
Fla. 1986); Baer v. Abel, 637 F. Supp. 347 (W.O. Wash. 1986); Murdock-SC Assoc. v.
Beverly Hills Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 624 F. Supp. 948 (C.D. Ca. 1985), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part, 815 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1987) (without opinion), petition for cert. filed, 56
U.S.L.W. 3249 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1987) (No. 87-452).
144. In Coit Independence Joint Venture v. FirstSouth Say. & Loan Ass'n, 829 F.2d
563, 564 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. ll05 (1988), Coit brought suit in state
court against FirstSouth in October, 1986, alleging several state law claims, including
"usury, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of the duty of good faith and fair deaIing."
The Board placed FirstSouth in receivership in December, 1986, and FSLIC removed the
action to federal district court. Id. The district court granted FSLIC's motion to dismiss,
and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. The Coit court indicated that, although
courts disagree about the proper standard of review for FSLIC adjudications, any adminis
trative review disposed of due process problems. Id. at 565 (citing Woods v. Federal
Home Loan Bank Bd., 826 F.2d 1400, 14ll (5th Cir. 1987). The court also ruled that
Coit's other constitutional challenges-violation of separation of powers under article III
and deprivation of the right to a jury trial under the seventh amendment-were not ripe for
resolution. Coit, 829 F.2d at 565.
In FSLIC v. Bonfanti, 826 F.2d 1391, 1392 (5th Cir. 1987), petition for cert. filed sub
nom. Zohdi v. FSLIC, 56 U.S.L.W. 3165 (U.S. Sept. 9, 1987) (No. 87-255), the plaintiffs
brought suit alleging "fraudulent diversion of loan proceeds" and breach of contract, as
well as "violations of federal law." The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the Hud
speth approach, holding that once FSLIC is appointed receiver, courts lose jurisdiction to
entertain all claims against the receivership estate because "no end runs around the re
ceiver's broad realm of authority" are permitted. Id. at 1394.
145. Murdock-SC Assoc. v. Beverly Hills Say. & Loan Ass'n, 815 F.2d 82 (9th Cir.
1987), aff'g in part and rev'g in part, 624 F. Supp. 948 (C.D. Cal. 1985), petition for cert.
filed, 56 U.S.L.W. 3249 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1987) (No. 87-452).
146. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals followed Hudspeth but indicated some
willingness to reconsider its decision if arguments on exclusive FSLIC adjudication were
presented to it. Lyons Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Westside Bancorporation, 828 F.2d 387 (7th
Cir. 1987). In an attempt to evade the Hudspeth holding, the creditor claimants in Lyons
amended their complaints to avoid asking for any affirmative relief. Thus, the court did not
hear the arguments on the adjudication issue. The Lyons court found Hudspeth controlling
and held that the claim must first be adjudicated administratively. The court decided that
it could not follow the Morrison-Knudsen court without having the issue argued before it,
and thus affirmed the district court's dismissal of the case. Lyons, 828 F.2d at 395.
Many district courts and state courts have continued to follow Hudspeth. See. e.g.,
York Bank & Trust Co. v. FSLIC, 663 F. Supp. 1100 (M.D. Pa. 1987); Acquisition Corp.
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approach in its entirety;147 At least two other cases offer support for
the Morrison-Knudsen approach without fully embracing it. 148 Fi
nally, one court followed the Hudspeth court's statutory interpretation
but found it unconstitutional. 149
of Am. v. Sunrise Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 659 F. Supp. 138 (S.D. Fla. 1987); FSLIC v. Olden
burg, 658 F. Supp. 609 (p. Utah 1987); FSLIC v. Quality Inns, Inc., 650 F. Supp. 918 (D.
Md. 1987); Resna Assoc. v. Fin. Equity Mortgage Corp., 673 F. Supp. 1371 (D.N.I. 1987);
FSLIC v. Kennedy, 732 S.W.2d 1 (Tx. Ct. App. 1987); Glen Ridge I Condominiums, Ltd.
v. FSLIC, (supplemental opinion on motion for rehearing) (Tx. Ct. App. 1987).
147. FSLIC v. Glen Ridge I Condominiums, Ltd., No. C-6776 slip op. (Tex. Sp. Ct.
March 30, 1988); Summertree Venture III v. FSLIC, 742 S.W.2d 446 (Tx. Ct. App. 1987).
The Summenree court refused to follow the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals even though
Texas is in the fifth circuit and there is state precedent on following the Fifth Circuit Court .
of Appeals on questions of federal law. Summenree, 742 S.W.2d at 450.
148. Peninsula Fed. Sav.& Loan Ass'n v. FSLIC, 663 F. Supp. 506 (S.D. Fla. 1987).
The claimant in Peninsula brought suit against FSLIC in two capacities: on state law con
tract claims based on pre-receivership conduct of the association, and for conduct of
FSLIC after receivership. Id. at 507. The Peninsula court denied FSLIC's motion to dis
miss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and maintained jurisdiction over all claims at
issue. [d.
The court construed FSLIC power more narrowly than the Hudspeth court, yet more
broadly than the Morrison-Knudsen court, and followed neither. The court distinguished
the facts of Peninsula so as to avoid both the Hudspeth and Morrison-Knudsen approaches.
The claims in Peninsula involved both pre- and post-receivership conduct. The court at
tempted to draw the distinction between contract claims against the insolvent association
(pre-receivership) and claims against FSLIC's handling of the receivership (post-receiver
ship) and found that FSLIC had no authority to adjudicate post-receivership claims. Ac
cording to the Peninsula court, the claims in both HUdspeth and Morrison-Knudsen
involved only pre-receivership conduct. [d. at 509-10. The Peninsula court erred on this
point. All of the claims in Hudspeth involved post-receivership conduct; Hudspeth chal
lenged FSLIC's decision to terminate his contract and the authority ofFSLIC to freeze him
out. See supra notes 77-90 and accompanying text for the facts of Hudspeth.
The Peninsula court found that Congress did not intend FSLIC to have the power to
adjudicate all claims: if Congress intended FSLIC to hear all claims, Congress would have
provided so expressly. Peninsula, 663 F.2d at 509-10. The Peninsula court did follow the
Morrison-Knudsen court in one respect: if the case is one that can be brought in court or
decided through an administrative process, exhaustion of administrative remedies is a mat
ter of discretion for the court. [d. at 510-11. The Peninsula court then discussed some of
the factors that might be involved in a decision to keep or relinquish jurisdiction. Among
the factors discussed were: 1) the level of complexity of the case, 2) the fact that the admin
istrative procedure is not well developed for processing mixed claims (claims involving pre
and post-receivership) conduct, 3) the possibility of unfairness to the claimant if the claims
are resolved in an administrative process (a court proceeding may be more expensive for
the creditor, in a complicated case, and the creditor does not get a chance for full presenta
tion of evidence). [d.
In FSLIC v. Provo Excelsior. Ltd., 664 F. Supp. 1405 (D. Utah 1987), the court held
that FSLIC did not have authority to adjudicate state law-based counterclaims against an
insolvent association.
149. Glen Ridge I Condominium, Ltd. v. FSLIC, 734 S.W.2d 374 (supplemental
opinion on motion for rehearing) (Tx. Ct. App. 1987) (Congress intended FSLIC to have
the exclusive power to adjudicate creditor claims, but such delegation of power was uncon
stitutional.). The Texas Supreme Court affirmed the result of the Texas Appellate Court's
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III. EXCLUSIVE FSLIC ADIUDICATION: STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND BOARD
RULEMAKING AUTHORITY
Part III presents and analyzes the courts' arguments for and
against the statutory authority for exclusive FSLIC adjudication. Sec
tion A analyzes the position that FSLIC's authority, whether adjudi
cative or otherwise, is exclusive. Section B evaluates the argument that
FSLIC has adjudicatory authority. Section C then discusses the possi
bility that the Board, through its rulemaking power, might establish
FSLIC adjudicatory authority.

A.

Section 1464(d)(6)(C): An Exclusive FSLIC Remedy

The Hudspeth court relied on section 1464(d)(6)(C)ISO in finding
that FSLIC, as receiver, had the exclusive power to adjudicate credi
tors' claims against insolvent savings and loan associations. lSI Careful
analysis of the text and the legislative history, however, demonstrates
that Congress neither provided for nor intended an exclusive FSLIC
remedy for state law-based creditor claims. Enacted as part of the
Financial Institutions Supervisory Act of 1966 (FISA),IS2 section
1464(d)(6)(C) reads: "Except as otherwise provided in this section, no
court may take any action, for or toward the removal of any conserva
tor or receiver, or, except at the instance of the Board, restrain or
affect the exercise of powers or functions of a conservator or
receiver."IS3
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found that once the Board
holding that the trial court had jurisdiction over the claims, but disagreed with the appel
late court's reasoning. See FSLIC v. Glen Ridge I Condominium, Ltd., No. C-6776 slip
op. (Tex. Sp. Ct. March 30, 1988). The Texas Supreme Court followed the Morrison-Knud
sen court's statutory construction, finding that FSLIC had no adjudicatory authority, and
thus found that the court of appeals "erroneously reached the Article III issue." Id. The
Texas Supreme Court further stated that it "neither approve(s] nor disprove[s] the holding
of the court of appeals that the exercise of adjudicatory power by the FSLIC as receiver
violates Article III ...." Id. See infra notes 421-25 and accompanying text for a discus
sion of the court of appeals' constitutional analysis.
150. 12 U.S.c. § 1464(d)(6)(C) (1982).
151. Hudspeth, 756 F.2d at 1103. FSLIC also argued that 12 U.S.C.
§ 1464(d)(6)(C), together with § 1729(d), is analogous to 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(I)(1982).
Under § 362(a)(I), the "filing of the bankruptcy petition operates to stay all judicial pro
ceedings against the debtor." Brief of Appellee at 19,'stevenson Assocs. v. FSLIC (consoli
dated with Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. CHG Int'l, Inc., 811 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 1987» (86
2081). However, these sections provide only that certain proceedings can be stayed, as
discussed infra at text accompanying note 177.
152. Pub. L. No. 89-695, 80 Stat. 1028 (codified as 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d) (1982».
153. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(6)(C) (1982).
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appointed FSLICas receiver, courts lose jurisdiction to adjudicate
claims against the insolvent association. 1s4 Judicial "resolution of
even the facial merits of claims outside of the statutory reorganization
process would delay the receivership function" of distribution of assets
and thus constitute restraint of a receiver in violation of section
1464(d)(6)(C).1SS The Hudspeth court argued indirectly, reasoning
that a receiver has the power to liquidate, and a lesser included part of
that power is the right to "[fix] the time and manner of distribu
tion."IS6 Any court ruling that a creditor was owed a debt would in
terfere with FSLIC's power to fix the time and manner of the
distribution of assets,IS7 and would constitute impermissible restraint
of a receiver under section 1464(d)(6)(C).ls8
The Morrison-Knudsen court, on the other hand, reasoned that
court adjudication of either the amount or the existence of a claim
under FSLIC adjustment would not affect or restrain the receivership
function because FSLIC as receiver did not possess adjudicatory au
thority.ls9 The Morrison-Knudsen court criticized the Hudspeth
court's reasoning: "Judicial adjudication ... does not restrain or af
fect a receivership; it simply determines the existence and amount of
claims that a receiver is to honor in its eventual distribution of as
sets."I60 The Morrison-Knudsen court faulted the Hudspeth court for
154. The Hudspeth court's position is that §§ 1464(d)(6)(C) and 1729(d), taken to
gether, establish exclusive FSLIC adjudication. See Hudspeth, 756 F.2d at 1101. The court
does not analyze the statutory authority separately. For heuristic purposes, this comment
examines the adjudicatory issue and the exclusive adjudicatory issue separately. First, this
comment, in section III A, examines the extent to which 1464(d)(6)(C) establishes an ex
clusive remedy. Then, in section III B, this comment examines the extent to which
1464(d)(6)(C) and 1729(d) establish adjudicatory authority.
155. Hudspeth, 756 F.2d at 1102. Plaintiff Hudspeth argued that a determination by
the court that the defunct savings and loan owed him a debt (as opposed to a fixed amount)
did not restrain or affect the receivership function. Id. at 1102.
156. Id. (quoting Morris v. Jones, 329 U.S. 545, 549 (1947».
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1217. As the Morrison-Knudsen court noted,
this section does not describe the powers of FSLIC as receiver; rather, it simply says that a
court may not interfere with FSLIC's powers. Id. Thus, if adjudication is one of FSLIC's
powers, then § 1464(d)(6)(C) would prohibit courts from interfering with FSLIC adjudica
tion. This, however, would not amount to exclusive FSLIC adjudication because FSLIC
would not have any authority to prevent courts from adjudicating.
With respect to FSLIC's receivership powers, § 1464(d)(6)(C) does appear to prevent
courts from interfering with them. For example, FSLIC decides whether to merge or liqui
date an insolvent association. Section 1464(d)(6)(C) prevents courts from interfering with
that decision.
160. Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. CHG Int'l Inc., 811 F.2d 1209, 1217 (9th Cir. 1987)
(citing Morris v. Jones, 329 U.S. 545, 549' (1947».
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flawed logic,161 asking "[i]f judicial review, which will delay-perhaps
by years-the liquidation process, does not restrain or affect a receiver,
then why does initial adjudication by a court of creditors' claims do
SO?"162 If the Hudspeth court's argument were valid, then judicial re
view also would restrain or affect the receivership function impermissi
bly, because it would delay the distribution of assets: either both
initial adjudication and subsequent judicial review restrain a receiver
ship function, or neither does so. Judicial review does not restrain a
receiver impermissibly-indeed, judicial review is part of the Hudspeth
approach. Thus, initial adjudication does not restrain a receiver.
Regardless of whether FSLIC has adjudicatory authority, section
1464(d)(6)(C) does not establish exclusive FSLIC adjudicatory author
ity. An examination ofFISA's legislative history supports the position
that courts are not prohibited from adjudicating once the Board ap
points FSLIC as receiver. None of the courts that addressed this issue
properly utilized this legislative history in its statutory analysis. 163
The purpose of section 1464(d)(6)(C) was to prevent court interven
tion in FSLIC receivership proceedings in only two circumstances,
neither of which is the adjudication of creditor claims.
1.

Legislative History of FISA

The purpose of FISA was to "strengthen the regulatory and su
pervisory authority of the Federal agencies [the Board and FDIC] over
insured ... savings and loan associations."I64 Prior to its enactment,
the Board had only two enforcement powers: it could take over the
savings and loan association by placing it in receivership, or it could
terminate the association's insurance. 16S Both powers seem to be dras
tic measures if the Board simply wanted to force a solvent savings and
loan to comply with the law. FISA granted the Board new enforce
ment powers: 1) to issue permanent and temporary cease-and-desist
orders requiring that the association stop certain specified conduct,
2) to remove dishonest officers and directors, and 3) to examine any
corporation controlled by an officer of the savings and loan. 166
161. Id. at 1216.
.
162. Id. Under the Hudspeth approach, the creditor is ~titled to judicial review
under the APA once administrative remedies have been exhausted.
163. Lyons Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Westside Bancorporation, 636 F. Supp. 576 (N.D.
III. 1986), aff'd, 828 F.2d 387 (7th Cir. 1987), briefly discussed the legislative history of
FISA, but only in a general way.
164. Financial Institutions Supervisory Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-695, 80 Stat.
1028, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1204 (emphasis added).
165. T. MARVELL, supra note 28, at 32-33.
166. Id. These powers are codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d) (1982).
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Congress viewed these new powers as intermediate, less drastic
powers to be used in order to prevent "violation of law or regulation
and unsafe and unsound practices which otherwise might adversely
affect the Nation's financial institutions."167 Although FISA affected
receivership powers, Congress' primary interest was to supplement the
Board's and the FDIC's arsenal of regulatory and supervisory powers
over their respective institutions.
Prior to FISA's enactment, the Board proceeded under section
5(d)(1) of the Home Owners Loan Act of 1933 (HOLA)168 to force a
savings and loan to correct violations of law or regulation. It was
often a "long-drawn-out process ... [and was] ill-suited to securing
prompt correction of irregular practices or unsafe operation."169
FISA replaced this process by channelling appeals of the Board's en
forcement orders through an administrative procedurepo According
to the Senate Report explaining the FISA, "[h]earings provided for in
section 5(d) [1464(d)] would be held in the federal judicial district in
which the home office of the association is located, ... [and] con
ducted in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act ...."171
The only hearings provided for in section 5(d) are for determining
whether the Board's exercise of enforcement power against a savings
and loan association is appropriate. FISA did not speak to the admin
istrative adjudication or other resolution of creditors' claims.
Though it increased the Board's enforcement powers, FISA lim
ited the Board's power to appoint a receiver. The legislative history
167. Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, S. REp. No. 1482, 89th Cong.,
2nd Sess. I, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CoDE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 3532, 3533 (hereinafter
S. REP. No. 1482).
168. Home Owners Loan Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-43, 48 Stat. 128 (codified at 12
U.S.C. §§ 1461-1470 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986».
169. S. REP. No. 1482, supra note 167, at 4-5, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CoDE CoNG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 3537. Section 5(d)(I) of the HOLA, prior to the enactment of the FISA,
provided for an administrative hearing, and, in the absence of a special statutory review
procedure, a party could have obtained initial court review of a final order of the Board in a
federal district court, followed by an appeal to a court of appeals. However, within 30 days
after service of notice upon it of alleged violations, the association could waive the adminis
trative hearing and submit the controversy to a federal district court. Often, the ensuing
trial de novo was a long, drawn out process; in one case, pre-trial discovery procedures
lasted three years. [d.
170. For example, temporary cease-and-desist orders can be stayed by the local dis
trict court if appealed within 10 days of the issuance of the order. Permanent cease-and
desist orders, on the other hand, may be challenged in court only after a hearing is held
under the Administrative Procedure Act. S. REP. No. 1482, supra note 167, at 10-11, re
printed in 1966 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS at 3541-3542.
171. [d. at 15, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS at 3546 (em
phasis added).
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shows that, under FISA, the Board could no longer appoint a receiver
whenever it deemed it necessary,172 but only when certain circum
stances obtained. 173 The statute granted a savings and loan associa
tion placed in receivership for any of the prescribed circumstances
thirty days to bring an action in district court for removal of the re
ceiver.114 If any "proceeding such as an action to stay a temporary
cease-and-desist order, or a petition by an association for judicial re
view of a cease-and-desist order"17s is pending in court at the time that
the savings and loan is placed in receivership, those proceedings would
be stayed "pending the outcome of the association's action to remove
the conservator or receiver ...."176
The Senate Report concluded by summarizing the bill as follows:
The provisions of this subparagraph [l464(d)] would, in effect,
limit the jurisdiction of a court to order the removal of a conserva
tor or receiver, except in an action for removal brought by an asso
ciation under authority of paragraph (6)(A) [1464(d)(6)(A)] of the
proposed amended section5(d) [1464(d)], or, except at the instance
of the Board, to restrain the exercise of the powers or functions of a
conservator or receiver. 177
172. Id. at 13, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 3544.
173. Id. The Board must find that
one or more of the following (grounds exist]: (i) insolvency in that the assets of
the association are less than its obligations to its creditors and others, including
its members; (ii) substantial dissipation of assets or earnings due to any violation
or violations of law, rules, or regulations, or to any unsafe or unsound practice or
practices; (iii) an unsafe or unsound conditions to transact business; (iv) willful
violation of a cease-and-desist order which has become final; (v) concealment of
books ....
12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(6)(A) (1982).
174. S. REp. No. 1482, supra note 167, at 14, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CoDE CoNG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 3545.
175. Id.
176. Id. If a court upheld the appointment of the receiver, judicial review of any
cease-and-desist order would be moot, because the association must challenge the legality
of the order administratively as prescribed by F1SA. If not, the proceedmgs would resume.
177. Id. (emphasis added). One court quoted this language as evidence of Congress'
intent to channel creditor claims through the administrative process. Lyons Say. & Loan
Ass'n v. Westside Bancorporation, 636 F. Supp. 576, 580 (N.D. Ill. 1986). The court read
the language broadly, much the same way that the Hudspeth court read § 1464(d)(6)(C).
The Lyons court also quoted language from the House Banking and Currency Committee's
summary of the FISA: "The scope of judicial review shall also be in conformity with the
provisions of Title 5 of the United States Code relating to judicial review of administrative
action, . . . . The purpose of the new language is to safeguard the right of individuals and
institutions from arbitrary and capricious agency action." Id. (quoting from H. REp. No.
2077, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1966». This language does not support the Lyons court's
holding because it is referring to challenges to Board supervisory orders as discussed above
in the text.
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This legislative history demonstrates that section 1464(d) does
not provide an administrative procedure for resolving creditor claims,
and limits the jurisdiction of a court in only two respects. First, a
court may not remove a receiver after thirty days from the time of
appointment. Second, if a court were entertaining an association's
challenge to a Board cease-and-desist order, and the association were
subsequently placed in receivership, then the court action would be
stayed. Read together with the specific statutory language, the history
shows that, in enacting FISA, Congress contemplated only the limita
tion ofjurisdiction in these two specific respects, and not the wholesale
elimination of the couft'S jurisdiction. Further, and directly under
mining the Hudspeth court's conclusion, neither of the two jurisdic
tional limitations intended by Congress has anything to do with
FSLIC adjudication of hreditor claims. FISA simply does not address
the creditor claims issue, and thus establishes neither adjudicatory au
thority nor exclusive adjudicatory authority. Support for FSLIC's au
thority to adjudicate such claims must come, if at all, from some other
source.
B.

Statutory Authority for FSLIC Adjudication

This section examines the many statutory arguments that have
been used to justify FSLIC's adjudicatory authority. Subsection III B
(1) explores section 1464(d)(6)(C), in the general context of the
HOLA. Subsection III B (2) explores several statutes in the NHA,
with primary emphasis on section 1729(d). Subsection III B (3) dis
cusses the current regulations. Then, subsection III B (4) compares
FSLIC to the FDIC. Finally, section III C explores whether the
Board may use its rulemaking power to authorize FSLIC adjudication.
1.

The HOLA and FSLIC Adjudication

FSLIC argued, and the Hudspeth court agreed, that section
1464(d)(6)(C)178 established FSLIC adjudicatory authority. 179 Section
1464(d)(6)(C) is part of the HOLA.180 Under the HOLA, the Board is
authorized to charter and oversee fed,eral savings and loan associa
tions. 181 In addition, the Board has the power to appoint FSLIC as
receiver for state and federally chartered institutions. 182 Section
178, 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(6)(C) (1982). See supra text accompanying note 153 for
the language of § 1464(d)(6)(C).
179. Hudspeth, 756 F.2d at llOI.
180. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461-1470 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
181. See id.
182. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1464, 1729 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986),
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1464(d)(6)(C) is but one provision of a complicated section 1464(d).183
As discussed in section III A of this comment, section 1464(d), which
Congress enacted as part of FISA, prescribes Board powers, not
FSLIC powers. The HOLA, in general, does not prescribe the powers
and duties of FSLIC as receiver.
"
According to the Hudspeth court, as explained in section III A,
1464(d)(6)(C) prohibits courts from adjudicating claims against the re
ceivership once FSLIC is appointed as receiver. Therefore, since
courts are prohibited from adjudicating, FSLIC must adjudicate. 184
The Mornson-Knudsen court read section 1464(d)(6)(C) as a pro
vision which prohibits courts from interfering with FSLIC's receiver
ship powers, but not as establishing what those powers are. 18S Under
the Morrison-Knudsen approach, section 1464(d)(6)(C) would pre
clude a court from interfering with FSLIC adjudication of creditor
claims if FSLIC had adjudicatory authority, but section 1464(d)(6)(C)
does not establish such authority. Because adjudicatory authority is
not among the traditional powers of a receiver,186 the Morrison-Knud
sen court reasoned that such authority must come from some other
statutory source. 187 Even if the power to adjudicate was among the
traditional powers of a receiver, relevant statutes would define FSLIC
183. 12 u.s.c. § 1464(d) (1982) is entitled "Proceedings to enforce compliance with
law and regulations; cease and desist proceedings; temporary cease-and-desist orders; sus
pension or removal of directors or officers; appointment and removal of conservator or
receiver; hearings and judicial review; regulations for reorganization, dissolutions, etc.; pen
alties; definitions; application to other institutions."
184. The Hudspeth court's position is that § 1464(d)(6)(C), together with § 1729(d),
establishes exclusive FSLIC adjudication. The court does not explain how adjudicatory
authority is established, except by the inference that FSLIC must adjudicate because courts
cannot.
185. Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1217.
186. Id.
187. The Morrison-Knudsen court stated that a receiver's functions do not ordinarily
include the power to adjudicate, and relied on Morris v. Jones, 329 U.S. 545, 549 (1947):
"The establishment of the existence and amount of a claim against the debtor in no way
disturbs the possession of the liquidation court, in no way affects title to the property, and
does not necessarily involve a determination of what priority the claim should have." Mor
rison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1217 (quoting Morris, 329 U.S. at 549). Hudspeth also cited
Morris as authority for the proposition that the receiver has the right to fix the "time and
manner of distribution" of the assets ofthe receivership. Hudspeth, 756 F.2d at 1102 (quot
ing Morris, 329 U.S. at 549). Hudspeth argued that court adjudication of claims consti
tuted impermissible restraint of this receivership function. Hudspeth, 756 F.2d at 1102.
Morrison-Knudsen's use of the Morris opinion is much more in keeping with the context of
the Morris opinion.
The Court was describing the "two-fold" liquidation process. Morris, 329 U.S. at 549.
One aspect of this process involves the distribution of property. "No one can obtain part of
the assets or enforce a right to specific property in possession of the liquidation court [or
receiver] except upon application to it." Id. The other aspect involves the "proof and .
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powers because FSLIC is a statutory receiver. ISS
2.

The NHA and FSLIC Adjudication

Title IV of the National Housing Act (NHA)IS9 prescribes the
duties and powers of FSLIC. Section 1729(d)l90 of that act describes
FSLIC's powers upon the liquidation of an insured association. The
Morrison-Knudsen court rejected FSLIC's argument that section
1729(d) authorized FSLIC adjudication,191 while the Hudspeth court
relied on section 1729(d) as establishing FSLIC adjudication. 192 Sub
section (2)(a) explores section 1729(d) from its original enactment
through its subsequent amendments and demonstrates that section
1729(d) alone does not establish adjudicatory authority. Subsection
(2)(b) explores other statutes of the NHA, and concludes that section
1729(d) in the context of the NHA does not establish FSLIC
adjudication.

allowance" of claims, which is "distinct from distribution." Id. Courts adjudicate the
claims; the receiver distributes the assets.
The "right rule of decision" is that a "valid judgment in personam [as opposed to a
judgment in rem over the assets] can not be ignored in another action." Beach, Judgment
Claims in Receivership Proceedings, 30 YALE L.l. 674,679-80 (1921). This view is consis
tent with the position the Supreme Court adopted in Morris, that is, courts may not inter
fere with the receiver's control of the assets, and court adjudication does not interfere with
the receiver's control of the assets.
The Morrison-Knudsen court unearthed some evidence that Congress might have con
sidered that the power to adjudicate was among the powers of a receiver. When Congress
amended the Federal Credit Union Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1766, 1783 and 1787 (1982), to pro
vide for receivership authority, the following comment was included in the legislative his
tory: "[The provisions] are similar to those which are customarily prescribed in other types
of liquidation and would authorize, for example, . . . the receipt and adjudication of
claims." S. REP. No. 1647, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1946 U.S. CODE CONGo
SERVo 1323, 1324. Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1219 n.3. Morrison-Knudsen stated that
Congress simply was mistaken, that "Federal receivers of insolvent banks have never had
the power conclusively to adjudicate creditor claims. In any case, section 1766(b)(3) along
with its legislative history is so remote from the cases at bar that it cannot affect our deci
sion. Without more it is too slender a reed to support FSLIC's construction of its own
statutory authority." Id. (citation omitted).
<
188. Powers of a statutory receiver are determined by statute. 66 C.l.S. Receivers
§ 184 (2d. ed. 1972). "The powers and functions of a statutory receiver are limited by the
purpose of the statute under which he is appointed." Id. See e.g. Illinois Savings & Loan
Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32 para. 923 (Smith-Hurd 1970).
189. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1724-1730 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
190. 12 U.S.C. § 1729(d) (1982).
191: Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1218-19.
192. Hudspeth, 756 F.2d at 1101-02.
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Section 1729(d)

In 1934, Congress enacted section 1729(d) as part of the NHA.
Section 1729(d) read:
In connection with the liquidation of insured institutions in de
fault, the Corporation shall have power to carry on the business of
and to collect all obligations to the insured institutions, to settle,
compromise, or release claims in favor of or against the insured in
stitutions, and to do all other things that may be necessary in con
nection therewith, subject only to the regulation of the court or
other public authority having jurisdiction over the matter. 193
Though Congress did not alter the language of section 1729(d) when it
enacted the Bank Protection Act of 1968 (BPA),194 the BPA provided:
"In connection with the liquidation of any ... [state chartered savings
and loan] the language 'court or other public authority having juris
diction over the matter' ... shall mean said Board."19s In 1982, the
Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act (GSDIA) amended the
language of section 1729(d). From the passage of the GSDIA in 1982
until October 15, 1986 when the language expired, section 1729(d)
read: 196
In connection with the liquidation of insured institutions, the
Corporation shall have power to carry on the business of and to
collect all obligations to the insured institutions, settle, compromise,
or release claims in favor of or against the insured institutions, and
to do all things that may be necessary in connection therewith, sub
ject only to the regulation of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board.
or. in cases where the Corporation has been appointed conservator.
receiver. or legal custodian solely by a public authority having juris
diction over the matter other than said Board. subject only to the
regulation of such public authority.197

Both the Hudspeth and Mo"ison-Knudsen courts interpreted the
GSDlA-amended language. 198
193. National Housing Act of 1934, ch. 847, Title IV, § 406(d), 48 Stat. 1259.
194. Pub. L. No. 90-389, 82 Stat. 294 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S. CoDE CoNG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 357 at 359.
195. /d., reprinted in 1968 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 357. This lan
guage, deleted in 1982 by the GSDIA. has been reinstated. 12 U.S.C. § 1729(c)(3)(B)
(Supp. IV 1986).
196. See 12 U.S.C. § 1729(d) (Supp. IV 1986).
197. 12 U.S.C. § 1729(d) (1982) (emphasis added). Section 1729(d) now reads as
originally enacted. 12 U.S.C. § 1729(d) (Supp. IV 1986).
198. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decided Coit Independence Joint Venture v.
FirstSouth, 829 F.2d 563 (5th Cir. 1987), petition for cerL granted. 108 S. Ct. 1105 (1988)
under the reinstated original language of § 1729(d) and held that the difference did not
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If Congress intended, through section 1729(d), to empower
FSLIC with adjudicatory authority, it had three opportunities to do
so, first when Congress enacted the NHA, or subsequently when it
passed either the BPA or GSDIA. Before exploring section 1729(d) in
the context of the NHA, the BPA, and the GSDIA to determine
whether Congress authorized FSLIC adjudication, this subsection ex
plains and criticizes the positions of the Hudspeth and Morrison-Knud
sen courts.
The Hudspeth court looked to the language of section 1729(d)
and the legislative history of the BPA to demonstrate that section
1729(d), in conjunction with section 1464(d)(6)(C), established FSLIC
adjudication. 199 "Congress wanted the FSLIC· to be able to act
quickly and decisively in reorganizing, operating, or dissolving a failed
institution, and intended that the FSLIC's ability to accomplish these
goals not be interfered with by other judicial or regulatory authori
ties."2°O Once again, the Hudspeth court reasoned that this policy pre
vents courts from adjudicating, thus inviting the inference that FSLIC
as receiver has an implied power to adjudicate.
The Hudspeth court made two mistakes which limit the persua
siveness of its argument. First, the court stated that section 1729(d)
originally was enacted as part of the BPA.201 Congress, however, en
acted section 1729(d) as part of the NHA some thirty-four years prior
to the BPA. Second, the Hudspeth court employed the legislative his
tory of the BPA to interpret the GSDIA language. 202 According to
section 1729(d) at the time that Congress enacted the BPA, FSLIC
was subject "only to the regulation of the court or other public author
ity having jurisdiction over the matter."203 The GSDIA changed this
language, so that FSLIC was subject "only to the regulation of the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board . . . ."204 The GSDIA language,
affect the Hudspeth approach that all claims were switched to the administrative track. Id.
at 564.
199. Hudspeth. 756 F.2d at 1101.
200. Id. at 1101. "[T]he Senate confirmed that FSLIC's authority '[i]n carrying out
its receivership responsibilities ... would be subject only to the regulation of the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board ... .' .. Id. at 1101 (quoting S. REP. No. 1263. 90th Cong.• 2d
Sess. 10. reprinted in 1968 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2530. 2539).
201. Hudspeth. 756 F.2d at 1101 n.2. Using legislative history to interpret a statute
is a legitimate analytical tool. However. the legislative history referred to ought to be that
of the statute in question. or the use of the different legislative history should be specifically
noted and defended.
202. Hudspeth. 756 F.2d at 1101-02.
203. See supra text accompanying note 193 for the language of § 1729(d) as it existed
in 1968.
204. See supra text accompanying note 197 for the GSDIA-amended language.

,
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coupled with the legislative history of the BPA, provides support for
the Hudspeth approach that no court may interfere with FSLIC, but
the court's reliance on the BPA's legislative history is misplaced. The
Hudspeth court relied on the legislative history of the BPA, enacted in
1968, in interpreting the GSDIA language of section l729(d), enacted
in 1982, when, in fact, Congress enacted the statute in 1934-thirty·
four years prior to the BPA.
The Hudspeth court then compounded this error. The court con·
cluded that Congress, in enacting the BPA, intended FSLIC as re·
ceiver to have unlimited power to facilitate the efficient and
inexpensive winding up of the affairs of insolvent associations. The
court reasoned that adjudication is such a power, and thus concluded
that FSLIC had adjudicatory authority.2os While the BPA was en·
acted, in part, in order to facilitate efficiency and limit the costs of
receivership proceedings, the BPA neither provided FSLIC with ex·
clusive adjudicatory authority, nor with carte blanche to do whatever
it deemed would further efficiency.
FSLIC argued in Morrison·Knudsen that the power to adjudicate
was necessary and thereby included in the powers to "settle, compro·
mise, or release claims ... and to do all things that may be necessary
...."206 The Morrison-Knudsen court dismissed this argument as un·
duly burdening the word "necessary" and as being "incompatible"
with the explicitly granted powers to settle, compromise, or release
c1aims. 207 According to the court, adjudicators do not settle, compro
mise, or release claims; they adjudicate, holding for one party or the
other.20s
i.

Legislative History of the NHA

There is no evidence to suggest that Congress intended to estab·
lish FSLIC adjudication when it enacted the NHA in 1934. 209 The
main purpose of the bill was to provide home mortgage insurance that
all banking establishments could offer their customers in order to ease
the effects of the Depression. 210 The savings and loan industry and the
Board opposed the legislation, fearing that other banking institutions
205.
206.
(Supp. IV
207.
208.
209.
210.

See Hudspeth, 756 F.2d at 110t.
Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1218, 1219 (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 1729(c)(3)(B)
1986».
Id. at 1219.
[d.
12 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1750)(g) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
T. MARVELL, supra note 28, at 27.
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would take away a portion of the home mortgage business. 211 To ap
pease the savings and loan industry, Congress created FSLIC through
Title IV of the NHA212 to insure the accounts of savings and loan
associations. 213 Congress copied FDIC214 and made FSLIC part of
the Board. 2lS This enabled saving and loan associations to compete
with other banking institutions. 216
There are two factors which support the conclusion that Congress
did not intend to grant FSLIC adjudicatory powers in the 1934 Act.
The first is the language of section 1729(d) itself.217 As previously
discussed, adjudication is not one of the specifically enumerated pow
ers, and is, in fact, inconsistent with some of those powers. Second,
Congress modelled FSLIC after the FDIC, a pre-existing govemment
owned insurance corporation which also acts as receiver for insolvent
banks. The FDIC does not have adjudicatory authority.218 To the
extent that Congress intended to copy the FDIC, it probably did not
intend to empower FSLIC with adjudicatory authority. Thus, if sec
tion 1729(d) establishes adjudicatory authority, it must do so by virtue
of an amendment.
11.

Legislative History of the BPA

Though it did not alter section 1729(d), Congress did enact the
cryptic phrase: "In connection with the liquidation of any ... [state
chartered savings and loan], the language 'court or other public au
thority having jurisdiction over the matter' in subsection (d) of this
section shall mean said Board."219 The question is whether Congress,
by means of this enactment, altered the meaning of section 1729(d) to
authorize FSLIC adjudication.
Congress enacted the BPA to solve a specific problem connected
with state-chartered associations that arose in the 1960's. As of 1980,
FSLIC had paid insurance claims to depositors of only thirteen sav
211. Id. For this reason, Congress gave this job to the Federal Housing Administra
tion (now part of the Department of Housing and Urban Development). Id.
212. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1724-1730(g) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
213. T. MARVELL, supra note 28, at 27.
214. Id. at 84.
215. 14,. at 27.
216. Id.
217. See supra text accompanying notes 193 & 197 for the language of § 1729(d).
218. See infra note 303 and accompanying text.
219. Pub. L. No. 90-390, 82 Stat. 296, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONGo & An
MIN. NEWS 359. The GSDIA deleted this language in 1982, but Congress reinstated it on
October 13, 1986. 12 U.S.C. § 1729(c)(3)(B) (Supp. IV 1986).

FSLIC-ADJUDICATION OF CREDITOR CLAIMS

1988]

267

ings and loan associations. 22o Six of the thirteen insolvencies occurred
in the 1960's, and five of those six involved Illinois associations. 221 All
five thrift institutions were state-chartered and FSLIC-insured. Prior
to the BPA of 1968, which amended section 406(k) of the NHA,222
FSLIC and the Board did not have the same powers over state
chartered savings and loan associations as they did over federally
chartered associations. In the case of state-chartered thrift institu
tions, a state commissioner, and not the Board, had authority to ap
point a receiver, yet FSLIC still was required to pay all of the
depositors' insured accounts in the event of insolvency.223 In the Illi
nois cases, the state commissioner appointed a state receiver; the ac
tions of this receiver put severe stress on FSLIC's assets. 224
The purpose of the BPA was to assure that the Illinois situation
did not recur. To effectuate this purpose, Congress gave the Board the
power to appoint FSLIC as receiver for state-chartered associations
placed in receivership under certain conditions, essentially "federaliz
ing" the receivership. 22~
220. Note, FSLIC Federal Receivership Appointments for Allegedly Insolvent State
Savings and Loan Associations: A Plot to Federalize State Savings and Loans Against their

wiln 33 DE PAUL L. REv. 783, 791 n.47 (1984) (citing D. CoHEN & R. FREIER, THE
FEDERAL HOME LoAN BANK SYSTEM 11 n.6 (1980» [hereinafter Federalize State
Savings].
221.

Id.

222. National Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 73-479,48 Stat. 1246 (1934) (codified at 12
U.S.C. §§ 1701-17SO(g) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986».
223. See T. MARVELL, supra note 28, at 99-102 (description of the protracted receiv
ership of Marshall Savings & Loan Association).
224. Federalize State Savings, supra note 220, at 791. See also S. REp. No. 1263, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2530,2536 [here
inafter S. REp. No. 1263]. In the case of the insolvent Illinois savings and loan associa
tions, FSLIC paid out more than 216 million dollars. By the time that the BPA was passed
in 1968, FSLIC had yet to recover any of the funds, even though one of the associations
had been in receivership for five years. The state commissioner did not appoint FSLIC as
receiver and refused to give FSLIC any information on the financial status of the associa
tion until the hearings on the BPA were held in 1968. FSLIC paid one thrift, Marshall
Savings & Loan Association, 83 million dollars for the insured accounts. Marshall had the
use of that money for three years, interest-free, while the association was in the hands of a
state receiver. FSLIC lost the use of this money and the interest it would have earned, and
recouped nothing in this three year period. Id. at 7-8, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CoDE CoNG.
& ADMIN. NEWS at 2537.
225. Id. at 9, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 2538. Before
the Board can appoint FSLIC receiver for a state-chartered association, the following con
ditions must be met: 1) the state must first place the association in receivership, 2) the
Board must determine that the § 1464(d) grounds exist, and 3) the savings account holders
must be unable to withdraw funds. [d. at 9-10, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CoDE CoNG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 2538-39. Once the Board appoints FSLIC as receiver, the receivership is
handled in the same way as if the association were federally chartered. Id. at 10, reprinted
in 1968 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 2539.
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The Senate Report explained the enacted provision which affected
section 1729(d):
Section 406(c)(3)(B) authorizes the FSLIC to liquidate the institu
tion in an orderly manner or make such other disposition of the
matter as the FSLIC might deem to be in the best interest of the
institutions, its savers, and the FSLIC. In carrying out its receiver
ship responsibilities, the committee expects the FSLIC to give due
consideration to the interest of all of the claimants upon the assets
of the association, including general creditors, uninsured depositors,
and association stockholders. The authority of the FSLIC in this
regard would be subject only to the regulation of the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board and not to that of any State authority, adminis
trative or judicial, which may previously have had regulatory au
"
thority with respect
to the institution. 226

This language must be interpreted in light of the history and purposes
of the 1968 Act. To give FSLIC and the Board more control over the
appointment of a receiver and the liquidation proceedings of state
chartered associations, Congress wrested both administrative and judi
cial power from the state and gave it to the Board and FSLIC. To
allay fears that FSLIC would abuse its power and conduct liquidation
proceedings in an arbitrary manner, Congress instructed FSLIC to
give "due consider~tion to the interest of all of the claimants upon the
assets of the association. "227
The language of section 1729(d) as it existed at the time of the
BPA can now be understood in the context of the BPA. It dealt solely
with the particular problem of FSLIC control of state-chartered sav
ings and.1oan associations. Pursuant to state law, a state authority
could appoint whomever it wished as receiver for a state-chartered as
sociation. Until and unless the Board stepped in and appointed
FSLIC receiver, the state-appointed receiver would be under the com
plete control of the state authority.228 Then, once the Board ap
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. The powers of a state-appointed non-FSLlC receiver are established by state
law. Those powers, at least in general, do not include the power to adjudicate. For exam
ple, in Illinois, a creditor may prove his or her claim "to the satisfaction of the receiver" or
adjudicate it in a court. Illinois Savings & Loan Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32 para. 923
(Smith-Hurd 1970). The powers of a receiver under Illinois law are analogous to the pow
ers of the FDIC as receiver. The receiver may allow a claim, but does not have final au
thority to refuse a claim. See section III C for the discussion of the FDIC. Furthermore,
the creditor may bring a claim in any court that has subject-matter jurisdiction; the creditor
is not limited to the court supervising the receivership. See FSLlC v. Krueger, 435 F.2d
633,636 (7th Cir. 1970) (An action in personam brought in a federal district court does not
interfere with the state court's supervision of the receivership.).
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pointed FSLIC, the state authority would lose all control over FSLIC.
The language added by the BPA refers to FSLIC receiverships of fed
eralized state-chartered savings and loan associations. In such cases,
FSLIC shall have the power to act in the specified ways, "subject only
to the regulation" of the Board. 229 The language of the BPA thus had
this specific purpose, and did not in any way establish FSLIC
adjudication.
If section 1729(d) empowers FSLIC with adjudicatory authority,
it must be by virtue of the GSDIA. Subsection (2)(a)(iii) explores the
legislative history of the GSDIA to determine whether Congress in
tended to empower the FSLIC with adjudicatory authority through
the 1982 Act.
iii.

Legislative History of the GSDIA

Congress enacted the Gam-St. Germain Depository Institutions
Act of 1982 (GSDIA) to "revitalize the housing industry by strength
ening the financial stability of home mortgage lending institutions and
ensuring the availability of home mortgage loans."23o The GSDIA
gave savings and loan institutions increased banking powers which en
abled them to offer consumers more services and to compete more ef-·
fectively with other banking institutions. 231 In addition, the GSDIA
provided greater protection to depositors and creditors232 and granted
FSLIC and the FDIC greater flexibility to "deal with financially dis
tressed depository institutions."233
In strengthening FSLIC's powers, section 122(a) of the GSDIA
authorized FSLIC to make loans to insured depository institutions in
order to prevent default or lessen FSLIC's risk, and to merge insolvent
institutions with solvent ones. 234 Section 122(b) increased FSLIC's
powers over a defaulted federally chartered savings and loan associa
229. 12 U.S.C. § 1729(d) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
230. Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (1982).
231. S. KIDWELL & R. PETERSON, supra note 2, at 126. In the early 1980's, rising
interest rates and unstable infiation rates seriously threatened savings and loan institutions.
Consumers were taking their savings out of savings and loans and investing their money in
money market funds. Most of the savings and loan investments were in long term home
mortgages at fairly low interest rates. See Comment, The "Brokered Deposit" Regulation:
A Response to the FDIC's and FHLBB's Efforts to Limit Deposit Insurance, 33 U.C.L.A. L.
REv. 594, 610-14 (1985).
232. S. REp. No. 536, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. I, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CoDE CoNG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 3054, 3055 [hereinafter S. REp. No. 536].
233. Id.
.
234. Section 122(a) amended § 406(f) of the National Housing Act (codified at 12
U.S.C. 1729(f) (1982». See S. REp. No. 536, supra note 232, at 48-49, reprinted in 1982
U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 3102-3103.
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tion in order to equal FSLIC's powers over state-chartered associa
tions.23s Finally, the GSDIA gave the Board increased, but only
temporary, authority over state-chartered savings and loan associa
tions. Section 122(d) of the GSDIA authorized the Board to appoint
FSLIC receiver for a state-chartered savings and loan association
before the state authorized the receivership.236 The state r~mained
free to appoint FSLIC receiver and, until and unless the Board inter
vened, the state authority controlled FSLIC and the receivership.237
The GSDIA-enacted language of section 1729(d) reflects the dis
tinction between sections 1729(b) and (c). Between 1982 and 1986,
when the GSDIA expired, the Board could have appointed the FSLIC
receiver for state-chartered associations in either of two ways. First,
the state could have placed the association in receivership, and then
the Board could have stepped in and appointed FSLIC as receiver
based on statutory grounds as established by the BPA. Second, under
the GSDIA, the Board could have appointed FSLIC as receiver with
out waiting for the state to place the association in receivership. In
either event, the Board controlled FSLIC, and the state authorities
were without any control. After the emergency power to appoint
FSLIC as receiver without prior state action expired,238 the language
of section 1729(d) no longer needed to reflect this distinction, and thus
the language of 1729(d) as amended by the GSDIA expired, and the
235. Section 122(b) amended § 406(b) of the National Housing Act (codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1729(b) (1982». See S. REP. No. 536, supra note 232, at 49, reprinted in 1982
U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS at 3103. Prior to the GSDIA, "an anomalous situa
tion exist[ed] whereby the ability of the FSLIC to make "such other disposition' of a de
faulted S&L as in the best interests of its insured members applie[d] only to State-chartered
insured institutions, and not to Federal associations." Id.
236. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1729(c)(I)(B)(ii)(I) and (c)(I)(B)(ii)(II) (1982). See section III B
(2)(a)(ii) for an explanation of when the Board could appoint FSLIC as receiver for state
chartered savings and loan associations prior to the GSDIA.
According to the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee, the Board is
allowed "to appoint the FSLIC as conservator or receiver of a State-chartered insured insti
tution upon a determination that the institution is in an unsafe or unsound condition to
transact business, has substantially dissipated its assets, or had assets less than its obliga
tions. However, the Bank Board must seek written approval from the relevant State official
prior to exercising such receivership authority, and FSLIC may act without such approval
only if the state fails to act in a timely manner or FSLIC is appointed receiver by a pubic
[sic] authority of an institution in default." S. REP. No. 536, supra note 232, at 8, reprinted
in 1982 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 3062.
The authority to appoint FSLIC in this fashion was a temporary authority; it expired
on October 15, 1986. 12 U.S.C. § 1729(d) (Supp. IV 1986).
237. 12 U.S.C. § 1729(c)(2)(A) (1982).
238. This emergency power (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1729 (c) (1982» expired October
15, 1986. 12 U.S.C. § 1729(c) (Supp. IV 1986).
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earlier language was reinstated. 239
The GSDIA temporarily increased the Board's powers, expedit
ing Board procedures for appointing FSLIC as the receiver for state
chartered thrift institutions. 24O Like the BPA and the FISA, each of
which also increased the Board's and FSLIC's authority over state
chartered associations, the GSDIA did not provide for the administra
tion or adjudication of creditors' claims. Section 1729(d), as originally
enacted, or as altered by the BPA or the GSDIA, does not establish
FSLIC adjudicatory authority.241
b.

FSLIC Adjudication and Other Statutes in the NHA

The previous discussion has illustrated that adjudicatory author
ity for FSLIC cannot by derived from section 1729(d) alone. This sub
section explores other statutes in the NHA's statutory scheme that
may tend to prove or disprove the existence of authority for FSLIC
adjudication. It concludes that Congress did not intend, through the
NHA, to empower FSLIC with adjudicatory authority.
I.

Section 1729(b)(1)(B): Power to Pay Valid Claims

Section 1729(b)(1)(B) provides: "In the event that a Federal asso
ciation is in default, the Corporation shall be appointed as conservator
or receiver and as such shall pay all valid credit obligations of the
association."242 FSLIC argued that the power to "pay all valid credit
239. 12 u.s.c. § 1729(d) (Supp. IV 1986).
240. Congress reasoned that early intervention might prevent a default, or, at a mini
mum, minimize a troubled association's loss of assets and minimize FSLIC payment from
FSLIC's own fund. S. REp. No. 536, supra note 232, at 8-9, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CoDE
CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS at 3061-62.
241. In order to determine the force of any statute, a court must examine the statute
against the background of the entire statutory framework. Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at
1219 (citing Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S.(19 How.) 183 (1857)).
FSLIC also argued that: 1) its rejection of a claim is "analogous to a trustee's rejection
of a contract in a bankruptcy proceeding." Hudspeth, 756 F.2d at 1101-02. Section 365(a)
of the Bankruptcy Code provides, in part, that a "trustee, subject to the court's approval,
may assume or reject any executory contract." 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1982). Even though
the court would be a bankruptcy court, § 365(a) does not give the trustee sole power to
reject or assume a contract. Id. To extend FSLIC's analogy further, one could argue that
the bankruptcy court's control over the trustee is analogous to the Board's control over
FSLIC. However, the Board merely reviews FSLIC's conclusion. The bankruptcy court,
on the other hand, "has full power to inquire into the validity of any claim asserted against
the estate ...." In re Dean, 460 F. Supp. 452, 456 (W.D.N.Y. 1978) (quoting Pepper v.
Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 305 (1939))..
242. 12 U.S.C. § 1729(b)(I)(B) (1982). Section 1729(b) is entitled "Powers of Cor
poration on default of Federal Savings & Loan Association." Section 1729(b)(I)(A) lists
the following additional powers: the receiver is authorized
(i) to take over the assets of and operate such association; (ii) to take such action
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obligations" further evidenced Congress' intent to grant FSLIC power
to adjudicate creditor claims. 243 The Mo"ison-Knudsen court coun
tered by observing that Congress used the word "valid" in the ordi
nary sense, to indicate that it does not want FSLIC to pay invalid
claims, noting that "(wJho determines 'validity' is not specified [by
§ 1729(b)(1)(B)]."244 The Morrison-Knudsen court's view is more
consistent with the ordinary meaning of the language. Given that
meaning ofthe term "valid," this section ofthe statute simply does not
support the inference that Congress granted FSLIC the authority to
determine the validity of such claims, let alone adjudicate them.
11.

Section ·1728: Suits by Depositors
Section. 1728('?) requires the Corporation,
[i]n the event of a default by any insured institution, [to pay] ...
each insured account in such insured institution . . . . Provided,
That the Corporation ... in any case where the Corporation is not
satisfied as to the validity of a claim for an insured account, ... may
require the final determination of a court of competent jurisdiction
before paying such claith. 245

"The language used indicates unambiguously that Congress antici
pated judicial adjUdication [of depositor claims] in the event of a dis
puted claim."246
Section 1728(c), a statute of limitations for depositors' suits, pro
vides that: "No action against the Corporation to enforce a claim for
payment of insurance upon an insured account of an insured institu
tion in default shall be brought after the expiration of three years from
the date of default ...."247 The Morrison-Knudsen court viewed this
as persuasive evidence that Congress "anticipated judicial adjudica
tion" for depositors' claims. 248
as may be necessary to put it in a sound solvent condition; (iii) to merge it with
another insured institution; (iv) to organize a new Federal association to take over
its assets; (v) to proceed to liquidate its assets in an orderly manner; or (vi) to
make such other disposition of the matter as it deems appropriate; whichever it
deems to be in the best interest of the association, its savers, and the Corporation

Id.

243. Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1218.
244. Id.
245. 12 U.S.C. § 1728(b) (1982).
246. Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1220.
247. 12 U.S.C. § 1728(c) (1982).
248. Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1220. The court relied on Jugum v. FSLIC, 637
F. Supp. 1045 (W.n. Wash. 1986), where depositors brought suit in federal district court to
recover insurance on their deposits. The Jugum court held that: 1) plaintiffs were entitled
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The Morrison-Knudsen court inferred from its analysis of the stat
ute of limitations that "FSLIC may adjudicate neither depositors' nor
creditors' claims."249 According to the court, it does not make sense
to "assume that FSLIC must litigate depositors' claims, with which it
has great expertise, but may adjudicate creditors' claims against the
institution in receivership, as to which its expertise is much less
.... "~50 FSLIC is part of a federal system of deposit insurance, the
purpose and function of which is to insure deposits. Congress created
the system and was obliged to detail depositors' rights and FSLIC du
ties.2S1 There is no corresponding statute detailing non-insured credi
tors' rights. The Morrison-Knudsen court's position is that Congress
would not have given FSLIC power to adjudicate creditors' claims,
while denying such power over depositors' claims. 252
FSLIC could counter that because Congress neither provided
that FSLIC may require a creditor to prove its claim in court before
paying an uninsured creditor, nor provided a statute of limitations for
uninsured creditor claims, Congress did not envision the judicial reso
lution of creditor claims. Furthermore, since Congress did not envi
sion judicial resolution of such claims, it must have intended
administrative resolution. This argument, however, is not persuasive.
There are statutes of limitations covering all claims. The statutes in
the NHA create a contractual relationship between the depositor and
the insurer and enumerate the duties and rights of both. The rights of
creditors are established by common law or other federal and state
statutes. Congress provided for depositors' rights in the NHA because
it created FSLIC to insure depositor accounts. Congress was silent on
the rights of creditors because their rights are determined by other
law. 2S3
to bring a court action, 2) the court was not limited to review of agency action under the
Administrative Procedure Act (plaintiffs had first presented their claims to FSLIC who
denied them in part), and 3) § 1728 was an independent source of jurisdiction that did not
require exhaustion of administrative remedies (although plaintiffs had exhausted adminis
trative remedies). Id.
249. Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1220.
250. Id.
251. See generally 12 U.S.C. § 1728 (1982).
252. Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1220. FSLIC is better equipped to deal with
depositor claims than creditor claims. Id. There is limited potential for complicated de
positor claims. On the other hand there is great potential for complicated creditor claims.
Morrison-Knudsen is an example. See supra notes 107-124 and accompanying text for the
facts of Morrison-Knudsen. FSLIC is hardly equipped to sort this out, given the nature of
its claims procedures. See supra note 54 for details of FSLIC's claims procedures.
253. One might contend that because Congress failed both to establish a contractual
relationship between FSLIC as receiver and uninsured creditors and to preserve a creditor's
right to a court action, Congress intended to defer to agency control over all creditor
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Section 1730: Jurisdiction
Section 1730(k) provides, in part:
(B) any civil action, suit, or proceeding to which the Corporation
shall be a party shall be deemed to arise under the laws of the
United States, and the United States district courts shall have origi
nal jurisdiction thereof, ... and (C) the Corporation may, ... re
move any such action, suit, or proceeding from a State court to the
United States district court for the district ... by following any
procedure for removal ... in effect: Provided, That any action, suit,
or proceeding to which the Corporation is a party in its capacity as
conservator, or receiver, or other legal custodian of an insured
State-chartered institution and which involves only the rights or ob
ligations of investors, creditors, stockholders, and such institution
under State law shall not be deemed to arise under the laws of the
United States. 2S4

In arguing against FSLIC adjudicatory authority, the Morrison
Knudsen court contended that section 1730(k)(l) reflected "Congress's
tacit assumption that claims against FSLIC's receivership assets would
be amenable to judicial resolution,"2ss and interpreted this section as
"distributing between state and federal courts the jurisdiction over
suits that must be brought in court."2S6
According to the Morrison-Knudsen court, the proviso clause
keeps certain actions in state court.2S7 FSLIC argued, on the other
claims. It follows from this argument that Congress empowered FSLIC and the Board
with more authority over uninsured creditors' claims than over depositors' claims. Consid
ering the purposes of the NHA-to insure depositors' accounts-it is unlikely that Con
gress would have so intended.
254. 12 U.S.C. §§ 173O(k)(I)(B), 1730(k)(I)(C) (1982).
255. Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1220.
256. [d.
257. [d. (citing Hancock Fin. Corp. v. FSLIC, 492 F.2d 1325, 1327 (9th Cir. 1974».
In a declaratory action to determine the ownership of the assets of a state-chartered associ
ation, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the action for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction because the proviso clause required that the action be brought in
state court. Hancock, 492 F.2d at 1327. The Hancock court "assumed that, were it not for
this proviso clause, § 1730(k)(I) would confer jurisdiction" on the federal courts. [d. at
1327 n.2 (citing S. REP. No. 1482, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 19, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE
CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 3532, 3550). Furthermore, the Hancock court reached this con
clusion "in spite of some dicta in recent opinions of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit suggesting that clause (B) relates solely to removal proceedings by the FSLIC in
actions in which it has been made a party." Hancock, 492 F.2d at 1328 n.2 (citing Katin v.
Apollo Sav., 460 F.2d 422, 425 n.5 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 918 (1972) (That
section [1730(k)(I)] provides jurisdiction in suits in which FSLIC is plaintiff but denies
jurisdiction where FSLIC as defendant removes the action to federal court.), and FSLIC v.
Krueger, 435 F.2d 633,636 (7th Cir. 1970) (proviso relates "solely to removal proceedings
from state courts in actions wherein the corporation has been made a party"».
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hand, that the proviso clause applies on1y to receiverships of state
chartered, state-regulated associations, where FSLIC has been named
receiver by the state and the Board has not yet appointed FSLIC re
ceiver. 2s8 So long as such a receivership has not been "federalized,"2s9
creditor actions against FSLIC as receiver of a state-chartered savings
and loan association do not arise under federal law and cannot be re
moved to federal court.
The Morrison-Knudsen court found that section 1730(k)(I) does
not limit a court's jurisdiction, although other statutes may limit juris
diction in particular ways.2OO The Morrison-Knudsen court found no
other statutory authority which limits the jurisdiction of a court with
respect to creditor claims. Furthermore, the court stated that section
1730(k)(I) indicates that Congress contemplated that creditor claims
would be resolved in federal court, so that the proviso provides an
exception for a defined class of claims against state associations which
have not been federalized.
FSLIC, on the other hand, contended that sections 1464(d)(6)(C)
and 1729(d) limit a court's jurisdiction with respect to creditor
claims,261 and thus section 1730(k)(I) simply does not apply. How
ever, as previously discussed, section 1729(d) neither limits a court's
jurisdiction, nor establishes FSLIC adjudication,262 and section
1464(d)(6)(C) on1y limits the jurisdiction of a court in two specific
contexts. 263 Thus, in the absence of any other statute limiting the ju
risdiction of court adjudication of creditor claims, section 1730(k)(1)
permits court adjudication.
IV.

Section 1730: Powers as Supervisor and Receiver Compared

A comparison of FSLIC's powers as supervisor of state-chartered
thrift institutions with its powers as liquidator of insolvent associations
confirms that Congress did not intend to empower FSLIC with adjudi
catory authority in its receivership capacity. Section 1730,264 entitled
"Termination of insurance and enforcement provisions," is similar to
258. FSLIC's Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion of Appropriateness of Rehear
ing in Bane at 12-13 n.8 Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. CHG Int'l, Inc., 811 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir.
1987).
259. See supra note 225 and accompanying text for an explanation of how a state
receivership is "federalized."
260. Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1220. As previously discussed, § 1464(d)(6)(C)
limits the jurisdiction of a court in two contexts. See section III A (1).
261. See First Amer. Say. Bank v. Westside, 639 F. Supp. 93, 97 (W.D. Wash. 1986).
262. This proposition is established in section III B (2)(a).
263. This proposition is established in section III A.
264. 12 U.S.C. § 1730 (1982).
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section 1464(d),26S and grants FSLIC several enforcement powers.
Section 1730(b) empowers FSLIC to withdraw an association's insur
ance coverage without the consent of the association. 266 Sections
1730(e) and (f) provide FSLIC with the authority to issue permanent
and temporary cease-and-desist orders. 267 Finally, sections 1730(g)
and (h) allow FSLIC to remove or suspend a director or officer. 268
These subsections provide that challenges to FSLIC enforcement or
ders will be handled through an administrative procedure consisting of
an administrative hearing followed by judicial review. 269 The Mo"i
son-Knudsen court correctly observed that Congress empowered
FSLIC, through section 1730, and the Board, through section 1464, to
adjudicate violations of federal law in their capacities as supervisors of
the nation's savings and loa:n associations. 27o
Section 1729 is entitled "Liquidation of insured institutions. "271
Its subsections describe FSLIC's powers and duties as receiver for
both state and federally chartered institutions. 272 Enforcement powers
are not included in this section. No mention is made of any type of
administrative procedure or judicial review, and no analogous statute
to either section 1730(j) or section 1464(d)(7)(A) is included, detailing
the manner in which hearings shall be held .
This comparison shows that Congress established different statu
tory programs for handling FSLIC enforcement actions and creditor
claims. Congress explicitly empowered FSLIC to adjudicate chal
lenges to its enforcement powers; Congress gave no such explicit adju
dicatory authority for the closely-related area of resolving creditor

.

265. As discussed in section III A, § 1464(d) is entitled "Proceedings to enforce
compliance with the law and regulations; cease and desist proceedings; temporary-cease
and desist orders; suspension or removal of directors or officers; appointment and removal
of conservator or receiver; hearings and judicial review ...." 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d) (1982).
Part of the HOLA, this section gives the Board various enforcement powers over federally
chartered associations and prescribes an administrative process for challenging any Board
enforcement action under this act through an administrative procedure consisting of an
initial hearing with subsequent judicial review. Section 1464(d)(7)(A), which defines the
type of hearings and the manner in which they shall be conducted, makes no mention of
creditor claims. See 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(7)(A) (1982).
266. 12 U.S.C. § 173O(b) (1982).
267. 12 U.S.c. §§ 1730(e) and 1730(f) (1982).
268. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1730(g) and 173O(h) (1982).
269. 12 U.S.C. § 17300) (1982). Section 17300) specifies the administrative proce
dure to be followed for challenges to FSLIC enforcement orders. Id. Section 17300) is
analogous to 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(7)(A) (1982).
270. Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1220.
271. 12 U.S.C. § 1729 (1982).
272. See discussion of § 1729 in section III B (2)(a).
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claims. In view of this lack of explicit authority, Congress did not
intend to empower FSLIC to adjudicate creditor claims.
3.

The Regulations

Whether Congress intended to empower FSLIC with adjudica
tory authority or not, the current regulations governing creditor
claims do not establish adjudicatory authority.273 The Board promul
gated sections 549.4(a) and 569a.8 274 for the administration of creditor
claims. Together, they require FSLIC to notify all creditors that they
must "present their claims, With proof thereof" to FSLIC as re
ceiver.275 Once presented with a claim, "[t]he receiver shall allow any
claim seasonably received and proved to its satisfaction. The receiver
may wholly or partly disallow any creditor claim ... not so proved,
and shall notify the claimant of the disallowance. "276
The Hudspeth court viewed these regulations as evidence that ad
judication is a receivership function ofFSLIC.277 Because an agency's
interpretation of its authority evidenced in part by its regulations is
entitled to great weight,278 the Hudspeth court concluded that
FSJ,JC's interpretation must be upheld "unless demonstrably irra
tional."279 On the other hand, the Morrison-Knudsen court recog
nized such deference, but reasoned that "deference will not save an
agency interpretation that is contrary to clear congressional pur
pose."280 Not only did the Mo"ison-Knudsen court find FSLIC's in
terpretation to be contrary to "congressional purpose," it also found
that the regulations failed to support the FSLIC interpretation. 281
By their terms, the regulations permit FSLIC to allow or disallow
273. See section III C for a discussion of the scope of Board rulemaking authority.
The Board may have the authority to empower FSLlC with adjudicatory authority even in
the absence of specific statutory authority for FSLlC adjudication.
274. 12 C.F.R. §§ 549.4(a), 569a.8 (1987). Section 549.4(a) applies to creditors of
federally chartered associations and 569a.8 applies to creditors of state-chartered
associations.
275. 12 C.F.R. § 549.4(a) (1987). Creditors of state-chartered associations must also
present their claims. See 12 C.F.R. § 569a.8 (1987).
276. 12 C.F.R. § 549.4(b) (1987). Section 569a.8(b) provides, in part: "Any claim
filed ... and proved to the satisfaction of the Receiver shall be allowed by the Receiver.
The Receiver may disallow in whole or in part or reject in whole or in part any creditor
claim ... not proved to its satisfaction ...." 12 C.F.R. § 569a.8(b) (1987).
277. Hudspeth, 756 F.2d at 1102 n.5.
278. Id. at 1103 (citing Mattox v. FIC, 752 F.2d 116, 123-24 (5th Cir. 1985) and
Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resource Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984».
279. FSLlC's Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion of Appropriateness of Rehear
ing in Banc at 8, Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. CHG Int'I, Inc., 811 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 1987).
280. Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1215 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9).
281. Id. at 1218.
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a claim.· The Morrison-Knudsen court found this power to be
equivalent to "[p]aying or refusing to pay [a claim, which] ... is not
an adjudication of a claim,"282 but merely an administrative deci
sion. 283 Further, while the regulations may enable FSLIC to deter
mine "whether a dispute exists," they do not empower FSLIC "to
resolve disputes with the force of law."284
To support its determination that the regulations do not establish
adjudicatory authority, the Morrison-Knudsen court compared the
language detailing the depositor claims procedure with the language
detailing creditor claims procedure. Section 549.5-1(b)(2) provides in
part: "The receiver shall approve any seasonably filed claim proved to
its satisfaction. The receiver may wholly or partly disallow any claim
... not so proved . . .. [D]isallowance shall be final, except as the
Board may otherwise determine."28s FSLIC does not have the power
to adjudicate depositor claims. 286 The language of section 549.5
1(b)(2) is almost identical to that of sections 549.4(b) and 569a.8(b)
and (d) and thus cannot provide the basis for exclusive adjudicatory
power. 287 Furthermore, comparing sections 549.4(b), 569a.8(b) and
569a.8(d) to sections 509.1 through 509.22288 yields the inescapable
conclusion that sections 549.4(b) and 569a.8(b) and (d) do not estab
lish adjudicatory authority. Sections 509.1 through 509.22 occupy
nine full pages in the Code of Federal Regulations and detail every
aspect of trial-like proceedings for challenges to FSLIC's enforcement
orders. There is nothing remotely trial-like about the regulations ap
plicable to depositor and creditor claims procedures.
4.

Comparison to the FDIC

Subsections III B (1), (2), and (3) combine to show that Congress
did not empower FSLIC with adjudicatory authority and thus that the
Hudspeth court's holding is incorrect. By comparing FSLIC to the
FDIC, this subsection demonstrates that the Morrison-Knudsen
court's holding also is incorrect: although Congress did not empower
FSLIC with adjudicatory authority, Congress did not prohibit FSLIC
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. 12 C.F.R. § 549.5-1(b)(2)(1987).
286. See the discussion in section III B (2)(b)(ii).
287. Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1218 n.2. The court wondered "how a single
administrative process [could] ... be adjudicative for creditors but non-adjudicative for
depositors." Id.
288. 12 C.F.R. §§ 509.1-509.22 (1987) (detailing procedures for FSLIC adjudica
tions of challenges to its enforcement orders).

1988]

FSLIC-ADJUDICATION OF CREDITOR CLAIMS

279

from adjudicating. 289 The Morrison-Knudsen court's contention that
Congress intended FSLIC and the FDIC to have parallel authority in
all respects is not borne out by the facts: while a statute prohibits the
FDIC from adjudicating, no statute similarly bars FSLIC from such
undertakings.
Congress created the FDIC as part of the Federal Reserve Act of
1933. 290 The FDIC insures banks established under the National
Bank Act of 1864,29\ and other qualified banking institutions. 292 The
Comptroller of Currency appoints the FDIC as receiver for insolvent
banks. 293 The Morrison-Knudsen court contended that:
[C]ongress has given the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC) the same powers by statute that the Board has given the
FSLIC by regulation: to receive "legal proof" of creditors' claims
and to pay only on "such claims as may have been proved to [its]
satisfaction." . . . But the FDIC has never claimed, and no court
has ever found, that these powers vest the liquidating agency rather
than the district courts with the ultimate power to adjudicate credi
tors' claims. 294

According to the Morrison-Knudsen court, because the FDIC never
has asserted that it has the power to adjudicate creditor claims, Con
gress did not grant it that power. Because the Board gave FSLIC the
same powers Congress gave the FDIC, FSLIC lacks adjudicatory
power.295
This argument, however, is based on a false premise: Congress
did not give the FDIC the same powers by statute that the Board gave
FSLIC by regulation. The statute controlling the FDIC as receiver,
section 193, provides that the "Comptroller shall, ... cause notice to
be given,· ... calling on all persons who may have claims against such
association to present the same, and to make legal proof thereof."296
289. The Morrison-Knudsen court held that Congress intended not to empower
FSLIC with adjudicatory authority. Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1215, 1222. This
comment has established that Congress did not intend to empower FSLIC with adjudica
tory authority, a weaker position. See section II B for the discussion of Morrison-Knudsen.
290. Ch. 89, § 8, 48 Stat. 168 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (1982 and Supp. IV
1986».
291. Ch. 106, § 50, 13 Stat. 114 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C. (1982 and Supp. IV 1986».
292. 12 U.S.C. § 1814(b) (1982).
293. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c) (1982).
294. Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1218 (quoting, in part, 12 U.S.C. §§ 193, 194,
1821(d) (1982».
295. Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1221.
296. 12 U.S.C. § 193 (1982). The Comptroller of Currency is appointed by the Pres
ident, along with two others, to constitute the three member board which oversees yet is
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Section 194 provides that "the comptroller shall make a ratable divi
dend of the money so paid over to him ... on all such claims as may
have been proved to his satisfaction or adjudicated in a court of com
petent jurisdiction ...."297 Finally, section 1821(d) provides that the
"Corporation as ... receiver, ... may, in its discretion, pay dividends
on proved claims . . . ."298 The FDIC as receiver pays out claims
proved to the FDIC board or "adjudicated in a court of competent
jurisdiction."299
In quoting section 194, the Morrison-Knudsen court failed to
quote the entire text and, most notably, omitted the language "adjudi
cated in a court of competent jurisdiction."3°O There is no analogous
language in FSLIC's enabling statute or in regulations 549.4 or
569.a(8), the Board-created rules for claim resolution. 30l Under sec
tions 549.4 and 569.a(8), FSLIC has the power to allow claims proved
to its satisfaction, and to disallow any claim not so proved. 302 Thus,
the FDIC receivership powers are distinct from FSLIC's receivership
powers.
It has been argued persuasively that the FDIC does not have the
power to adjudicate creditor claims. 303 Sections 191 through 194,
which govern the FDIC,304 have been in existence since 1864. 305 Long
before the FDIC was created, the Supreme Court held that a receiver
appointed under these sections did not have final authority to refuse a
part of the FDIC. See S. KIDWELL & R. PETERSON, supra note 2,at 224, and 12 U.S.C.
§ 1812 (1982). While the FDIC's board is similar to the Board, the Board is separate from
FSLIC. See section I A for the discussion of the structure of the Board and FSLIC. The
FDIC is itself an independent agency. T. MARVELL, supra note 28, at 89.
297. 12 U.S.C. § 194 (1982) (emphasis added). Sections 193 and 194 originally were
enacted as part of the National Bank Act, ch. 106, § 50, 13 Stat. 114 (1864) (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 191-194).
298. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d).
299. 12 U.S.C. § 194.
300. Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1218 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 194).
301. 12 C.F.R. §§ 549.4, 569.a(8) (1987).
302. Id.
303. Note, Creditors' Remedies Against the FDIC as Receiver of a Failed National
Bank, 64 TEX. L. REv. 1429, 1433-34 (1986). In the event that the FDIC refuses to allow
a creditor's claim, the creditor may bring a court action, and if the creditor succeeds on the
merits, the court will order the FDIC as receiver to honor the creditor's claim. Id. at 1438.
See also Philadelphia Gear Co. v. FDIC, 751 F.2d 1131 (10th Cir. 1984) (court ordered
FDIC to allow claim), and First Empire Bank v. FDIC, 572 F.2d 1361 (9th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 919 (1978), (frozen out creditors entitled to prove their claims against
the receivership in court).
304. 12 U.S.C. §§ 191-200 apply to receiverships of national banks. Since 1934, the
receiver for national banks has been the FDIC.
305. Ch. 106, § 50, 13 Stat. 114 (1864) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
12 U.S.C. (1982».
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claim, and thus had no adjudicatory authority.306 ;.\
The Morrison-Knudsen court also contended that "Congress
meant to give both agencies [FSLIC and FDIC] parallel authority
over their respective institutions,"307 when it enacted the GSDIA.308
Congress intended through the GSDIA to enable the FDIC and
FSLIC to better assist troubled banks and savings and loans. 309 The
GSDIA empowered both agencies, on a temporary emergency basis,
with expanded "merger-related" powers and enhanced powers to as
sist banks in order to prevent their closing. 310 While Congress did
intend to "give both agencies parallel authority over their respective
institutions,"311 in this respect, the GSDIA did not alter any statute
affecting the creditor claims procedure. The most sensible reading of
the GSDIA is that it achieved "parallel authority" in a limited area
but left other areas, and other differences, untouched.
The Morrison-Knudsen court then reasoned that because Con
gress failed to distinguish FSLIC and FDIC adjudicatory authority,
Congress intended the a~encies' adjudicatory authority to be the same.
Since the FDIC does not have adjudicatory authority, neither does
FSLIC.312 This argument is fallacious. It also would be fallacious,
306. White v. Knox, 111 U.S. 784 (1884) (creditor claim originally refused by re
ceiver was allowed by the court). See also Schulenberg v. Norton, 49 F.2d 578 (8th Cir.
1931) (court ordered the receiver to pay the claim after the receiver had refused the claim).
307. Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1221. The court intended "parallel authority"
in the broadest sense: parallel authority in every respect. Id.
308. Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (1982). See section III B (2)(a)(iii) for the
discussion of the legislative history of the GSDIA.
309. S. REp. No. 536, supra note 232 at I, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CoDE CoNG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 3054. Between January I, 1981, and July 30, 1982, the FDIC closed
twenty-six commercial banks and nine mutual savings banks, at a total cost of 1.7 billion
dollars (only four cases involved direct payment to depositors), and the situation was ex
pected to get worse. Id. at 4, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS at
3057-58. During this same period, FSLIC closed 281 saving and loan associations. Sev
enty-six were merged voluntarily, and 205 were merged under FSLIC supervision. Of these
205, sixteen required direct financial assistance. Id. at 3058. In 1981,328 saving and loans
associations were merged voluntarily and sixty-one were merged under FSLIC supervision.
Of these, twenty-three required financial assistance. Id.
310. Id. at 5-6, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 3059. Com
pare 12 U.S.C. § 1823 (1982) (emergency powers of FDIC codified) with 12 U.S.C. § 1729
(1982) (emergency powers of FSLIC codified).
311. Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1221.
312. The Morrison-Knudsen court argued that Congress
easily could have distinguished FSLIC's adjudicatory authority from that of the
FDIC. It did not do so. . .. Because the FSLIC only recently has found itself
defending controverted creditor claims in its receivership capacity, we regard the
FDIC's longstanding interpretation of the receiver's role, acquiesced in by Con
gress, as very persuasive authority.
Id.

282

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 10:227

under these circumstances, to argue from the premise that Congress
failed to clarify FSLIC adjudicatory authority, to the conclusion that
Congress thereby acquiesced in FSLIC's interpretation of its adjudica
tory authority. Both arguments ignore the context in which Congress
acted. Congress had'no reason to distinguish FSLIC and FDIC adju
dicatory authority: the question of FSLIC adjudicatory power was
not at issue in 1981 and early 1982. 313 Congress was concerned with
keeping FSLIC and the FDIC solvent and preserving as many banks
and savings and loan associations as possible; Congress was not con
cerned with FSLIC or FDIC creditor claims procedures. 314
If Congress had intended FSLIC not to have adjudicatory author
ity, it could have enacted a statute analogous to section 194. 31S Con
gress did not enact such a statute when it created FSLIC only one year
after the FDIC and in many respects was modelling FSLIC after the
FDIC. Thus, there is no basis for the Morrison-Knudsen holding that
Congress intended FSLIC not to adjudicate.
In the absence of a statutory grant explicitly authorizing the adju
dication of creditor claims, and the lack of evidence that adjUdication
is implicit in the statutory scheme, it is unlikely that Congress in
313. Congress had no reason to be aware of FSLIC's position on adjudication.
FSLIC stated that it never argued this point until the 1980's because no federally chartered
association was liquidated between 1941 and 1980, and only seven state-chartered savings
and loan associations were liquidated during that period. FSLIC's Petition and Suggestion
for Appropriateness for Rehearing in Bane at 7 n.6, Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d 1209 (9th
Cir. 1987). The Hudspeth court was the first circuit court of appeals to hold that FSLIC
had adjudicatory authority. Hudspeth, 756 F.2d at 1103. Thus, Congress had little reason
to clarify FSLIC adjudicatory authority one way or the other when it enacted the GSDIA.
If Congress had little reason to clarify FSLIC adjudicatory authority in 1982, it had no
reason to clarify such authority when it enacted the BPA, the FISA, the NHA, or the
HOLA. But see First Am. Sav. Bank v. Westside Fed. Sav., 639 F. Supp. 93, 98 (W.D.
Wash. 1986) (FSLIC has been adjudicating claims for 30 years, Congress had at least three
. opportunities to clarify FSLIC and Board authority in this regard and did not, thus Con
gress intended that FSLlC adjudicate.).
314. It has been proposed that FSLIC and the FDIC merge. See, e.g., S. KIDWELL
& R. PETERSON, supra note 2, at 411. FDIC-insured banks have not been in favor of this
proposal. Id. FDIC-insured institutions would end up paying higher premiums,
"[b]ecause the FSLIC had higher losses, it accumulated fewer reserves than the FDIC, gave
lower rebates and levied extra premiums." Id. There is at present a FSLIC re-capitaliza
tion plan. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, THRIFT INDUSTRY: THE TREASURY/
FEDERAL HOME LoAN BANK BOARD PLAN FOR FSLIC RECAPITALIZATION (1987).
Were a merger to occur, however, it is more likely that FSLIC would cease to exist than the
FDIC. The FDIC received more capitalization to begin with, oversees more institutions,
and has lost less money. For example, the FDIC made 280 payments totaling 160 million
dollars in its first 35 years. FSLIC made only 12 payments in its first 34 years yet paid out
almost 238 million dollars, over double what the FDIC paid out. See T. MARVELL, supra
note 28, at 97-98.
315. 12 U.S.C. § 194 (1982).
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tended FSLIC to have the power to adjudicate creditor claims, much
less the exclusive power to adjudicate creditor claims. However, Con
gress, rather than detailing FSLIC claims procedures through statutes,
gave the Board rulemaking authority to promulgate rules regulating
receivership proceedings. 316 The next section explores an alternative
theory for FSLIC adjudication: that Congress, by failing to prohibit
FSLIC adjudication and by granting the Board rulemaking authority,
has empowered the Board to authorize FSLIC adjudication by
promulgating appropriate regulations.
C. Board Rulemaking Power: FSLIC Adjudication and Exhaustion
ofAdministrative Remedies
Subsections III B (1), (2), and (3) of this comment surveyed sev
eral statutes and regulations for evidence that Congress intended to
empower FSLIC with adjudicatory authority, and found no such evi
dence. This lack of any evidence does not dispositively refute adjudi
catory authority, however, for two reasons. First, as subsection III B
(4) demonstrated, Congress failed to prohibit FSLIC from adjudicat
ing when it might reasonably have done so. Second, Congress granted
the Board the "power to make rules ... for the reorganization, consol
idation, liquidation, and dissolution of associations."317 That
rulemaking power might encompass the power to establish FSLIC ad
judication, provided that such adjudication is: 1) not inconsistent with
any established interpretation of a statute in the NHA or the HOLA,
2) consistent with some congressional policy that the NHA or the
HOLA was intended to effectuate, 3) not inconsistent with any con
gressional policy that the NHA and the HOLA was intended to effec
!uate, and 4) constitutional.
Because exclusive FSLIC adjudication is probably unconstitu
tional,318 the Board would be prohibited from promulgating an adjudi
catory scheme that required exhaustion of administrative remedies.
The Board may promulgate regulations that require exhaustion of ad
ministrative remedies if it were to adopt a non-adjudicatory claims
procedure. Courts, however, may not be bound by those regulations.
Subsection III C (1) first examines the rulemaking statute for re
ceivership proceedings, section 1464(d)(11),319 by exploring its legisla
tive history and meager case law and comparing it to the rulemaking
.•.

316. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(II) (1982).
317. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(1l) (1982).
318. Section IV A argues that exclusive FSLlC adjudication is unconstitutional.
319. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(II) (1982).
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statute for the regulation of federal savings and loan associations, sec
tion 1464(a).320 Subsection III C (2) then explains the four necessary
conditions for proper administrative rulemaking and evaluates, in an
abstract way, whether the Board could promulgate FSLIC adjudica
. tion. Subsection III C (3) measures the current and proposed regula
tions against the four necessary conditions and suggests possible
FSLIC adjudicatory schemes that would satisfy them. Subsection III
C (4) concludes by discussing a Board-promulgated exhaustion of ad
ministrative remedies requirement and the extent to which courts
would therefore be bound to require exhaustion.
1.

Board Rulemaking Authority under Section 1464(d)(II)

Enacted in 1966 as part of the FISA, section 1464(d)( 11) provides
that "[t]he Board shall have power to make rules and regulations for
the reorganization, consolidation, liquidation, and dissolution of as
sociations ...."321 The legislative history of section 1464(d)(11) fails
to indicate the scope of delegation. The only recorded comment, the
Senate Report accompanying the FISA, simply repeats the statutory
language of section 1464(d)(11).322 While section 1464(d)(11) bears a
striking resemblance to the original section 5(d) of the HOLA,323 the
legislative history of that section also is sparse. 324
320. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(a) (1982).
321. Pub. L. No. 89-695, 80 Stat. 695 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(11) (1982».
322. S. REp. No. 1482, supra note 167, at 15, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CoDE CoNG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 3546. "The Board would be authorized to make rules and regulations for
the reorganization, consolidation, liquidation, dissolution, and merger of associations, for
associations in conservatorship and receivership, and for the conduct of conservatorships
and receiverships." Id.
323. Ch. 64, § 5, 48 Stat. 132 (1933) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d».
As originally enacted, § 5(d) of the HOLA read: "The Board shall have full power to
provide in the rules and regulations herein authorized for the reorganization, consolidation,
merger, or liquidation of such associations, including the power to appoint a conservator or
a receiver to take charge of the affairs of any such association, ...." Id., 48 Stat. at 133.
324. See section III B (1) for the legislative history of the HOLA. See also Fidelity
Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 163 (1982); Note, Due-on-Sale Clauses
and Restraints on Alienation: Does Wellenkamp Apply to Federal Institutions?, 11 PAC. L.J.
1085, 1102-04 (1980).
In 1954, Congress amended § 5(d) of the HOLA with section 503(2) of the Housing
Act of 1954 (Housing Act). Pub. L. No. 83-560, § 503(2), 68 Stat. 590, reprinted in 1954
U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 675. Section 503 replaced the one paragraph § 5(d) of
the HOLA with two very detailed sections 503(1) and (2). Section 503(2) read, in part:
"The Board shall have power to make rules and regulations for the reorganization, merger,
and liquidation of Federal associations and for such associations in conservatorship and
receivership and for the conduct of conservatorships, and receiverships." Id., reprinted in
1954 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 732. Congress enacted the Housing Act to
provide "a means by administrative and court proceedings whereby the Board could en
force compliance with law and regulations by Federal savings and loan associations ...."
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Section 1464(d)(II)'s case law is similarly unilluminating. Only
five cases, including Morrison-Knudsen, ,cite section 1464(d)(1l), and
none of these cases give section 1464(d)(II) more than a passing
reference.325
Basing its position on the language of section 1464(d)(II) and a
case construing a different statute, Fidelity Savings and Loan Associa
tion v. de la Cuesta,326 the Board has contended that this provision
grants the Board plenary power to make rules regulating the receiver
ship of insolvent associations. 327 At issue in Fidelity was the Board's
power under section 1464(a) to make and enforce rules regulating fed
eral savings and loan associations. 328 Stating that the Board was
"vested with plenary authority to administer the Home Owners' Loan
Act of 1933,"329 the Supreme Court construed the Board's power
under section 1464(a) broadly, and held that the Board's regulations
were valid and preempted conflicting state law. 330 In light of Fidelity,
the Supreme Court probably would find that the Board's power under
section 1464(d)(II) is as broad as the Board's power under section
1464(a).331
S. REp. No. 1472, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 44, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 2723, 2766 (hereinafter S. REp. No. 1472). Additionally, the Housing Act also
provided a procedure for appointing a receiver and granted FSLIC the same power to
terminate an association's insurance as the FDIC had over the banks it insured. Id. at 8,
reprinted in 1954 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 2729-30. See supra notes 168-69
and accompanying text for a description of the enforcement procedure that the Housing
Act put into effect and which the FlSA later modified. The Senate RepOrt to section 503(2)
focused entirely on the new Board enforcement powers without indicating the scope of
Board rulemaking power under section 5(d) of the HOLA. S. REp. No. 1472, supra at 87
88, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 2810-11.
325. See, e.g., Central Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 422 F.2d
504, 598 n.2 (8th Cir. 1970) (unsuccessful challenge to the Board's authority to approve
mergers); Baer v. Abel, 648 F. Supp. 69, 72 (W.O. Wash. 1986) (superseding Baer v. Abel,
637 F. Supp. 347, 350 (W.O. Wash. 1986» ("The Board was also authorized to promulgate
rules and regulations governing the liquidation of an association and the conduct of receiv
erships."); Washington Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 526 F.
Supp. 343, 396-97 (N.D. Ohio 1981) (unsuccessful challenge to the Board's power to pro
mulgate regulations under § 1464(dXll) which empower FSLIC to liquidate assets for
cash); Glendale Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Fox, 459 F. Supp. 903, 910 (C.D. Cal. 1978).
326. 458 U.S. 141 (1982).
327. 50 Fed. Reg. 48,970 (1985).
328. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(a) (1982). Under § 1464(a), the Board is "authorized, under
such rules and regulations as it may prescribe, to provide for the organization, incorpora
tion, examination, operation, and regulation of associations ...." Id.
329. Fidelity, 458 U.S. at 144.
330. Id. at 152-54. The Board governs "the powers and operations of every Federal
savings and loan association from its cradle to its corporate grave." Id. at 145 (quoting
People v. Coast Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 98 F. Supp. 311, 316 (S.D. Cal. 1951».
331. If the Board was vested with plenary authority to administer the HOLA, Fidel
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Four Conditions for FSLIC Adjudication

Even with a broad deleg'ation of power, there is some limit to the
Board's power to promulgate regulations. The court will not sustain
administrative rulemaking that "transcends the delegation."332 Re
cent Supreme Court decisions suggest several factors to consider in
order to detennine whether the administrative nilemaking was legal:
first, the administrative action must not be inconsistent with the well
established interpretation of a statute;333 second, the administrative ac
tion must serve or be consistent with a congressional policy behind the
act that the agency is to administer;334 third, the administrative action
must not be inconsistent with a well-defined congressional policy be
hind the enabling legislation;33s and fourth, the administrative action
must be constitutional;336
The Board could promulgate regulations authorizing some fonn
of FSLIC adjudication that would satisfy these four conditions. With
ity, 458 U.S. at 144, and § 1464(d)(II) is part of the HOLA, then the Board has plenary
authority to administer § 1464(d)(11).
332. 1 J. STEIN, G. MITCHELL & B. MEZINES, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 3.03[5]
(1987).
333. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S.
361 (1986). The Board of Governors promulgated a regulation defining "bank" to include
certain institutions specifically not included in the statutory definition of "bank." Id. at
363-64. The Court held that the Board of Governors went beyond its authority in promul
gating the regulation, and struck it down. Id. at 374-75. See also Civil Aeronautics Bd. v.
Delta Airlines, Inc., 367 U.S. 316 (1961) "[T]he fact is that the Board is entirely a creature
of Congress and the determinative question is not what the Board thinks it should do but
what Congress has said it can do." Id. at 322.
334. The administrative act must "serve congressional will as evidenced in the stat
ute it is empowered to administer." Dimension, 474 U.S. at 374. See also Mourning v.
Family Pubs. Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356 (1973). Congress authorized the Federal Reserve
Board (FRB) to administer § lOS of the Truth in Lending Act. 82 Stat. 148 (codified at IS
U.S.C. § 1604). The FRB promulgated a regulation to enforce that statute by defining a
credit sale to include any sale with four or more installments. Mourning, 411 U.S. at 3S8,
362. Congress clearly empowered the FRB to enact statutes that would prevent companies
from disguising credit sales as non-credit sales. Id. at 367-68. The Supreme Court applied
a very deferential standard to determine the validity of the regulation: it was valid because
it was "reasonably related to the purpose of the enabling legislation." Id. at 369 (quoting
Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 393 U.S. 268, 280-81 (1969».
335. H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970). In Porter, the Supreme Court
struck down a NLRB action ordering 'a company to agree to a certain term in a difficult
contract negotiation setting because the policy behind the National Labor Relations Act
was not to force labor and management to agree to terms, but to provide a context for fair
negotiations. !d. at 102.Q9.
336. The respondent in Mourning argued that the FRB's regulation violated the fifth
amendment. Mourning, 411 U.S. at 376-77. Cf. Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U.S. 230
(1926) (taxing regulation violated the constitution); accord Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312
(1932). See also 3 B. MEZINES, J. STEIN & J. GRUFF, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 13.01
(1987).
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respect to the first condition, there is only a possible conflict, and it is
not a serious one. Section 1729(d) grants FSLIC the power "settle,
compromise, or release claims in favor of or against the insured insti
tutions, and to do all other things that may be necessary in connection
therewith ...."337 While settling, compromising, and releasing claims
is different from adjudicating them,338 this difference probably would
not be viewed as unacceptable, and surely not as a contradiction of a
stated congressional interpretation, because Congress has not made its
interpretation of section 1729(d) known. Congress often enacts en
abling statutes which survive despite containing potential
inconsistencies. 339
FSLIC adjudication also could satisfy the second condition. In
enacting both the FISA and the BPA, Congress intended to give the
Board and FSLIC more control over receivership proceedings, so that
FSLIC could preserve its assets and wind up the affairs of insolvent
associations as expeditiously as possible. 340 FSLIC argued strenuously
that exclusive FSLIC adjudication is necessary to effectuate that pur
pose. 341 The question then becomes whether non-exclusive FSLIC ad
judication serves this congressional purpose. 342 FSLIC adjudication
would serve this purpose, although perhaps not as well as exclusive
FSLIC adjudication. FSLIC adjudication would provide creditors
with an informal, less expensive, more efficient forum in which to pres
ent their claims. Any claim resolved by administrative adjudication
would aid in serving the purpose of efficiency in winding up the affairs
of the association.
The third condition already has been shown: Congress failed to
prohibit FSLIC from adjudicating when it might reasonably have
337. 12 u.s.c. § 1729(d) (1982) (describing FSLIC powers in the liquidation con
text). See section III B (2)(a) for the legislative history and analysis of § 1729(d).
338. The Morrison-Knudsen court held that compromise and settlement is not adju
dication; rather, adjudication is holding for one party or the other. Morrison-Knudsen, 811
F.2d at 1219.
339. See R. Pierce, supra note 16 at § 3.1, at 44.
340. The FISA significantly increased the Board's powers to enforce law and regula
tion in an efficient manner. See section III A (1) for the discussion of the FISA. The BPA
increased the Board's powers to appoint a receiver for state-chartered savings and loan
associations so that FSLIC could better protect its assets. See section III B (2)(a)(ii) for the
discussion of the BPA.
341. Hudspeth, 756 F.2d at 1101-02. See also FSLIC's Petition for Rehearing and
Suggestion of Appropriateness of Rehearing in Banc at 2-6, Morrison-Knudsen Co. v.
CHG Int'I Inc., 811 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 1987).
342. Exclusive FSLIC adjudication, without judicial review, would, as a matter of
common sense, best serve this congressional policy. This, however, would not be constitu
tional. Exclusive FSLIC adjudication with judicial review also fails to pass constitutional
muster. See section IV A for the discussion of this problem.
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done SO.343 Thus, no express or implied congressional policy prohibits
FSLIC adjudication. FSLIC adjudication, if properly designed, would
be constitutional, and thus could satisfy the fourth requirement. Ex
clusive FSLIC adjudication, however, has insurmountable constitu
tional problems.
It is not clear whether these four factors constitute the necessary
and sufficient conditions for proper agency rulemaking. If they do, the
Board could empower FSLIC with non-exclusive adjudicatory author
ity if carefully prescribed. There is, however, no evidence that these
conditions are sufficient, and there are no examples of an agency's ac
quiring adjudicatory authority in this manner. It is undisputed that
Congress has the power to delegate legislative authority and judicial
power to administrative agencies. 344 Congress granted the Board leg
islative authority: it is questionable whether the Board may, as an
exercise of its legislative power, delegate adjudicatory authority to
FSLIC.
Adjudicatory authority is different from most powers that agen
cies acquire through rulemaking. Congress delegates general author
ity to administer an act which involves considerable technical
expertise for which the agency is better equipped than the Congress to
,decide. 345 There are examples of congressional delegation of authority
to enforce an act where the agency is given free reign to determine the
manner of enforcement. 346 There are also examples of vague, open
ended delegations to agencies when it is impossible to determine ex
actly what problems will arise in the future; the intent is to leave to the
agency the authority to make rules to handle whatever problems do
arise. 347 Finally, Congress may delegate a particular general function,
leaving the agency free to fill in the blanks. 348
Adjudication, arguably, is a reasonable means to effectuate the
HOLA, but is otherwise different from the examples of agency delega
tion. Adjudication of creditor claims where the decisionmaker is,
343, See section III B (4),
344, 1], STEIN, G, MITCHELL & B, MEZINES, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 3,03[6]
(1987) (citing Federal Trade Comm'n v, Rubberoid Co" 343 U,S, 470 (1952», See a/so
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v, Schor, 106 S, Ct. 3245 (1986),
345, R, PIERCE, supra note 16, at § 3.4,3 at 58 (citing Industrial Union Dep't v,
American Petroleum Inst" 448 U,S, 607 (1980) (Occupational Health an Safety Adminis
tration required to set exposure limits for toxic substances for employees),
346, Mourning v, Family Pubs, Serv" Inc" 411 U,S, 356 (1973), See supra note 334
for more details of Mourning,
347, North Carolina Uti!. Comm'n v, FCC, 552 F,2d 1036, 1051 (4th Cir, 1977),
cert, denied, 434 U,S, 874 (1977); Lichter v, United States, 334 U,S, 742 (1948),
348, See United States v, Grimaud, 220 U,S, 506 (1911),
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most often, applying state law does not involve special agency exper
tise; FSLIC is a regulator and an insurer, not a court. Although the
Board and FSLIC have distinct enforcement powers, FSLIC adjudica
tion is not a means for enforcing those powers, and thus the enforce
ment model is not a good analogy.349 The analogy of unforeseeable
future problems prompting the Board to use its discretion and regulate
accordingly, also is inappropriate. Congress gave the Board rulemak
ing power to regulate receiverships, and FSLIC adjudication surely
would have been foreseeable. Finally, FSLIC adjudication is more like
a general function rather than a particular function needed to justify
some other specifically delegated general function. As a general func
tion, it is the kind of power Congress would delegate directly to
FSLIC, perhaps leaving it to the Board to fill in the exact procedures
to be employed. 35o Thus, the Court would have room to distinguish
adjudicatory authority from other, more typical rulemaking exercises
if it so chose. There is, however, no case law that would preclude
Board delegation of adjudicatory authority to FSLIC.
3.

Regulations: Current, Proposed and Possible

Even if one accepts the argument that the congressional grant of
rulemaking authority to the Board empowers it to authorize FSLIC
adjudication, the Board has not yet exercised its power. The current
rules detailing FSLIC claims procedures fail to establish adjudicatory
authority.351 There is no evidence that the Board or FSLIC ever con
strued these reguiations as being evidence of adjudicatory authority
until quite recently.352 Section 549.4(b) has been in existence for more
than thirty years,353 and it describes an administrative procedure
which is analogous to the non-adjudicatory administrative procedure
for resolving depositor claims. 354 It is unlikely that the regulation was
promulgated to implement adjudicatory authority.355
349. Compare promulgated FSLIC adjudication with Mourning v. Family Pubs.
Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356 (1973) discussed supra at note 334.
350. This is, essentially, FSLIC's position, but as sections III B (2) and (3) show,
Congress did not delegate adjudicatory authority to FSLIC.
351. See supra notes 54 & 56 for the current claims and appeals procedures. See
section III B (3) for the discussion and analysis of the regulations.
352. Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1216.
353. 21 Fed. Reg. 4548, 4553 (June 21, 1956).
354. See supra notes 285-87 and accompanying text for the comparison of the deposi
tor claims procedure with the creditor claims procedure.
355. But see First Am. Say. Bank v. Westside Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 639 F. Supp.
93,98 (W.D. Wash. 1986) (the existence of regulations establishing adjudicatory authority
for more than thirty years is evidence of FSLIC adjudicatory authority).
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The proposed regulations, which detail FSLIC claims and appeals
procedures,3s6 are based on the Hudspeth court's holding that Con
gress empowered FSLIC with exclusive adjudicatory authority, and
the Board was thus merely filling in the details. This view has two
serious problems: . first, Congress did not empower FSLIC with adju
dicatory authority;3S7 and second, exclusive FSLIC adjudication, as
construed by the Hudspeth court, is not constitutional. 3s8
.
The proposed regulations do not appear to establish FSLIC adju
dicatory authority.3s9 That is, the claims procedure outlined at pro
posed rule section 569c.7 might be adjudicatory or non-adjudicatory~
depending· on what congressionally mandated power the regulation
was designed to promote. 360 Had Congress explicitly authorized
FSLIC to adjudicate, the proposed administrative procedure would be
adjudicatory. Congress, however, did not so authorize FSLIC, and
thus there is no basis for regarding this administrative procedure as
adjudicatory. Proposed rule section 569c.7 details separate notice pro
cedures for depositors and creditors, but the same FSLIC decision
making process is described for both depositors and creditors. 361 As
previously demonstrated, FSLIC does not have adjudicatory authority
with respect to depositor claims. 362 Thus, there is no reason to infer
that the described procedure is an adjudicatory one.
If the Board were to promulgate regulations which effectively es
tablish FSLIC adjudication, those regulations should establish a
scheme that is clearly adjudicatory~ Because there is no specific con
gressional authority for FSLIC adjudication, the regulations will be
the basis from which courts will infer that FSLIC has adjudicatory
authority.363 Furthermore, that adjudicatory scheme must be consti
tutional and thus be non-exclusive and include a neutral
356. 50 Fed. Reg. 48,992 (1985) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 569c.7) (claims proce
dures). Id. at 48,994-95 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 569c.9). (appeals procedures).
357. See sections III B (2) and III B (3).
358. See Part IV.
359. Focusing on the proposed regulations, without referring to the lengthy dis
course accompanying them, which clearly states that the proposed regulations are designed'
to implement exclusive FSLlC adjudication (see 50 Fed. Reg. 48,970-983 (1985», it ap
pears that the regulations do not establish an adjudicatory scheme.
360. The proposed rules would codify the existing claims resolution procedure. See
supra note 58 and accompanying text.
361. See 50 Fed. Reg. 48,992 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 569c.7(c».
362. See section III B (2)(b)(ii).
363. In Morrison-Knudsen, the court found no statutory basis for FSLlC adjudica
tion and no evidence that the administrative procedure was an adjudicatory one. Conse
quently, the court concluded that FSLIC was not an adjudicator. See Morrison-Knudsen,
811 F.2d at 1215-18.

1988]

FSLIC-ADJUDICATION OF CREDITOR CLAIMS

291

decisionmaker.364
The proposed claims and appeals procedures attempt to mandate
exhaustion of administrative remedies. The proposed regulation
which details the appeals procedure clearly states that "[a] timelyap
peal filed with the Director FSLIC in accordance with the provisions
of this section shall be mandatory to establish judicial review of an
initial determination."365 Proposed section 569c.7(e)366 states that
FSLIC will pay dividends on FSLIC-allowed claims only. The follow
ing subsection evaluates the extent to which the Board, through regu
lations, can require courts to dismiss creditor claims for failing to
exhaust administrative remedies.
4.

Rulemaking and Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Perhaps more than the adjudicatory power, FSLIC wants credi
tors to exhaust administrative remedies prior to any court preced
ing. 367 That is, if the Board had to choose between promulgating
regulations that established adjUdication and regulations that estab
lished an exhaustion requirement, the Board more probably would
elect the exhaustion requirement. This subsection explores the effec
tiveness of Board-promulgated regulations which would require the
claimant to exhaust administrative remedies. The more difficult ques
tion is whether a court would be bound by the regulation and be re
quired to dismiss a creditor's claim for failing to exhaust
administrative remedies, or whether a court would have discretion to
hear the case provided certain conditions obtained.
The Morrison-Knudsen court stated that "[w]here there is no ex
plicit statutory requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies,
the application of exhaustion rules is a matter committed to the discre
tion of the district court."368 FSLIC, on the other hand, argued that
364. See Part IV.
365. 50 Fed. Reg. 48,994 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 569c.9(a)(5».
366. 50 Fed. Reg. 48,993 (1985).
367. FSLIC's Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion of Appropriateness of Rehear
ing in Banc 3-5 Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. CRG Int'l, Inc., 811 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 1987).
By requiring a claimant to exhaust its administrative remedies, it is possible
to achieve a more orderly and timely disposition of the receivership estate, which
is one of FSLIC's chief duties.... If exhaustion is not required, FSLIC receiver
ships will be seriously disrupted. . . .
Even more fundamental, if all claimants are required to submit claims to the
administrative process before they can proceed in court, some- perhaps most
of those claims will be resolved without resort to the courts. This will conserve
receivership assets and hasten the liquidation of the receivership estate.
Id. at 3-4 (footnote omitted).
368. Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1223 (citing Wong v. Department of State, 789
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"[e]xhaustion of administrative remedies can be mandated either by
statute or regulation."369 There is no statutory prerequisite requiring
exhaustion of administrative remedies prior to judicial review. The
two positions can be reconciled. The Board may promulgate rules
that purport to mandate exhaustion of administrative remedies, but a
court, in the absence of a statutory requirement, may exercise its dis
cretion. "[T]he exhaustion doctrine is a prudential rule created by the
courts to enable them to allocate responsibilities efficiently between
agencies and courtS."370 The Board, in promulgating an exhaustion
requirement, would be attempting to deprive courts of their ability to
allocate responsibilities, and thus the courts may not be bound by the
regulatory requirement. Yet courts generally require a party to ex
haust administrative remedies,371 and it is only for good cause that a
court would not require a party to exhaust. 372 Thus, the best way for
the Board and FSLIC to require exhaustion is to put in place sound
procedures that protect the interests of the claimant so that courts will
require exhaustion.
IV.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS

Part IV 0 discusses and evaluates two constitutional problems
raised by FSLIC adjudication, the propriety of a non-article III entity
adjudicating state law claims- the Northern Pipeline Construction Co.
v. Marathon Pipe Line CO.373 issue-and due process concerns. As
discussed in this section, a constitutionally sound FSLIC adjudicatory
scheme must, at a minimum, be non-exclusive and employ a neutral
decisionmaker. In addition, the Constitution may require that the los
ing party be offered more than "ordinary appellate review."374 Section
F.2d 1380, 1385 (9th Cir. 1986); Rodriques v. Donovan, 769 F.2d 1344, 1349 (9th Cir.
1985».
369. FSLIC's Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion of Appropriateness of Rehear
ing in Banc at 8, Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. CHG Int'l, Inc., 811 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 1987)
(citing Doria Mining and Engin'g Corp. v. Morton, 608 F.2d 1255 (9th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 962 (1980».
370. R. PIERCE, supra note 16, at § 5.7.3, at 190 (footnote omitted) (citing Ass'n of
Nat'l Advertisers, Inc. v. FTC, 627 F.2d 1151 (D.c. Cir. 1979), cerL denied, 447 U.S. 921
(1980) (Levanthal, J., concurring».
371. Id.
372. See supra note 135 and accompanying text for factors courts balance when con
sidering to require exhaustion. See also section IV A and IV B for further discussion of
exhaustion of administrative remedies in the context of adjudicatory and non-adjudicatory
claims procedures.
373. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
374. Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prod. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 584 (1985). See infra
note 390 for the facts of Thomas. Northern Pipeline rejected the deferential "clearly errone
ous" standard, terming it "ordinary appellate review." Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 85.
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A discusses the Northern Pipeline issue. Section B discusses the due
process concerns.
A.

The Northern Pipeline Issue
Article III of the Constitution provides:
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may
from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the
supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good
Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services a
Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Contin
uance in Office. 37s

Taken literally, article III prohibits Congress from delegating any ju
dicial authority to article I entities. 376 The Supreme Court, however,
has upheld the constitutionality of article I courts which are created to
adjudicate "public rights."377
In Northern Pipeline,378 the Supreme Court held unconstitutional
the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 (Act) which granted bankruptcy courts
exclusive jurisdiction over "all civil proceedings arising under title
11."379 The Court reasoned that article III prevented Congress from
establishing article I COurts380 which would have jurisdiction over "all
375. u.s. CoNST. art. III, § 1.
376. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 106 S. Ct. 3245, 3256 (1986).
"[F)rom its language, [article III] . . . appears to tolerate no exceptions to its require
ments." Redish, Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and the Northern Pipeline De
cision, 1983 DUKE L.J. 197,226 (1983).
377. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 67. The "Court has upheld the constitutionality
of legislative courts and administrative agencies created by Congress to adjudicate cases
involving 'public rights.''' Id.
378. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. 50. Northern Pipeline filed for reorganization
under the bankruptcy laws in January of 1980. Id. at 56. In March of 1980, Northern
Pipeline brought suit against Marathon Pipe Line in the bankruptcy courts created by the
Bankruptcy Act of 1978 on a breach of contract claim. Id. at 56-57. The Supreme Court
held that the broad grant of jurisdiction in the 1978 Act, and thus the entire Act, was
unconstitutional. Id. at 87. Justice Rehnquist, in a concurring opinion in which Justice
O'Connor joined, agreed that "adjudication of Northern's lawsuit cannot be ... sustained."
Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 91 (concurring opinion). However, Justice Rehnquist would
have stricken only so much of the Act as permitted this case to be decided in bankruptcy
court, rather than striking down the entire Act as unconstitutional. Id.
379. Id. at 50 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1471(b) (1982) (subsequently amended to read:
"Notwithstanding any Act of Congress that confers exclusive jurisdiction on a court or
courts other than the district courts, the district courts shall have original but not exclusive
jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or related to cases
under title 11." 28 U.S.C. § 1471(b) (Supp. IV 1986».
380. When it creates an article I court, "Congress will usually employ one of its
enumerated powers in article I, in combination with the 'necessary-and-proper' clause of
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civil'proceedings" under the Act, because some of those proceedings
would involve "private rights" as opposed to "public rightS."381 Pub
lic rights "arise 'between the government and others.' "382 "Private
rights," on the other hand, involve the" 'liability of one individual to
another under the law as defined,' " and may not be removed from
article III courtS. 383 The issue here presented is whether exclusive or
non-exclusive FSLIC adjudication of creditors' "private rights"
claims offends article III.
Morrison-Knudsen expressed concern that exclusive FSLIC adju
dication might be unconstitutional because private rights were being
adjudicated in non-article III fora. 384 The court did not reach, and
thus did not decide, the issue, but rejected FSLIC's statutory "inter
pretation because it raises these 'serious' constitutional difficulties,
which the statute can quite 'fairly be read' to avoid."38s
FSLIC contended that the Supreme Court modified the Northern
Pipeline doctrine in decisions upholding agency adjUdication of private
rights in the face of article III challenges. 386 Some courts have held
that FSLIC adjudication is constitutional because judicial review is
available under the Administrative Procedure Act. 387 Morrison-Knud
that same article, as the source of its authority to create these courts, they are referred to as
'article I' courts or 'legislative courts.''' Redish, supra note 376, at 198 (footnotes omit
ted). "[T]he category includes the territorial courts, the military courts, the court of the
District of Columbia and the Tax Courts." Id. at 199 n.18. Congress attempted to estab
lish an additional class of article I courts through the Bankruptcy Act of 1978. Northern
Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 53. Although Congress establishes both article I and article III courts,
these courts differ in that article I judges do not enjoy life tenure and protection against
salary diminution (the bankruptcy judges were appointed for a term of 14 years and their
salary was "subject to adjustment"). Id.
Administrative agencies, though not referred to as courts, "are analogous to legislative
courts because, although they may and often do perform adjudicatory functions, their
members do not receive the salary and tenure protections of article IlL" Redish, supra
note 376, at 214 (footnote omitted). The Supreme Court has recognized that Northern
Pipeline applies to agency adjudication as well. See infra notes 390-91 and accompanying
text.
381. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 51.
382. Id. at 69 (quoting Ex Parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 451 (1929».
383. Id. at 69-70 (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932».
384. Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1222.
385. Id. at 1222 (quoting Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 106 S. Ct.
3245, 3252 (1986».
386. FSLIC's Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion of Appropriateness of Rehear
ing in Banc at 13, Morrison-Knudsen Co., v. CHG Int'l, Inc., 811 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir.
1987). See Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prod. Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985); Schor, 106 S.
Qn~.

.

387. See. e.g., First Am. Say. Bank v. Westside Federal Say. & Loan Ass'n, 639 F.
Supp. 93 (W.O. Wash. 1986) (investors' suit against Westside dismissed once the Board
appointed FSLIC as receiver); Lyons Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Westside Bancorporation, 636
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sen conceded that, with respect to the Northern Pipeline problem, a
FSLIC adjudicatory scheme that passes "constitutional muster" is
possible. 388
Though it might have struck the death knell for much adminis
trative agency adjudication,389 Northern Pipeline has not caused such
drastic consequences. Recently, the Supreme Court upheld agency ad
judication of private rights, or claims based solely on state law. Under
current Northern Pipeline doctrine, as found in the two majority opin
ions written by Justice O'Connor in Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricul
tural Products Co. 390 and Commodity Futures Trading Commission v.
Schor,391 a non-exclusive FSLIC adjudicatory scheme might pass conF. Supp. 576, 581-82 (N.D. Ill. 1986), aff'd, 828 F.2d 387 (7th Cir. 1987) (Northern Pipe
line does not apply to administrative procedures because agencies neither "render final
judgment" nor "issue binding orders.").
388. Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1222.
389. See Redish, supra note 376, at 199-200.
390. 473 U.S. 568 (1985). The Court upheld a voluntary binding arbitration system
for resolving compensation disputes under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenti
cide Act (FIFRA) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 136 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)). Under the FlFRA,
the Environmental Protection Agency must license every insecticide, fungicide, and roden
ticide. Id. at 571. In support of its application for a license, a firm must submit scientific
data. Id. Any data which are not protected as trade secrets may be used by other firms
seeking to license a chemically similar substance, provided that they compensate the origi
nal submitter. Id. at 571-72. If the parties fail to agree on the amount of compensation, the
dispute is resolved through binding arbitration with limited judicial review for "fraud, mis
representation, or other misconduct." /d.. at 573-74 (quoting § 3(c)(1)(D)(ii) of the Federal
Pesticide Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 819 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(1)(D)(ii) (1982)). This
arbitration system replaced judicial resolution of compensation questions. Thomas, 473
U.S. at 571-73.
Justice Brennan, in a concurring opinion in which two other justices joined, found that
the statutory compensation question was a matter of "public rights," and thus agency adju
dication was appropriate. Id. at 594-602.
391. 106 S. Ct. 3245 (1986). The Supreme Court upheld agency adjudication, on a
voluntary basis, of a narrow class of private, state law claims with judicial review. Con
gress created the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTq to implement the
Commodity Exchange Act (CEA). Id. at 3250. One of the duties of the CFTC was to
administer a "reparations procedure through which disgruntled customers of professional
commodity brokers could seek redress for the brokers' violations of the Act or CFTC regu
lations." Id. The CFTC employed formal adjudication procedures for claims alleging vio
lations of the CEA or any CFTC regulation. Id. at 3250-51. The CFTC promulgated a
regulation which allowed it to "adjudicate counterclaims 'aris[ing] out of the transaction or
occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences set forth in the complaint.';' Id. at 3250
(quoting 41 Fed. Reg. 3994,3995,4002 (1976) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 12.23(b)(2)(1987)).
Schor was a customer and debtor of ContiCommodity Services, Inc. (Conti) at the
time the dispute began. Schor, 106 S. Ct. at 3250. Schor brought suit in the administrative
forum, alleging that his debt was due to Conti's violations of the CEA. /d. Conti, prior to
notice of the suit in the administrative forum, brought an action in federal district court for
the balance due on Schor's debt. Id. Schor moved to dismiss the district court proceeding
so that all claims could be adjudicated in the administrative forum. Id. at 3250-51. Before
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stitutional muster. Though not compelled by its recent decisions, the
Supreme Court might require more than ordinary appellate review for
FSLIC adjudications. 392
In Thomas and Schor, the Supreme Court used the "public
rights" I"private rights" distinction as an evaluative, but not determi
native, guide in assessing whether a particular claim may be adjudi
cated in a non-article III forum. 393 According to the Court, agency
adjudication of public rights is less likely to encroach on the indepen
dence. of the judicial branch than agency adjudication of private
rights. 394 Thus, "where private, common law rights are at stake, [the
Court's] ... examination of the congressional attempt to control the
manner in which those rights are adjudicat.ed has been searching."39s
Although no single characterization of the nature of the claims subject
to FSLIC adjudication can be made,396 included among them are pri
vate rights claims, based solely on state law for their existence and
resolution, and subject to "searching" review. 397
A majority of the Justices in Northern Pipeline agreed that "Con
the court ruled on Schor's motion to dismiss the federal court action, Conti voluntarily
withdrew the action. Id. at 3251.
The CFfC held in favor of Conti on both the claim and counterclaim. Schor then
challenged the constitutionality of the CFfC power to decide the state law-based contract
counterclaim. Id.
392. See infra notes 407-39 and accompanying text.
393. Schor, 106 S. Ct. at 3259 (citing Thomas, 473 U.S. at 586-88).
394. Id.
395. Id. (citing Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 84 (Rehnquist, J. concurring».
396. Under Hudspeth, all claims are switched to the administrative track. The credi
tor inHudspeth sought to challenge FSLIC's handling of the receivership. The creditors in
Morrison-Knudsen and Coit Independence Joint Venture v. FirstSouth Sav. & Loan Ass'n,
829 F.2d 563 (5th Cir. 1987), asserted state law-based claims and sought court adjudica
tion. See supra note 144 for facts of Coit.
397. The issue addressed in this comment is whether FSLIC has the exclusive power
to adjudicate creditor claims. Those creditor claims are based primarily on contract, or
other state law causes of action. As such, state law provides the rule of decision. "It is
therefore a claim of the kind assumed to be at the 'core' of matters normally reserved to
Article III courts." Schor, 106 S. Ct. at 3259 (citing Thomas, 473 U.S. at 587; Northern
Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 70-71, and n.25).
The argument might be made that FSLIC adjudication of creditor claims is a matter of
public right: FSLIC is restructuring debtor-creditor relations. In his Northern Pipeline
plurality opinion, Justice Brennan wrote: "But the restructuring of debtor-creditor rela
tions, which is at the core of the federal bankruptcy power, must be distinguished from the
adjudication of state-created private rights, such as the right to recover contract damages
that is at issue in this case." Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 71. Although granting the
bankruptcy courts jurisdiction to adjudicate Northern Pipeline's contract claim violated
article III, the adjudication of claims against Northern Pipeline in the bankruptcy courts
would not violate article III. Adjudication of claims against the entity in some stage of
bankruptcy is a matter of restructuring debtor-creditor relations. Justice Rehnquist's con
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gress may not vest in a non-Article III court the power to adjudicate,
render final judgment, and issue binding orders in a traditional con
tract action arising under state law, without consent of the litigants,
and subject only to ordinary appellate review."398 Focusing on sub
stance rather than form,399 the Schor court concluded that the under
lying purposes of article III protection were to guard the independence
of the judicial branch within the doctrine of the separation of pow
ers,400 and to protect litigants' "right to have claims decided before
judges who are free from potential domination by other branches of
govemment."401 According to Schor, this article III, section 1 protec
tion was designed primarily to safeguard the personal interest, rather
than the structural or institutional interest. 402
The Schor Court held that the Commodity Futures Trading Com
mission's (CFTC) adjudicatory scheme protected this personal interest
in choice of forum, because the statute gave the claimant the choice to
bring a claim for Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) violations in either
a federal district court or the administrative forum.403 The CFTC ad
curring opinion in Northern Pipeline is consistent with this view. See supra note 378 for
Justice Rebnquist's opinion.
FSLIC could argue by analogy that when it adjudicates claims against the insolvent
savings and loan, it is restructuring debtor-creditor relations. The restructuring of debtor
creditor relations, however, is distinct from the adjudication of creditor claims. An article
III court could, for instance, determine the validity of all claims against the bankrupt en
tity. FSLIC, as the federal agency which has been empowered by Congress to restructure
debtor-creditor relations, would then decide how the assets of the bankrupt would be
shared by the creditors. Creditors may argue that Congress intended FSLIC's powers as
receiver to be more like this model.
A plurality of the Supreme Court in Northern Pipeline viewed the entire. Bankruptcy
Act of 1978 as unconstitutional. In response, Congress restored most of the judicial power
to the district courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1474 (Supp. IV 1986). As a result, the question of
whether adjudication of claims against a bankrupt entity is a matter of public rights cannot
now arise. Congress, by restoring most of the judicial power to article III courts, may be
indicating that it regards adjudication of claims against the bankrupt as a matter of private
right.
Furthermore, since the Supreme Court has abandoned the private right/public right
test for determining when agency adjudication is proper, and upheld agency adjudication of
private rights under certain conditions, the Court does not have to sacrifice its intuitions
about what is and is not a private right. That is, the Court may uphold agency adjudication
of state law contract claims, without finding them to be a matter of public right. The Court
can find these rights to be private rights, without the result that agency adjudication is
forbidden.
398. Thomas, 473 U.S. at 584 (citing Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 84 (plurality
opinion); Id. at 90-92 (concurring opinion); Id. at 92 (Burger, C.J., dissenting».
399. Schor, 106 S. Ct. at 3256.
400. Id.
401. Id. (quoting United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 218 (1980».
402. Id.
403. Id. at 3250.
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judicated the state law contract claim in Schor only with the consent
of the parties. 404 The absence of consent was a "significant factor" in
the Court's rejection of the bankruptcy scheme in Northern
Pipeline. 4Os
Exclusive FSLIC adjudication of creditor claims cannot be sus
tained under this rationale because the creditor has no choice of fo
rum. 406 What offends the Constitution in this view is not FSLIC
adjudication of claims, but rather the exclusive adjudicatory authority
and consequent lack of personal choice. A non-exclusive FSLIC adju
dicatory scheme would satisfy the personal interest aspect of the un
derlying article III concerns. FSLIC and the courts would have
concurrent jurisdiction; the creditor could choose the forum.
With respect to the institutional interest of separation of powers,
the Court recently stated that there are no hard and fast rules. 407 If it
were non-exclusive and afforded more than "ordinary appellate re
view,"408 FSLIC adjudication might very well be sustained. 409 A non
exclusive FSLIC adjudicatory scheme with only "ordinary appellate
review" also might be sustained. The Schor court employed a balanc
ing test "with an eye to the practical effect that the congressional ac
tion [of empowering an agency with adjudicatory authority] will have
on the constitutionally assigned role of the federal jUdiciary."41O
Among the factors upon which [the Court] ha[s] focused are the
extent to which the "essential attributes of judicial power" are re
served to Article III courts, and conversely, the extent to which the
404. With respect to a state law counterclaim, the CFfC has jurisdiction over the
counterclaim when it arises out of the same facts as the alleged CEA violation. In Schor,
the parties consented to CFfC adjudication of the state law claim in two senses: 1) by
bringing the action in the administrative forum, Schor consented to the adjudication of all
of the facts of the controversy, and Conti consented when it voluntarily dismissed the state
law contract claims; and 2) Schor actually agreed to have all the facts adjudicated in the
administrative forum when he moved to have the district court dismiss Conti's claim in
order that all claims be decided in one forum. See supra note 391 for facts of Schor.
405. Schor, 106 S. Ct. at 3256 (citing Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 80 n.31 (plurality
opinion); Id. at 91 (Rehnquist, J., concurring); Id. at 95 (White, J., dissenting».
406. The Glen Ridge court agreed and held that exclusive FSLIC adjudication of
creditor claims was unconstitutional. Glen Ridge I Condominiums, Ltd. v. FSLIC, 734
S.W.2d 374 (supplemental opinion on motion for rehearing) (Tex. App. 1987), ajJ'd on
other grounds, No. C-6776, slip op. (Tex. March 30, 1988). See infra notes 421-25 and
accompanying text for the appeals court's constitutional analysis.
407. Schor, 106 S. Ct. at 3258.
408. See supra note 374.
409. Exclusive FSLlC adjudication probably would offend the Constitution on the
institutional prong because it deprives courts of jurisdiction. See infra notes 421-25 and
accompanying text.
410. Schor, 106 S. Ct. at 3258 (citation omitted).
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non-Article III forum exercises the range of jurisdiction and powers
normally vested only in Article III courts, the origins and impor
tance of the right to be adjudicated, and the concerns that drove
Congress to depart from the requirements of Article 111411
In Schor, the Court held that CFfC adjudication of state law
contract claims did not "impermissibly intrude on the province of the
judiciary."412 CFfC's initial jurisdiction depended on a violation of
the CEA, a "particularized area of law,"413 whereas jurisdiction given
to the bankruptcy courts under the 1978 Bankruptcy Act was
broad. 414 CFfC orders are enforceable only by the district COurt,41S
whereas the bankruptcy courts could issue final orders. 416 Judicial re
view of CFfC conclusions of fact was under the "weight of the evi
dence" standard,417 and judicial review of CFfC conclusions of law
was under the de novo standard,418 "rather than the more deferential
standard found lacking in Northern Pipeline."419 Finally, unlike the
bankruptcy courts, the CFfC did not "exercise 'all the ordinary pow
ers of district courts.' "420
The Texas Court of Appeals in Glen Ridge I Condominiums,
Limited v. FSLIC,421 applied these factors to an exclusive FSLIC adju
411. Id. at 3258 (citing Thomas, 473 U.S. at 582-84; Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at
84-86).
412. Id.
413. Id. (citing Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 85).
414. See supra note 379 and accompanying text for a description of bankruptcy court
jurisdiction under the Act.
415. Schor, 106 S. Ct. at 3259.
416. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 85-86.
417. Schor, 106 S. Ct. at 3259.
418. Id. Courts are the final arbiters on matters of law. 5 U.S.C. §§ 706(2)(B),
706(2Xc) (1982).
419. Schor, 106 S. Ct. at 3259 (citing Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 85 (The standard
of review for bankruptcy court judgments was the "more deferential 'clearly erroneous'
standard."».
420. Id. (quoting Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 85).
421. 734 S.W.2d 374 (supplemental opinion on motion for rehearing) (Tex. Ct. App.
1987). The Glen Ridge court followed the Hudspeth court's statutory construction, finding
that Congress empowered FSLIC with exclusive adjudicatory authority. Id. at 390. In an
.effort to convince the Glen Ridge court that FSLIC adjudication was constitutional,
FSLIC contended that the proper standard of review for FSLIC determinations was de
novo. Id. at 389. However, the Glen Ridge court followed Morrison-Knudsen, and found
that the standard of review was either the "arbitrary or capricious" standard or the "sub
stantial evidence test." Id.
Interestingly, FSLIC has stated that the appropriate standard of review for its deter
minations was the "arbitrary and capricious" standard. FSLIC's Petition for Rehearing
and Suggestion of Appropriateness for Rehearing in Banc at 14, Morrison-Knudsen Co. v.
CHG Int'l, Inc., 811 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 1987).
The Texas Supreme Court affirmed Glen Ridge, but on different grounds, following the
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dicatory scheme with only ordinary appellate review, and held that
such a scheme was unconstitutional. The Glen Ridge court reasoned
that because section 1464 "proscribe[s] any judicial action over FSLIC
whatsoever,"422 and judicial review is limited to a fairly deferential
standard, "FSLIC has usurped all the functions of article III
courtS."423 Balancing the right to an article III court with the govern
mental interest the legislature sought to achieve,424 the Glen Ridge
court found that, due to the absence of any choice on the part of the
creditor, the right to an article III court received no value in the equa
tion, and thus exclusive FSLIC adjudication was unconstitutiona1. 42s
As Glen Ridge indicated, applying the various factors to non-ex
clusive FSLIC adjudication of contract claims is more difficult than
the situtation in Schor and does not yield a conclusive result. 426
FSLIC's authority is neither as broad as the bankruptcy courts', nor as
narrow as the CYrC's. FSLIC acquires jurisdiction only after a sav
ings and loan association is in receivership and may only adjudicate
claims against the association in receivership.427 Nevertheless, FSLIC
adjudicates state law contract claims, not matters that depend on
agency expertise in a specific area of law, as was the case in Schor. 428
The contract disputes in Coit Independence Joint Venture Inc. v. First
South Saving & Loan Association and Morrison-Knudsen are at the
Morrison-Knudsen court's statutory construction and not deciding the constitutional issue.
FSLIC v. Glen Ridge Condominiums, Ltd., No. C-6776, slip op. (Tex. March 30, 1988)
("We neither approve nor disapprove the holding of the court of appeals that the exercise
of adjudicatory power by the FSLIC as receiver violates Article III ....").
422. Glen Ridge, 734 S.W.2d at 388.
423. Id.. at 389. FSLIC has more power than an article III court; FSLIC acts as
plaintiff, judge, and jury. Id.
424. This governmental interest, according to the Hudspeth approach, is to provide
an efficient and inexpensive claims procedure so that the receivership can be resolved
quickly in order to preserve FSLIC assets. See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
42S. Glen Ridge, 734 S.W.2d at 388-90.
426. In Schor, the right to an article III forum was given a high value in the equation
because the claimant had a choice of forum. For purposes of this discussion, the standard
of review in the non-exclusive FSLIC adjudicatory scheme would be "weight of the evi
dence" standard for findings of fact, and de novo review for findings of law. These stan
dards were approved of in Schor, see supra text accompanying note 417.
427. Any right of the insolvent savings and loan to acquire assets must be adjudi
cated in court. FSLIC's Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion of Appropriateness for Re
hearing in Bane at 6-7 n.S, Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. CHG Int'l, Inc., 811 F.2d 1209 (9th
Cir. 1987). "(T]he receiver must go to court or use whatever other process is available
outside of the administrative receivership to assert claims on behalf of the receivership."
Id.
428. CYrC adjudication of state law contract claims was ancillary to the CYrC's
primary jurisdiction to adjudicate violations of the CEA.
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"core" of "matters normally reserved to Article III COUrts,"429 and do
not depend on any statute in either the NHA or the HOLA for the
existence or the resolution of the legal issues. Additionally, FSLIC
does not require a court to enforce its final orders. FSLIC actually
holds the assets and thus has the power to give them up or refuse to
give them up. On the other hand, a higher-than-ordinary standard of
judicial review of a final FSLIC determination, as well as a provision
permitting a choice of forum, suggests that article III courts would
retain sufficient power to assure that FSLIC adjudication of some state
law contract claims would not impermissibly threaten the separation
of powers.
While the outcome of any balancing of these various factors is
unpredictable, the trend in the post-Northern Pipeline cases is towards
constitutionality. In Schor, th~ court upheld CYrC adjudication of a
narrow class of private rights as incident to its primary adjudicatory
function with consent of the parties and the availability of more than
"ordinary appellate review," finding that it did not impermissibly
threaten the separation of powers, the institutional prong of article HI
analysis. 430 An analogous FSLIC adjudicatory scheme is likely to pass
constitutional muster. Further, in view of the Court's recent stife
ment that the primary purpose of the article III protection is per
sonal,431 a non-exclusive adjudicatory scheme with merely "ordinary
appellate review" might also satisfy article III concerns.
Under a non-exclusive FSLIC adjudicatory scheme with only
"ordinary appellate review," the creditor's right to court adjudication
is preserved. Thus, the primary article III concern is satisfied. Once
this concern is satisfied, the institutional concern of separation of pow
ers is lessened substantially: first, no article III court is deprived of
jurisdiction to hear a case; second, on review of a FSLIC determina
tion, an article III court has the last word on matters of law;432 and
third, if the factual record is inadequate, the court may review any
factual findings anew under the de novo standard. 433 Provided that
th~ factual record were adequate, the reviewing court would be limited
to reviewing findings of fact under the deferential "arbitrary and capri
429. Schor. 106 S. Ct. at 3259 (citing Thomas. 473 U.S. at 585-86; Northern Pipeline.
458 U.S. at 70-71 and n.25).
430. Schor. 106 S. Ct. at 3260.
431. Id. at 3256.
432. 5 B. MEZINES. J. STEIN & J. GRUFF. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW. § 43.02[6] (1987)
(citing 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(D) (1982».
433. Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(F) (1982».
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cious" standard. 434 The Supreme Court has not decided whether this
. standard of review in a non-exclusive adjudicatory scheme infringes on
the institutional concerns of article III.
The Thomas Court upheld a voluntary arbitration scheme with
judicial review limited to circumstances involving "fraud, misrepre
sentation, or other misconduct,"435 a standard of review seemingly
even more deferential than the "arbitrary and capricious" standard.
The rights at issue in Thomas, however, are distinguishable from the
rights involved with FSLIC adjudication of state law claims. Thomas
upheld the arbitration scheme but limited its holding to "the proposi
tion that Congress, acting for a valid purpose pursuant to its constitu
tional powers under Article I, may create a seemingly 'private' right
that is so closely integrated into a public regulatory scheme as to be a
matter appropriate for agency resolution with limited involvement by
the Article III judiciary."436 As the Glen Ridge court noted, FSLIC's
regulatory scheme does not alter the rights of the parties with respect
to the validity of the state law claim.437 Thus, the rights involved are
distinguishable, and the Thomas holding does not reach FSLIC adju
dication. Schor, dealing specifically with private state law claims, up
held non-exclusive adjudication of creditor claims with a lower
deference "weight of the evidence" standard which was specifically
prescribed by statute. 438 Thus, Schor does not directly support the
constitutionality of non-exclusive adjudication of state law claims with
merely "ordinary appellate review."
Non-exclusive FSLIC adjudication with "ordinary appellate re
view," however, avoids the Northern Pipeline holding. 439 In light of
the post-Northern Pipeline trend towards finding agency adjudication
schemes constitutional, it is likely that a non-exclusive adjudicatory
scheme with only "ordinary appellate review" also would pass consti
434. The "arbitrary and capricious" standard applies to review of infonnal adjudica
tions. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982). The "substantial evidence" standard applies to review
offonnal adjudications. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1982). Since there is no statute which re
quires FSLIC adjudication to be "on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing,"
FSLIC is not required to comply with APA standards for formal adjudication, and thus the
"arbitrary and capricious" standard would apply. See section IV B (I) for arguments that
FSLIC must adjudicate fonnally.
435. Thomas, 473 U.S. at 573-74.
436. Id. at 593-94.
437. Glen Ridge, 734 S.W.2d at 378-79.
438. Schor, 106 S. Ct. at 3259.
439. The Northern Pipeline problem can be stated as follows: exclusive agency adju
dication of state law claims with only "ordinary appellate review" is unconstitutional.
Thus, any non-exclusive adjudicatory scheme avoids the Northern Pipeline problem.
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tutional muster, but the question remains open. A greater constitu
tional threat to FSLIC adjudication is that it offends due process.

B.

The Due Process Issue

The Constitution requires that no individual shall be deprived of
"life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."440 Court and
formal agency adjudication441 afford due process to the parties of an
action.442 As subsection B (1) shows, due process concerns are raised
because there is no statutory requirement that FSLIC adjUdication be
formal. Subsection B (2) discusses due process requirements in the
context of informal FSLIC adjudication and concludes that the lack of
a neutral decisionmaker in FSLIC adjudication, as presently con
ducted, denies due process to the creditors. Finally, subsection B (2)
suggests two possible solutions to this due process problem.
1.

FSLIC Adjudication is Informal, not Formal

The APA divides adjudication into two categories: formal and
informal. Formal adjudication under the APA is a trial-type proceed
ing with substantially the same ;safeguards afforded to the parties as
are provided by court adjudication. 443 Of particular importance is the
requirement that a neutral decisionmaker, usually an Administrative
Law Judge (ALJ), conduct formal adjudications. 444 But the APA
does not provide requirements for informal adjudications.
The APA requires formal adjudication only when "adjudication
[is] required by statute to be determined on the record after opportu
nity for an agency hearing. "445' While the Hudspeth court asserted
440. u.s. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
441. 5 U.S.c. § 554 (1982).
442. Formal adjudication under the APA exceeds the minimum requirements of due
process under the Constitution. R. PIERCE, supra note 16, § 6.4, at 280-281.
443. Id. § 6.4.3, at 302.
[A] party to a formal adjudication is entitled to an unbiased decision-maker, no
tice of the proposed action and the basis for that action, right to counsel, opportu
1 nity to present evidence orally and to make arguments, opportunity to know the
opposing evidence and to cross-examine opposing witnesses, resolution of factual
issues based exclusively on evidence admitted at trial, and written findings and
conclusions.
Id.
444. Id. § 6.4.3a, at 302. "Each agency shall appoint as many administrative law
judges as are necessary for proceedings required to be conducted in accordance with sec
tions 556 and 557 of this title." 5 U.S.c. § 3105 (1982). Sections 556 and 557 prescribe
how hearings are to be conducted in formal agency adjudication or rulemaking. 5 U.S.C.
§§ 556-557 (1982).
445. 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1982).
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that FSLIC adjudication is required by statute, this comment demon
strates that there is no statute or combination of statutes that explicitly
requires FSLIC adjudication. 446 Thus, in APA terms, not only is
there no statutory requirement that the determination be "on the rec
ord after opportunity for an agency hearing,"447 there is not even a
statutory requirement for a hearing.
Instances involving an interpretation of the formal adjudication
provision of the APA fall into four categories. First, there are exam
ples where "Congress explicitly indicated that the agency is not re
quired to use formal adjudication," courts will not require formal
adjudication. 448 "Second, there are cases where Congress explicitly in
dicated its intent to require an agency to use formal adjudication by
including in the statute the precise language that triggers the APA
formal adjudication provision . . . ."449 Third, there are instances
where the legislative history clearly indicated that Congress intended
to require formal adjudication, but the statutory language is less than
clear.450 Finally, in the fourth class, there are instances where both
ambiguous language and legislative history are present. 451 The case
for formal FSLIC a4judication does not fit into even the fourth class of
cases. FSLIC adjudication, if required by statute at all, does so implic
itly. It is not a question of vague language and legislative history.
There is no statutory language, and at best only vague legislative his
tory. There is no basis on which a court could decide that Congress
required FSLIC to use formal adjudication. 452
446. The HUdspeth arguments are based on the notion that Congress implicitly em
powered FSLIC with adjudicatory authority.
447. 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1982).
448. R. PIERCE, supra note 16, § 6.4.2, at 299 (citing Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S.
302 (1955».
449. Id. § 6.4.2, at 299.
450. /d. (citing Independent Bankers Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Re
serve Sys., 516 F.2d 1206 (D.C. Cir. 1975».
451. Id. § 6.4.2, at 298 (citing Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 572 F.2d
872 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 824 (1978». Seacoast was required to hold a public
hearing but the statute was silent as to whether a record was required. Seacoast, 572 F.2d
at 875. The court held that Congress required Seacoast to conduct its hearings as formal
adjudications. Id. at 877-78.
Other courts have resolved ambiguous or vague language as evidence that Congress
did not require formal adjudication. R. PIERCE, supra note 16, § 6.4.2, at 301-02 (citing
United States Lines, Inc. v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 584 F.2d 519 (D.C. Cir. 1978».
452. There is a second argument, albeit attenuated, that Congress intended FSLIC
adjudications to be in accord with the formal adjudication requirements. Under 12 U.S.C.
§ 1437(a) (1982), which is part of the Federal Home Loan Bank Act (FHLBA). Ch. 522
§ 17,47 Stat. 736 (1932) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1437 (1982», the Board has the power to
"adopt, amend, and require the observance of ... rules, ... and orders as shall be necessary
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Even if a court held, as a matter of statutory. construction, that
FSLIC was not required to adjudicate formally, a court might never
theless hold that FSLIC must adjudicate formally on due process
grounds. The Supreme Court upheld formal agency adjudication of a
narrow class of private law contract claims in Schor.4s3 That case
might have been resolved differently, on due process grounds, if the
agency had been adjUdicating informally, because due process has dif
ferent requirements depending on the context. Agency a",judication of
private common law rights might require more due process protection
than agency adjudication of public rights created by statute. In partic
ular, agency adjudication of private rights might require formal adju
dication in order to satisfy due process requirements, whereas informal
agency adjUdication of public rights would not. Section B (2) exam
ines the particular requirements of due process in the context of
informal FSLIC adjudication of creditor claims, and concludes that
due process requires, at a minimum, that FSLIC use a neutral
decisionmaker.
2.

Due Process and Informal FSLIC Adjudication

FSLIC currently adjudicates claims on an informal basis. Claim
ants submit forms and accompanying documentation to FSLIC as re
ceiver. FSLIC hires "special representatives" who are the
decisionmakers. 4s4 In this context, three questions arise: first,
whether due process applies to FSLIC adjudication; second, whether
the current procedures meet minimum due process requirements; and
from time to time for carrying out the purPoses of the provisions of this chapter." Section
1437(a) continues:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Board may from time to time
make such provision as it deems appropriate authorizing the performance by any
officer, employee, agent, or administrative unit thereof of any function of the
Board (including any function of the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corpo
ration), except with regard to promulgation of rules and regulations in accord
ance with section 553 of title 5, and adjudications subject to section 554 of title 5.

lei.

This language appears to be of general application and not limited to powers and duties
of the Board in the context of the FHLBA. Section 1437 is entitled: "Federal Home Loan
Bank Board; powers and duties; independent agency; report to Congress."
FSLIC is a part of the Board; any FSLIC action is an action by the Board. If the
Board empowered FSLIC with adjudicatory authority through rulemaking, § 1437(a)
might mandate that those adjudications be conducted formally. However, still absent is
any statutory requirement of a hearing or legislative history indicating that Congress re
quired FSLIC to adjudicate 'creditor claims'.
453. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 106 S. Ct. 3245 (1986).
454. For more detail of FSLIC's claims resolution procedures, see supra note 54.
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third, if the current procedures do not satisfy due process, what
changes must be made to satisfy due process.
Though not addressed explicitly in Morrison-Knudsen, there are
serious due process concerns with a FSLIC adjudicatory scheme that
allows FSLIC to be both a party to the proceeding and the deci
sionmaker. 45s Stevenson Associates, one of the appellants in Morri
son-Knudsen, contended that it would violate their right to due
process to require them to pursue their claims administratively.456 In
particular, Stevenson complained:
There is no opportunity ... for Stevenson (1) to present other
than documentary evidence; (2) to know, much less examine or
cross-examine, the data on which FSLIC or the Board would deny a
claim; (3) to subpoena witnesses or documents; (4) to conduct dis
covery; (5) to present any legal analysis of complex transactions
which are the basis of the claim; or (6) for oral argument .... More
over, ... the FSLIC is, in effect, acting as both the respondent to the
charges and as the adjudicator of the claim-an inherent and insur
mountable conflict that creates a preordained result. 457

The threshold question as to whether the constitutional require
ment of due process applies to FSLIC adjudication must be answered
affirmatively.458 Due process applies to adjudicative proceedings
which affect particular individuals and threaten the loss of life, liberty,
or property.4S9 A FSLIC adjudicative proceeding applies to individu
als, as opposed to groups, and threatens the loss of property .
.The next step is to .determine the particular procedural safeguards
that due process requires. Due process requires "some kind of hear
ing"460 with a neutral decisionmaker. 461 Thus, the most serious com
455. The Morrison-Knudsen court's concern that FSLIC was both claimant and ad
judicator may have been motivated by due process considerations. See Morrison-Knudsen,
811 F.2d at 1216. The court's holding avoided confrontation with due process just as it
avoided the Northern Pipeline problem, by finding that FSLIC does not have the power to
adjudicate.
456. Appellant's Opening Brief at 9-12, Stevenson Assocs. v. FSLIC (consolidated
with Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. CHG Int'l, Inc., 811 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 1987) (86-2081».
457. Id. at 11-12. As FSLIC argued, the due process challenge may have been pre
mature. Since a party must go through the claims procedure for there to be a due process
violation, a challenge prior to a final determination would be "nothing more than specula
tion." FSLIC's Reply Memorandum in Support of the Motion to Dismiss at 15, Stevenson
Assocs. v. FSLIC, No. C-85-7192 WHO (motion granted) (N.D. Cal. 1986).
458. See Note, Decisionmaker Bias and the Procedural Due Process Rights of With
drawing Employers Under the MPPAA, 9 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 227, 234 (1987).
459. R. PIERCE, supra note 16, § 6.3.1, at 227.
460. Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267 (1975) (quoting
Justice White in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-58 (1974».

1988]

FSLIC-ADJUDICATION OF CREDITOR CLAIMS

307

plaint Stevenson makes is that it is denied a neutral decisionmaker. 462
FSLIC as receiver is not a neutral decisionmaker. FSLIC institu
tionally, and the special representatives and FSLIC counsel appointed
by FSLIC to adjudicate creditor claims personally, are potentially bi
ased. FSLIC itself always is a creditor of the association in receiver
Ship.463 This situation would be problematic even if FSLIC were in
sound financial condition. Because FSLIC is financially troubled,464
461. Judge Friendly placed the requirement for a neutral decisionmaker as the single
most important factor. Id. at 1279. See also Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972)
(" 'neutral and detached' hearing body" was a minimum due process requirement); R.
PIERCE, supra note 16, § 9.2.1, at 484; Note, supra note 458, at nn.199-200 and accompany
ing text. But see Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (The Court developed a balanc
ing test to determine, in each instance, what due process requires. The Court did not
require any particular safeguard in each instance.). Under the Mathews test, there are no
absolute due process requirements. The test, however, has been criticized, and the Supreme
Court has been reluctant to apply it even when it had the opportunity to do so. See Note,
supra note 458, at 2S4-55 nn.I84-85 & 193 and accompanying text.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, held that "administrative review of
FSLIC receivership actions affords due process." Coit Independence Joint Venture v.
FirstSouth Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 829 F.2d 563, 565 (5th Cir. 1987), petition/or cert. granted,
108 S. Ct. 1105 (1988) (citing Woods v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 826 F.2d 1400,
1411 (5th Cir. 1987». The issue in Coit was whether FSLIC adjudication of state law
based claims violated due process. Coit, 829 F.2d at 565. The issue in Woods, however,
was whether the procedure according to which the Board appointed FSLIC as receiver,
thereby ousting the directors and placing an association in receivership, violated due pro
cess. Woods, 826 F.2d at 1411. The issues presented by the two cases are distinct: the
Woods opinion does not, by itself, control Coit. The ousted directors in Woods were enti
tled to immediate judicial review in a federal district court of the Board's administrative
action of placing the association in receivership. The creditors in Coit are challenging the
constitutionality of FSLIC acting as "both party and judge" of state law claims. Coit, 829
F.2d at 565. While administrative review of Board actions such as that in Woods may
afford due process, it is far from automatic that administrative review of FSLIC adjudica
tions of state law claims affords due process. The creditor is entitled to a neutral deci
sionmaker in the first instance. Ward v. Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 61-62 (1972).
462. The ten factors Judge Friendly singled out as the procedural safegaurds of a
hearing were, in order of importance:
(1) An unbiased tribunal. (2) Notice of the proposed action and the grounds
asserted for it. (3) Opportunity to present reasons why the proposed action
should not be taken. (4) The right to present evidence, including the right to call
witnesses. (5) The right to know opposing evidence. (6) The right to cross-ex
amine adverse witnesses. (7) Decision based exclusively on the evidence
presented. (8) Right to counsel. (9) Requirement that the tribunal prepare a rec
ord of the evidence presented. (10) Requirement that the tribunal prepare written
findings of fact and reasons for its decision.
R. PIERCE, supra note 16, § 6.3.3, at 255-56 (citing Friendly, supra note 460, at 1267.)
463. Even if FSLIC did not have to reimburse depositors out of its own funds,
FSLIC has borne the costs of the receivership, thereby becoming a creditor of the failed
association. Every creditor claim allowed by FSLIC reduces the potential amount of recov
ery for FSLIC.
464. See supra note 2.
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the potential for actual bias is far greater. There is a positive incentive
for FSLIC to decide claims against the creditor in order to keep itself
solvent,46S a dynamic which may create actual bias. 466
FSLIC as adjudicator also presents the problem of apparent
467
FSLIC has a statutory duty to do "whichever it deems to be in
bias.
the best interest of the association, its savers, and the Corporation."468
To be neutral, however, a decisionmaker must not owe a duty to one
of the parties, let alone be one of the parties. This situation prevents,
at a minimum, "the requisite appearance of fairness."469
In order to cure this unconstitutional bias, the interested deci
sionmaker must be removed from,the claims procedure and an impar
tial process must be established which includes a neutral
decisionmaker.470 This can occur in several ways. The most straight
. 465. In Ward v. Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972), the Supreme Court held that hav
ing the mayor of the town preside over the town's traffic court violated due process because
the proceeding lacked a neutral decisionmaker. The mayor was responsible for the town's
finances and a large percentage of the town's finances came from the traffic court. The
situation where FSLIC is an interested party and is also the adjudicator of creditor claims
presents a similar and even more egregious violation: in Ward. there was no evidence that
the town of Monroeville was in desperate straits, whereas the FSLIC is. See supra note 2.
466. See Note, supra note 458, at 258 nn.204-05 for an explanation of the notions of
actual and apparent bias used by the Court as explicated in Redish & Marshall, Adjudica
tory Independence and the Values ofProcedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 492 (1986).
For an example of actual bias, see the facts of Ward, supra note 465. For an example
of apparent bias, see Federal Home Loan Bank Bd. v. Long Beach Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n,
295 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1961). In Long Beach, the Board conducted a formal administrative
adjudication when the ousted directors of Long Beach Savings and Loan Association chal
lenged the Board's appointment of FSLIC as receiver. Id. at 404. At the time of Long
Beach, the Board did not have any permanent appointed Hearing Examiners (now known
as Administrative Law.Judges (AU's), 37 Fed. Reg. 16,787 (August 19. 1972». and sought
to borrow an examiner from the Security Exchange Commission. Long Beach, 295 F.2d at
407,410. "[W]here an agency such as the Board does not have examiners of its own an
examiner shall be selected by the Civil Service Commission." Id. (An agency is entitled to
borrow AU's from other agencies if the agency either does not have any permanent AU's
or is overburdened with adjudications temporarily. 5 U.S.C. § 3344 (1982).) In Long
Beach, the court invalidated the use of the particular hearing examiner because he was
selected by the Board, not by the Civil Service Commission. Long Beach. 295 F.2d at 410
11.
The court indicated concern over the appearance of "commingling" of the
prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions creating an appearance of bias in that the Board
had selected the hearing officer. Id. at 410. The court also noted that in enacting § 1010
(precursor to § 3344). which requires that the examiner be selected by the Civil Service
Commission, Congress sought to prevent the appearance of bias in the decisionmaker. Id.
Congress' concern with providing disinterested decisionmakers for formal adjudica
tions is another indication that Congress did not intend FSLIC to act as adjudicator.
467. See id.
468. 12 U.S.C. § 1729(b) (1982).
469. See Note, supra note 458, at 259 (footnote omitted).
470. A standard of de novo judicial review will not cure the constitutional defect.
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forward alternative would be to use Administrative Law Judges
(AU's), whose adjudicatory independence is protected by the APA, to
preside over the hearings. 471 Alternatively, FSLIC may use a system
of arbitration. 472 In any event, FSLIC must remove itself and its
agents from the decisionmaking role in the adjudicatory process.
V.

ALTERNATIVE ADJUDICATORY AND NON-ADJUDICATORY
CLAIMS PROCEDURES

Part V of this comment evaluates adjudicatory and non-adjudica
tory FSLIC claims resolution procedures for state law-based claims
that do not arise under FSLIC's enabling statute or any Board regula
tion. Claims that arise as a result of FSLIC's handling of the receiver
ship and <;lepend on a FSLIC statute or Board regulation, on the other
hand, should be resolved by means of a separate administrative proce
dure. Section A discusses the best adjudicatory procedure. Section B
discusses the best non-adjudicatory procedure. Both sections discuss
exhaustion of administrative remedies as applied to these adjudicatory
and non-adjudicatory claims procedures. Section C compares the best
adjudicatory procedure with the best non-adjudicatory procedure and
evaluates which of them is better.
This part uses several terms which, for clarity and consistency,
are defined in the following manner. An "adjudicatory procedure" is
The claimant is entitled to a neutral decisionmaker "in the first instance." Ward v.
Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 61-62 (1972).
471. The Board is entitled to appoint "as many Administrative Law Judges as are
necessary for proceedings required to be conducted in accordance with section 556 and 557
of the" APA; that is, formal adjudication. 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (1982). As Long Beach indi
cates, the Board conducts some formal adjudication, and thus, the Board has access to
AU's. The Board is still without any permanent AU's of its own. 52 Fed. Reg. 49,151
(Recommendations of the Administrative Conference of the United States) (1987). Were
FSLIC to conduct formal adjudications of creditor claims, the Board might be able to
supply the AU's.
FSLIC, however, adjudicates informally, and the less formal the adjudicatory proceed
ing, the less expensive and more efficient the administrative process. As discussed previ
ously, supra notes 2 & 367 and accompanying text, FSLIC is desperate to keep costs down
and efficiency up. It would, therefore, be ideal if FSLIC could use AU's in place of the
"special representatives" in informal adjudications. While there appear to be no examples
of agencies' use of AU's in informal adjudication, there may not be any reason why the
Board and FSLIC could not use an AU in this capacity.
472. If they agreed, FSLIC and the creditor could have their claims arbitrated under
the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-208 (1982). Under the Act, a court could ap
point the arbitrators, and thus the problem of institutional bias would be avoided.
The standard of review under the Act is quite deferential and may pose Northern
Pipeline problems (arbitrators award may be overturned for corruption, fraud, impartiality,
misconduct and exceeding his or her authority). 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1982). See section IV A for
a discussion of the Northern Pipeline problem and various standards of judicial review.

310

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 10:227

a procedure where FSLIC determines the parties' legal rights apart
from those that result from the receivership proceeding itself and
therefore depend on a FSLIC statute or Board regulation. 473 In a
FSLIC adjudicatory claims procedure, FSLIC adjudication would
take the place of court adjudication of those claims. A "non-adjudica
tory procedure" is a procedure through which FSLIC may "settle" or
"compromise"474 with a creditor any such claim, but failing settlement
or compromise, the claimant would have the right to have his or her
claim adjudicated in a court. 475 The "best procedure" is the procedure
optimally suited to effectuate the Board's and FSLIC's policy goals
while preserving the constitutional rights of the parties involved. 476
A.

The Best Adjudicatory Claims Procedure

The best adjudicatory claims procedure would involve a proce
dure much like the one currently in use,477 but instead of FSLIC or its
473. For example, the parties in Morrison-Knudsen were in court litigating before the
Board placed Westside in receivership. The legal issues that the parties sought to deter
mine in Morrison-Knudsen had nothing to do with the receivership, or any FSLIC statute
or Board regulation, because Westside was not yet placed in receivership.
474. See 12 U.S.C. § 1729(d) (1982).
475. Claims that arise from FSLIC's handling of the receivership and depend on a
FSLIC statute or Board regulation (receivership claims) should be resolved by an adminis
trative procedure. As previously discussed, the current and proposed claims procedures
are not designed to handle challenges of FSLIC's determinations as receiver. An adminis
trative procedure analogous to the process by which an association or a director of an
association may challenge a FSLIC or a Board enforcement order would be appropriate.
See section III A (1) for a description of the administrative procedure for challenging a
Board enforcement order. The administrative procedure for challenges to FSLIC enforce
ment orders is analogous. Cf, 12 U.S.C. § 1730 (1982). Such a system would empower
FSLIC with exclusive adjudication of receivership claims.
While exclusive FSLIC adjudication of state law-based claims raises the Northern
Pipeline problem,exclusive FSLIC adjudication of receivership claims does not. Receiver
ship claims are more naturally categorized as a matter of "public rights" as opposed to
"private rights." The determination that FSLIC acted properly will depend on statutes and
regulations that prescribe FSLIC's powers as receiver.
Exclusive FSLIC adjudication of receivership claims, however, does raise due process
concerns. FSLIC is an interested party, and thus the administrative procedure must in
clude a neutral decisionmaker.
Because a determination that FSLIC acted properly depends on statutes and regula
tions that prescribe FSLIC's powers, those powers must be described ",ith particularity so
that a decisionmaker or a reviewing court can measure FSLIC's conduct against them. As
previously argued, this is an area in need of improvement. See supra notes 59-73 and ac
companying text. In either an adjudicatory or non-adjudicatory claims procedure, as de
fined in this part, receivership claims might be handled in this manner.
476. Those policy goals are efficiency in winding up the affairs of insolvent associa
tions and preservation of FSLIC's assets. The constitutional rights at issue are the right to
have private rights adjudicated in a court and the right to a neutral decisionmaker.
477. See supra note 54.
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agents acting as decisionmakers, a neutral decisionmaker would be in
troduced to FSLIC claims procedures. While FSLIC adjudication
would not be exclusive,478 the Board or Congress could, nevertheless,
require that once the creditor elected to have his or her claims adjudi
cated by FSLIC, the creditor would be required to remain in the ad
ministrative track. If the creditor chose FSLIC adjudication, any
appeal would have to be made to the Board prior to judicial review
under the APA.479 The creditor, however, would have the right to
choose either court adjudication or FSLIC adjudication.
Because of the Northern Pipeline concern, and the litigant's right
to choose between agency or article III court adjudication, no adjudi
catory scheme can require a creditor to exhaust administrative reme
dies. If the creditor chooses court adjudication, and the court
dismisses for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the creditor is
denied the right to court adjudication. In an effort to attract creditors
to the administrative forum, the Board can promulgate fair and effi
cient procedures. A claims procedure similar to the one currently
used is sufficient, however, to handle adjudication of the vast majority
of cases. 480 It would complicate the claims process significantly to
provide procedures to handle the complicated legal relationships that
exist in a case like Mo"ison-Knudsen. 481 It may be more efficient, for
FSLIC and the litigants alike, for a court to sort out the legal tangles
of particularly complicated claims. Thus, the best adjudicatory claims
procedure would be fashioned after the scheme approved in Schor and
would involve much the same procedures that currently are in use.

478. "Exclusive jurisdiction," as used in this comment, refers to the Hudspeth ap
proach: all claims are switched to the administrative track once FSLlC is appointed re
ceiver. This would deprive a creditor of the right to have his or her claims adjudicated in a
court and deprive courts of their jurisdiction. See section IV A for a discussion of the
Nonhem Pipeline issue.
479. This is the approach that the Supreme Court approved in Schor. See supra
notes 391-405 and accompanying text for a discussion and analysis of Schor. See also 5
U.S.C. § 704 (1982) (APA requirement for final agency action prior to judicial review).
480. 50 Fed. Reg. 48,978 (1985). In explaining the proposed regulations, the Board
stated that in FSLI.C's experience "many claims can be described and presented without
difficulty by submitting a simple claim form .... [I]n some cases involving more complex
claims, a substantial amount of additional information is necessary . . . . Therefore,
§ 569c.7(c)(2) provides that the receiver may require submission of additional evidence in
written form." Id. (citing proposed regulation § 569c.7(c)(2) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R.
§ 568c.7(c)(2»). See also supra note 54 for description of current claims procedures which
the proposed regulation is to codify.
481. Morrison-Knudsen is an example of a complicated claim with all the many par
ties, original and impleaded, and many claims, counter-claims, and cross-claims.
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The Best Non-Adjudicatory Claims Procedure

The best non-adjudicatory process would involve procedures that
encourage FSLIC and the creditor to reach an agreement, whereby
either FSLIC accepts the claim or FSLIC and the creditor settle or
compromise. If the parties fail to agree, the creditor could appeal to
the Bo~d, giving the agency a chance to correct any errors itself. If
the creditor and the Board still cannot reach an agreement, the credi
tor could file a court claim. This is how the Morrison-Knud~en court
viewed the current claims and appeals procedures. 482
Because the procedure is non-adjudicatory, it presents no due
process or Northern Pipeline concerns. The doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies would apply.483 A court would require ex
haustion unless there are factors present which would make this inap
propriate. Those factors are:
whether resort to the administrative process would be futile,
whether the administrative process is well understood and well de
veloped, whether a prompt decision as to all of the contested issues
in the case is likely, whether an exhaustion requirement would be
fair to the parties in light of their resources, whether it would be fair
to other parties in the case whose interests might be affected,
whether the interests of judicial economy would be served by re
quiring exhaustion, and whether the agency demonstrates that not
requiring exhaustion would unduly interfere with its functioning. 484
Although most of these factors involve a case-by-case determina
tion, regulations and procedures could limit the occasions where a
court would not require exhaustion. The promptness of the decision is
a matter that could be controlled completely by regulation. The
Board could "demonstrate[] that not requiring exhaustion would un
duly interfere with its functioning."48s FSLIC has argued forcefully
that exhaustion is necessary to an orderly and efficient receivership
proceeding. 486 Furthermore, an exhaustion requirement serves judi
cial economy because only those cases that need to be litigated end up
in court.487 By developing a separate administrative procedure for
482. Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1223-24.
483. Id. at 1223.
484. Id. at 1223-24. See supra notes 135-40 and accompanying text for a discussion
of these factors as applied to the facts of Morrison-Knudsen.
485. [d.
486. FSLIC's Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion of Appropriateness for Rehear
ing in Bane at 3-6, Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. CHG Int'l, Inc., 811 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir.
1987).
487. Id. at 4.
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claims arising under FSLIC's enabling statute or Board regulation, the
Board or Congress could improve considerably the administrative pro
cess, and increase understanding of it.488 The other factors are factu
ally based, and no amount of regulation will prevent them from
occurring.
In the vast majority of cases, courts should and would require
exhaustion. The few situations where a court might not require ex
haustion would involve cases where requiring exhaustion would either
contravene the stated policy goals of FSLIC, or resUlt in unreasonable
unfairness to the creditor. 489 The judicial doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies, if properly applied, would serve the interests
of both the agency and the individual.
C.

The Best Claims Procedure

The best claims procedure is a non-adjudicatory one. Although
both the best adjudicatory and non-adjudicatory claims procedures
would protect the constitutional rights of the parties effectively, the
best non-adjudicatory claims procedure better serves the stated policy
goals of FSLIC.490 Because it is non-adjudicatory, courts would re
quire exhaustion of administrative remedies absent special and unu
sual circumstances. As argued previously, if FSLIC had to choose
488. The Hudspeth court never acknowledged the distinction between state Jaw
claims and claims arising out of FSLIC's enabling statute or a Board regulation. Had the
court acknowledged the difference, it might have confined its holding to the receivership
claims at issue in Hudspeth, which were challenges to FSLIC's determination to repudiate
Hudspeth's contract and freeze him out. See supra notes 77-90 and accompanying text for
facts of Hudspeth. If the court had confined its holding to receivership claims, Hudspeth
would not have controlled the courts' subsequent decisions involving state laW-based claims
like the ones at issue in Coit, and the court would have had to approach the issue of FSLlC
exclusive adjudication of state Jaw claims on the merits. See supra note 144 for the facts of
Coit.
By developing different claim resolution procedures for the different types of claims,
courts will be better able to determine when it is appropriate to require exhaustion of ad
ministrative remedies.
489. For example, suppose a creditor and a savings and loan association are in court
nearly finished litigating a contract claim when the Board places the association in receiver
ship and appoints FSLIC receiver. A court might be inclined not to require exhaustion for
the following reasons: 1) there already was a failure to come to an understanding, which
makes it less likely that the creditor and FSLIC would come to terms, and thus the admin
istrative process is likely to be futile; 2) it would be a significant drain on the resources of
both parties to dismiss a case so near its resolution; 3) it would be a waste of judicial
resources, especially if the case is likely to reach a court once administrative remedies are
exhausted; and 4) the court was near to deciding the contested issues. Requiring exhaus
tion in this case would not serve either the creditor's or FSLIC's interest.
490. Exclusive FSLlC adjudication best serves the stated policy goals of the FSLlC,
but is unconstitutional. See section IV A for the discussion of the Northern Pipeline issue.
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and it does-it should give up any adjudicatory power in exchange for
the exhaustion requirement. 491 Under a non-adjudicatory claims pro
cedure, FSLIC could settle most claims informally and inexpensively.
Both sides would have an economic incentive to settle in order to
avoid litigation, and only those claimants with real controversies
would end up in court.
In an adjudicatory FSLIC claims procedure, FSLIC would have
much less control over the receivership. With creditors free to bring a
court action, FSLIC would be adjudicating some claims and defending
other claims in court. Furthermore, a FSLIC adjudicatory scheme
would be more expensive than a non-adjudicatory scheme. First, the
required neutral decisionmaker is an added expense. Second, the legal
costs involved in defending the receivership estate in court against
claimants who select court adjudication might be significant. The re
ceivership process in an adjudicatory claims procedure is likely to be a
lengthy one. Presumably, more claims would be adjudicated in courts
in an adjudicatory FSLIC claims procedure than would be adjudicated
in a non-adjudicatory claims procedure. In a non-adjudicatory claims
procedure, most claims first would be presented to FSLIC. FSLIC's
initial claims procedure takes a maximum total of 270 days from the
date notice is published to the date that FSLIC must make its d!!termi
nation. 492 The creditor must file a claim with the receiver within
ninety days of notice. 493 If the creditor in an adjudicatory claims pro
cedure were permitted to either file a claim with the receiver for
FSLIC adjudication or file a court claim within 90 days, the maximum
total of days for FSLIC adjudication would still be 270 days, but the
maximum number of days for court adjudication is indeterminate, and
the average number of days certainly would be longer. Thus, a non
adjudicatory claims procedure is less expensive and more efficient than
an adjudicatory procedure and better serves the stated policy concerns
of FSLIC.
CONCLUSION

The Morrison-Knudsen court correctly determined that FSLIC
does not have congressionally mandated adjudicatory authority; Con
gress did not explicitly or implicitly empower FSLIC with adjudica
491. FSLlC placed failure to require exhaustion first on its list of "most troublesome
errors" made by the Morrison-Knudsen court. FSLlC's Petition for Rehearing and Sugges
tion of Appropriateness for Rehearing in Banc at 2, Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. CHG Int'l,
Inc., 811 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 1987). See also id. at 3-5.
492. See supra note 54 for FSLlC claims procedures.
493. Id.
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tory authority, and such authority is not established by the current or
proposed Board regulations. The Morrison-Knudsen court, however,
incorrectly held that Congress intended FSLIC to have no adjudica
tory authority. A better-reasoned conclusion is that Congress neither
required nor forbade FSLIC adjudication. Accordingly, the Hudspeth
court is incorrect in holding that Congress empowered FSLIC with
exclusive power to adjudicate creditor claims, and is incorrect in hold
ing that the regulations actually establish that authority.
According to Morrison-Knudsen, the Board does not have the
power to promulgate rules that would establish FSLIC adjudication
because Congress intended that FSLIC not adjudicate. Thus, while a
constitutionally sound FSLIC adjudicatory scheme is possible, it must
be authorized by an act of Congress. This comment has explored an
alternative view that the Board may, through rulemaking procedures,
empower FSLIC with adjudicatory authority without an act of
Congress.
Whether congressionally-enacted or Board-promulgated, a
FSLIC adjudicatory scheme must be constitutionally sound. Such a
scheme must be non-exclusive, provide a neutral decisionmaker, and,
perhaps, provide the claimant with more than ordinary judicial re
view. While an adjudicatory FSLIC claims procedure would remain
largely intact, FSLIC would not have the exclusivity of remedy that
FSLIC asserts is necessary. A non-adjudicatory claims procedure
would serve FSLIC's interests more effectively. FSLIC would control
the settlement procedure and have the chance to come to terms with
the creditor prior to any court litigation. Under the judicial doctrine
of exhaustion of administrative remedies, courts generally will require
exhaustion. However, unless Congress provides through statutes that
FSLIC has an exclusive remedy, a court may not require exhaustion of
administrative remedies in particular cases. The more comprehensive
the claims procedure is, the more probable a court will require
exhaustion.
Sidney Mannheim Jubien

